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Editorial Note: Aldersgate Time
1988 is Aldersgate year.
Methodists and other Wesleyans
remember, celebrate and praise Wesley's experience on the evening
of May 24, 1738. To the surprise of many, Wesley suddenly seems
to be "in." During the latter part of the nineteenth century and
the beginning of the twentieth, there emerged Wesley "biographies"
both here and there, with contents more hagiographical than
biographical. Around the middle of our century the reaction was
clear: John Wesley was slowly relegated to the dark chambers of
dust and forgottenness. When I, in the early sixties, did graduate
work in the theology of John Wesley at one of the United
Methodist Universities which had excellent collections of Wesley
material, we were only three working in that area, none of us
American. Today, however, a new generation of young Wesley
sc holars are emerging in the U .S. Celebrations such as mentioned
above, are no longer frowned upon. What has happened ? Does
John Wesley have anything to contribute to our lives as Christians
today? Or, as others may say, have we fallen prey to the pleasant
attractions of romanticized hagiography--although we appear to
have lost the much condemned (by some) and praised (by others)
triumphalism that seemed to be firmly yoked with the
hagiographical emphasis?
I wrote twenty years ago:
Modern Methodism, for all practical purposes, must be
considered Pelagian, with little spiritual power and very
limited intercourse with God in the lives of the individuals.
The sacraments have become "empty," mere signs; the Word
has lost the high place it should have in the devotional life of
the believer, and prayer has often become purely formalistic
or non-existent.
On the background of such a situation ,
which, of course, will admit of exceptions, the need for a
rediscovery of Wesley's basic emphasis is urgently needed .
The basic lack of God-given-spiritual power will demand that
the means of grace again be given, not reverence , but a
dynamic function in the common, as well as in th e private,
life. Only through a disciplined use of these means, springing
out of hearts longing to see their people and their church
arise with new spiritual vigor, can the great task of ren ewal
be made possible. Wesley's emphasis upon God's work and
initiative, coupled with man's responsibility, will serve as a
much-needed corrective to our self-sufficient, middle-class,
work righteousness.
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I do not think I would say anything different if I had to write
on the same topic today. I would just add that this concerns not
only Methodism, but also other expressions of the Christian faith.
I believe Wesley is highly relevant for us today, for several
reaso ns. First, his theology is a "theology of the center" : He keeps
in a fruitful tension and balance such key doctrines as
sanctification/ justification; spiritual/ practical; personal/ communal;
the need for spiritual experience/ the necessity for using the means
of grace; practical, concrete life/ a holy life; God's grace/ human
works and response; and much more.
Secondly, perhaps more importantly, we must recapture the
preaching of and the witnessing to sin and grace , God's forgiving
love, and our greatful response in commitment to Jesus Christ as
our Lord. As a consequence, the longing search for the fullness of
this grace must emerge as holiness, our being sanctified through
faith, which again is working through love, in service to God and
neighbor.
Finally, if we are to avoid the shoals of neglect, indifference or,
as Wesley called it, "enthusiasm" (fanaticism, i.e ., believing one can
reach the goal without the means), and escape the dark caves of
closed sacerdotalism, we'd better pay close attention to Wesley's
guidance.
I also wrote 20 years ago:
Without a recovery, not necessarily of the conceptual
framework and practice, but of the substance of Wesley's
theology of the sacraments and the means of grace, the future
of the Methodist Church as the living body of Christ is rather
doubtful.. .. The distinction between "evangelicalism and
'sacramentalism' must never be applied to Wesley. For him
these two aspects were one, and later Methodism has paid
dearly for tearing apart what God has united."
Is John Wesley relevant for today? Yes, indeed, he is.
BISHOP OLE BORGEN
Northern European Area, The United Methodist Church
Visiting Lecturer, Asbury Theological Seminary
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The Conversion of the Wesleys
--1738 Reconsidered
JOHN LAWSON
John Wesley's famous definition of evangelical saving faith
occurs towards the beginning of his Standard S ermons: "It is not
barely a speculative rational thing, a cold, Iifeless assent, a train of
ideas in the head; but also a disposition of the heart." (Sermon
Here are two qualities in principle distinct one from
I.i.4.)
another, yet in authentic Christian experience inseparably
connected. There is first the rational basis of Christian faith, " a
train of ideas in the head." This is something reliable, which can
be learned, argued about, and to which rational and responsible
assent can be given . And built upon this foundation, or rathe r,
flowering from this root, there is " a disposition of the heart." This
is the mysterious gift of God, and is immediate and personal. One
can by wise teaching be persuaded to desire it, but one cannot by
learning come to possess it. It is a gift.
That th is must be so springs from the circumstance that our
Christian faith is an historic faith, and also a life of present
fellowship with a living personal Savior. Most certainly our faith
is not based on subjective feelings .
We totally repudiate the
seductive suggestion of unbelief that religion took its origin in the
fact that our primitive ancestors woke to consciousness in a
mysterious world full of uncanny dangers, and found a compelling
psychological need to imagine a protective "father figure" to
This article was first d elivered as the annual lecture of the Wesley
Fellowship in Britain, and is released for publication in America by
that S ociety. Further tex ts of the hymns discussed in this article,
and the texts of other important Wesley hymns. are printed and
commented on , with full analysis of the Scripture references in
them. in The Wesley Hymns as a Guide to Scriptural Teaching
(written by John Lawson. published by Zondervan.)

John Lawson, MA., B.D., B.Sc., was a Methodist circuit minister in England for
twenty years, preceding twenty-one years as a professor at Candler School of
Th eology, Em ory University, A tlanta, Georgia. He is retired and lives in England.
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supply a sense of security, and that we believers still cling to the
idea of God because we desire comfort in a tragic and dangerous
world . The foundation of Christian faith is rational knowledge of
God's saving acts performed upon the plane of history.
The Old Testament contains the record of God's choice of His
Chosen People, and of His discipline of them through histo ric
experience and the teaching of the prophets, until there was a
people and a time prepared for the coming of Christ. Thus the Old
Testament speaks of Christ, and is Christian , as well as Hebrew
Scripture. In the New Testament there is witness to those historic
facts about Christ which are requisite to the preaching of the
gospel--His birth, character, teaching, acts, death and resurrection .
In the New Testament, also, there is the first formative and
autho r itat ive interpretation of the theological and spiritual meaning
of these facts, through the influence of the Holy Spirit. Thus in
Scripture there is the essential foundation of all doctrine.
If Scripture gives a clear witness to some point of belief, then to
the Christian that is definitive, final. Yet how is Scripture to be
interpreted? This is not purely an individual concern . The reliable
interpretatio n of Scripture requires, under the guidance of the
Spirit, the consensus of thought of long centuries of Christian
experience from that first day to this, among men and women of
man y and various gifts and temperaments, social and c ultural
backgrounds.
In the broad sense, then, Scripture is to be
interpreted through tradition. Yet there is also a place for reason,
for "a three-fold cord is not quickly broken." The interpreters in
the Ch urch must not only be devout, reverent and Spirit-guided-though that is essential if they are to discern truth in Scrip ture-they must also be informed in sacred learning. Nor are C hrist ians
antiquarians, who love a position simply because it is ve nerable and
acc ustomed. Tradition as well as exposition must be put through
the sieve of reason.
All this, however, though the indispensable found ation of faith,
is not more than "a train of ideas in the head ." It is a body of
be lief me riting intellectual assent, though it must not be ass um ed
that this assent is "cold and lifeless." It may well be a matter of
profound and si ncere conviction. Nevertheless , the bod y of reliable
scriptural belief only becomes full , evangelical faith, " the faith that
worketh b y love," when it captivates the heart and the imagination
as well as the mind, when it moves the affections and emotions in
such a way as to stir the moral will to action.
It is at this point that mention must be made of the c herished
evangelical principle of "the open Bible." We judge that this is not
to be take n to mean that the uninstructed Christian man or woman
can, as an isolated individual in a private corner, divine all sound

The

of the Wesleys--1738 Reconsidered

9

doctrine from the Bible. "The open Bible" belongs to the sphere
of public and private devotion, of worship and prayer, rather than
of theological instruction. It is the experience of Christian people
that if the sincere searcher, coming to the Bible with the eyes of a
modicum of informed Christian belief, reads in the attitude of
reverent devotion, then the Holy Spirit can visit with the blessed
experience that a text lights up with spiritual illumination. Our
Lord, as it were, "steps out of the page," and brings to the heart
the personal experience of His living presence, and of love shed
abroad . The grand case in point is that formative pioneers of the
evangelical way, such as St. Augustine, Luther and Wesley, came to
their liberating experience through Scripture in just this way. Here
is the mandate for all searchers to read the Bible, and to hear it
preached.
It is a familiar truth that whereas the thinking mind, with its
intelligent convictions, is the rudder on the ship, the engine which
moves the human will to effective action lies in the emotions.
Thus both parts are necessary. A Christian and scriptural "train of
ideas in the head," though of itself an excellent thing, may of itself
constitute only a sincere but powerless religion . It is uncharitable
to say of such a believer that he or she is not treading in the paths
of Christian salvation. However, such a one will not enjoy the
peace of mind and joy in God which is the good purpose of God
for His children. Even more of importance, such a one will not be
fully equipped to be an effective and winning witness to the
Christian gospel. In the last resort, the divine purpose in "a full
personal experience of Christ" is not to make us happy, but to
make us useful to God. On the other hand, to be possessed in
imagination and emotion without a secure grounding in authentic
Christian and scriptural knowledge is to have an engine without a
rudder.
This sort of religion is at best weak Christian
sentimentality, at worst, the perilous path of fanaticism .
Those who are wise enough to wish for Christian instruction
have something which they can usefully do. They can follow the
example of the "more noble" people of Berea who, having
"received the word" under the guidance of apostles "searched the
scriptures daily, whether these things were so" (Acts 17: 11 ).
However, those who are painfully aware of the poverty of their
personal experience cannot hope to improve themselves by their
own efforts. There is no profit for the heart to say within itself:
"Oh, I ought to have more sense of the presence of God, more
delight in prayer, more love to men and women round about me,"
and to repeat desperately a hundred times: "Oh, I ought! Oh, I
ought! Oh, I ought!" To seek to work oneself up into an
experience is the path to artificiality, and thence perhaps to
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despair. A man who is distressed to find that his marriage is
threatened has some things which he can try to do, and which he
can rightly do. He can try to be understanding to his wife, to be
courteous, to be just, to be forgiving . But he cannot try to love,
for the spring of pure personal affection is spontaneous. And so it
is with our standing before God. If all we had to do to please God
was to obey Him, the more fortunate among us in temperament,
habits and background might at a pinch try to save ourselves. But
God requires obedience for the sake of love. Whereas we can try
to make ourselves obey, we cannot, by trying, make ourselves love.
This is why there is so little use in conventional exhortations that
we ought to love God and our neighbor. And this is the essential
Divine grace is not merely
reason why salvation is by grace.
assistance to make it easier to do something which if we try hard
we can do for ourselves. It is the power of God to do for us what
we cannot do. All we can do if we would be granted the "full
personal experience of Christ" is to wait upon God for Him to
bestow His "unspeakable gift," in the time and in the measure
adapted to our need.
And we are to wait upon God not in
indiscipline, but in the appointed means of grace, expectantly using
them, but not trusting them. Many well-intentioned plans for
evangelism have miscarried at that point. Some have supposed that
the Church can by its devotional efforts work itself up to the point
when it can, as it were, constrain the "showers of blessing ." This
is a subtle branch of salvation by works. We cannot go through "a
great door and effectual" to the work of God, however much we
desire, unless God opens it, and leads us through.
A great example of these principles is the evangelical experience
of the Wesleys. It is often assumed that the "formal Churchmen"
of the Holy Club did not understand evangelical doctrine. It is
said that by the Aldersgate Street experience they were brought to
a new form of doctrine. This is clearly an exaggeration. John
Wesley does indeed express surprise when, in conversation with the
Moravians, he came across the idea of instantaneous conversion not
as something limited to the apostolic or ancient Church , but as a
matter of present experience . He was also surprised, and deeply
impressed, at testimonies to abounding peace , and joy in the Lord
(cf. Journal, April 21, 1738). However, these are things connected
with "the disposition of the heart," the apprehension of Christian
truth in personal experience.
They are matters of spiritual
devotion rather than the body of doctrine properly so called.
John Wesley had been brought up to accept that salvation is by
the grace of God , and had always accepted the doctrine of
justification by faith. These truths are enunciated in the Articles
and Homilies of the Church of England, which he regularly cites as
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the authoritative standards of "our own church." The element
which was revolutionary was the notion that one could venture
outside the decent and disciplined confines of the Church with this
gospel. The mind of Wesley is revealed in the celebrated and
moving testimony recorded in the Journal for March 4-6, 1738.
He writes: "Peter Bohler, by whom (in the hand of the great God)
I was, on Sunday the 5th clearly convinced of unbelief; of the want
of that faith whereby alone we are saved."
That was the
immediate impression, candidly recorded. Yet when he got round
to publishing for the guidance of his people, there is the later
footnote added and also candidly recorded, reflecting a more
considered verdict: "whereby alone we are saved - with the full
Christian salvation." So there are in fact degrees of faith, even
degrees of authentic justifying faith (cf. Journal December 31,
1739). The "unbelier• of which he was convinced was not
resistance to sound doctrine, but inability to "feel."
The response to Bohler's famous challenge "Preach faith till you
have it; and then, because you have it you will preach faith" is " I
began preaching this new doctrine, though my soul started back
from the work. The first person to whom I offered salvation by
faith alone, was a prisoner under sentence of death ." What, may
we ask, was "the new doctrine?" Hardly, "justification by faith,"
considered formally as a doctrinal position. Possibly the emphasis
"alone" was a new note. However, the sense of the passage surely
is that the chief thing which was new was the notion that one
could take justification by faith to a man who was in the desperate
condition of Clifford, awaiting execution. "My soul started back
from the work" because until that time he had been "a zealous
asserter of the impossibility of a death- bed repentance." What was
coming new to Wesley was an engagement of the heart, more than
a conviction of the theological mind.
The same point arises in connection with Wesley's preaching of
holiness. We are familiar with the proposition that Wesley regarded
it as the distinctive mission of Methodism "to spread scriptural
holiness throughout the land." It is significant that he always
sought to vindicate the truth of his preaching by demonstrating
that the doctrine was not new. It was part of the original tradition,
and he himself had always upheld it. Here is an example of the
gulf between the modern "liberal" theological mind and the
traditionalist mind of Wesley. Nowadays a scholar commonly seeks
to establish his credentials by affirming that he is abreast of the
latest developments. To Wesley the mark of a true doctrine was
that it was old, as was the manner of the writers of the ancient
Church. So he rejoices to find "Perfect Love" in the good old
Book of Common Prayer, citing the Collect for Purity. He points
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out that he lived in pursuit of holiness as an Oxford student, long
before Aldersgate Street.
Surely there is something of this behind the dialogue recorded in
the Journal for November 25, 1739, of Wesley's first visit to
Exeter. He preached in the beautiful Norman Church of St. Mary's
Arches, just 'round the corner from the Mint Methodist, where I
worship. He writes, in the morning "I preached at St. Mary's, on,
'The Kingdom of God is not meat and drink; but righteousness,
and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost.' [We may deduce the gist of
what he said from Sermon VII: Real religion is not common
honesty, regular church attendance and almsgiving, but inward
holiness, and joy in God.] Dr. Wight told me, after sermon, 'Sir,
you must not preach in the afternoon. Not,' said he, 'that you
preach any false doctrine. I allow all that you have said is true;
and it is the doctrine of the Church of England. But it is not
guarded; it is dangerous; it may lead people into enthusiasm or
despair.' " (And the nature of these objections is appropriately laid
out in Sermon l.iii .3-7.)
Wesley was doubtless gratified that
Prebendary Wight had sufficient knowledge and candor to
recognize that what had been preached was not an innovation,
considered as a body of doctrine. What was new and disturbing
was the way in which he said it! It was the application from the
heart to the heart.
We are aware of the intangible but potent difference bet ween
evangelical doctrine as sincerely accepted by the mind and as
captivating the heart. It is sadly possible to be an E vangelical in
the one sense, but not evangelical in the other. I remember many
years ago my honored tutor, that learned and evangelical soul; Dr.
R. Newton Flew, was disconcerted by my confession that I
sometimes felt reserve in singing the well-loved lines:
My chains fell off, my heart was free;
I rose, went forth , and followed thee .
What I was feeling after was this. Here was I, a young ma n of a n
evangelical background, who had, thank God, as a youth come to a
genuine conversion experience, and who was an entire ly si ncere
believer in and preacher of "our doctrines." Nevertheless, as I
read the moving testimony of the Wesleys I was painfully aware
that my personal experience and my evangelistic passion were lowkey compared to that of my heroes. And this was not because in
anything I had consciously been disobedient to the heavenly vision.
It was simply the effect of my personality and the times in wh ich I
lived. It has been my joy and pride to be a preacher of the gospel,
and a Methodist minister. I look back on the work I have done,
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with its modest success, with sincere satisfaction. In my early days
I desired with a great desire that God would powerfully use me in
the revival of His work, yet somehow He never laid His hand on
me in quite that manner. So after these years I have to accept that
in character and gifts and calling I am what I am, and not someone
else I might wish to be, because God has made me that way.
Surely, this is where our Church now is.
We know that
emasculated and unevangelical doctrine sadly flourishes in some
quarters of the Church. It is important, I think, that friends of
evangelical truth should take an informed and a charitable
judgment of this phenomenon. It does not generally spring from
carelessness for the truth, or conscious hypocrisy. The fact is that
if one's personal experience, and experience of preaching, makes
evangelical fervor hard to sustain, evangelical doctrine gradually
ceases to be credible. If one's sense of God has grown dim, it is
hard to speak convincingly about the Living God. It is easy to
refer to "the ground of being," a phrase not false in itself, but
inadequate. It is more congenial to speak of Jesus as a great
teacher, which He is, than as an atonement. Not a few teachers
coming from a Christian background, and sincerely wishing still to
call themselves Christians, have discovered that with the passage of
years , "the faithless coldness of the times," and the prevailing
intellectual atmosphere of the secular world have gradually chilled
down both themselves and their congregations.
So they
instinctively seek to make Christianity easier to believe by halfbelieving men and women by lightening the load of doctrine. This
is a fatal step, which makes the ailment worse. So we judge that
"reconstructed" theology is not the faith of the future being
creatively pioneered, as some would assure us.
It is residual
Christian faith, sincere so far as it goes, but faith observed in
process of dissolution, like the Cheshire Cat gradually vanishing,
until in some extreme cases only the grin is left. The only remedy
is one provided by God, namely, widespread spiritual revival, such
as will produce more and more convinced and convincing
preachers, and congregations prepared to respond. This is what
happened before. The revivals of spiritual devotion which marked
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries dispelled the miasma of
latitudinarianism, Deism and thinly disguised Unitarianism, which
had so widely prevailed, and restored to credibility the traditional
doctrine.
Some will accuse my own Methodist Church of evangelical
decay.
It is my distinct impression, gained from helping to

examine candidates for the preachers' plan, and for the ministry,
and from working with local preachers in their studies, that the
great majority of those who offer themselves have a genuine

14

Lawson

personal experience of Christ, and an authentic sense of divine call .
When, synod by synod, we Methodist ministers acknowledge that
we believe and preach our doctrines, I think in the main this is
true. Our difficulty is that, though our hearts have been touched,
they are not sufficiently engaged. It is hard for even the most
resolute preacher to live and minister unaffected by the world in
which we live. So we sing:
Enlarge, inflame, and fill my heart
With boundless charity divine;
but we do not always expect the prayer to be answered because our
expectations have been lowered by the experience of apathy in our
hearers. However, this is not the end , because "there is a God in
heaven." If His witnesses are faithful in bad times as well as good
He can work " His work, His strange work." So we have to wait
upon Him in believing prayer, though our cry is bound to be "O
Lord, how long!"
This expectation is in fact our confidence. We cannot hope to
outbid the massive apparatus of the secular world in resources for
propaganda . If competition of that sort were our only hope we
should indeed have arrived in "the post-Christian era." We cannot
forget that that is just what intelligent and sympathetic observers
were saying of England when the events we commemorate were
taking place. Joseph Butler, Bishop of Bristol, was the most
learned defender of the Christian faith in his day. When invited to
become Archbishop of Canterbury, he declined, on the ground that
"I have not strength to support a falling Church." That is what it
looked like in a day of frequent emasculated doctrine, relaxed
discipline and small congregations. Yet during that time there
endured God's righteous remnant in the Church, and God was
preparing His secret weapon. It is sad that the good and wise
bishop could not see the signs of the times, and was repelled by the
teaching of Wesley. On a famous occasion he said to Wesley: "Sir,
the pretending to extraordinary revelations and gifts of the Holy
Ghost is a horrid thing, a very horrid thing." He had his case, for
there were some pretenders to divine inspiration of which this was
true, just as there are in Britain today. The difference was that
Wesley was securely grounded in scriptural doctrine and the
discipline of the Church. His father and mother were of that
righteous remnant. So he possessed the reliable "train of ideas in
the head" as well as "the disposition of the heart." This is why his
claim to "the witness of the Spirit" was not individualist,
subjective and "extraordinary." The wise evangelical will not be
too hasty in questioning the right of the Holy Spirit to work
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salvation through eccentric sects, even if they are disapproved.
Me will ye mete with reason's line?
Or teach My grace how far to move?
Nevertheless, the historic experience of the Church shows that the
substantial, the lasting, the truly beneficial revivals of spiritual
religion have not taken place through individualist sects nourished
on partial truths, but through "the true Church within the
Church."
The natural instinct of impatient groups of zealous
revivalists to despair of the Great Church and to break away, has
often proved to be one of "Satan's devices" in frustrating revival.
In line with this we observe that Wesley's preaching of holiness
was not new. It had a background in reliable Christian tradition.
John Wesley was essentially a High Churchman turned evangelist,
and the traditionalist High Churchman had a reverence for
Christian antiquity. The young Wesley read, and found much to
admire in, such writers of the ancient Church as Clement of
Alexandria, and some of the ascetic writers such as "Macarius."
He also studied some of the devotional writings of the Roman
Church of later times. This historic tradition had a place for
"perfection," and the holy life, though we have with all respect to
say that it was often a flawed tradition. St. Anthony of Egypt was
one converted through hearing the reading of Scripture. His text,
which became the sheet-anchor of monasticism, was the words of
our Lord to the rich young man who had kept all the regular
commandments: "If thou wilt be perfect, go and sell all that thou
hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven:
and come and follow me"
(Matthew 19:21 ). Out of this was
derived the idea of a double standard of Christian morality.
The notion of a double standard is offensive to the doctrine of
salvation by grace, for it savors of the notion of the merit of good
works. At the same time, it appears to be a common-sense idea,
for it is a matter of plain experience that in the Christian
community there are always a few ardent souls who seem called by
God to a more fully committed life of service, and a great many
other essentially well-intentioned people who do not seem to have
it in them to embark upon the more heroic course. So it was
traditionally taught that God has given the "evangelical precepts"
for the guidance of the general body of believers, and the higher
"counsels of perfection" for those who are called thereto, and
given grace sufficient to follow them. This distinction extended to

all spheres of human life. For example, in the matter of property,
God has, since the Fall, allowed to sinful men and women the
institution of private property, and the social distinctions which
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flow from it. The reason for this is that unregenerate men will
only care for what is their own, which appears to be a realistic
judgment upon common human nature! However, those who would
anticipate on earth something of the life of heaven, and who have
the grace and spiritual vocation for it, can embrace the higher life
of the communal property and individual poverty of a religious
order. So in the matter of sex, the evangelical precept is the holy
estate of matrimony, instituted by God, for one man and one
woman "till death us do part," with a calling to bear and nurture
Christian children. And the higher way for the few is the celibate
life, married to Christ and His Church.
This doctrine has the advantage that it sets no limit on the
power of grace "to save to the uttermost." It is possible by grace
to live a life entirely devoted to the service of God. It is a salutary
discipline that this ideal should be affirmed. The flaw in the
scheme is that it appears to place a barrier between the holy life ,
and the home and workshop. The fatal implication that more can
be expected of folk like monks and nuns, or perhaps the clergy in
general, is that not too much can be expected of "ordinary people."
If the general body of men and women who have homes, spouses,
children and a living to earn in a hard world are made to feel that
they are condemned to a life of inevitable moral compromise, the y
will cease to aspire to the highest. The common-sense attitude of a
double standard "lowers the sights" of spiritual expectation.
Classic Reformation doctrine represents a natural strong reaction
against this venerable system. The young Martin Luther, caught in
an emergency by the sudden fear that he might die without being
fortified by the Last Rites, made the typical medieval reaction of
one who would devote himself entirely to God . To make sure of
his salvation he embarked upon the counsels of perfection , and
entered a monastic order. The change of times is discerned in that
he found deep spiritual frustration in this course of life. There
were many things which the young monk found he could do by the
exercise of disciplined will. He could excel all the other yo ung
monks in his zeal for keeping the rules of monastic devotion.
However, there was one thing he could not do. He could not make
himself love God, in the way he knew God ought to be loved . He
was moved to obedience too much by hope of celestial reward , and
fear of punishment.
Most sincere but conventional minds are more or less content if
they find that they can keep the usual rules of religion. They are
not too deeply concerned to look minutely within.
However,
Luther was different. Being a man of spiritual genius, he had
grace and sense to discern that his condition was deepl y
unsatisfactory in the sight of God. To please God he must not
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only obey. He must obey for the right reason, from the heart. So
in the end, when God mysteriously visited him with "the
o'erwhelming power of saving grace," and set him free from his
bondage, Luther very naturally turned strongly against the whole
Talk of "perfection"
conception of counsels of perfection.
reflected a totally inadequate estimate of the fallen character of
human nature, and of the impossibility of doing anything to please
God by one's own moral resolve. So far, so good: we accept this
Lutheran position. However, there is in it concealed a flaw .
It would, we judge, be unsympathetic to condemn Luther
himself at this point. The phrase we are later to quote from him in
relation to Wesley's evangelical experience is a clear affirmation of
the true evangelical position that saving faith must of necessity
produce moral good works. However, there is in Luther an
element of rugged paradox, and phrases which have sometimes
been misunderstood by those who have proclaimed themselves his
followers. The Reformation proposition simul justus et peccator
(i.e., that the Christian believer is "at the same time justified and a
sinner") is intended as no more than a statement of the truth that
those justified by faith still need to pray for forgiveness.
However, it can be allowed to slip into a degraded sense , namely,
that it is not absolutely necessary for the believer to bring forth the
good works of faith in order to be accepted by God. The bare
transaction of the atonement is sufficient for divine acceptance,
without a moral change in the believer. "Just as I am," taken in
the sense "In my hand no price I bring; Simply to Thy cross I
cling," involves the separation of justification and sanctification.
This also is a fatal "lowering of the sights" of moral expectation,
in another direction. The common-sense attitude among quite
sincere believers that "after all , no one of us is perfect" can
convey the implication that even in believers some degree of
deliberate moral compromise is in principle inevitable, human
nature and the world we live in being what they are. This is to
deny the power of God "to save to the uttermost."
Between these two extremes we find Wesley, the High
Churchman turned evangelist, occupying a prudent and moderate
middle ground. No one could be plainer than he in witnessing to
salvation by grace, through faith, and in excluding all thought of
the merit of good works. Herein he is clearly on the Reformation
side. Yet to him "perfection" is not an opprobrious word. He
boldly restores it to a place of honor. And he is most vigilant to
guard the preaching of salvation by grace from antinomianism-that is to say, from the notion that free divine forgiveness in some
way releases the believer from the absolute duty of obeying the
moral law of God . So, following the devotional writers of the
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ancient tradition, he is not afraid to talk about "perfection" and
"holiness" as the only proper aim in life for the earnest Christian
disciple. Yet in Wesley there is no flawed double standard, as
between the cloister and the hearth.
There is no place for
"counsels of perfection" in practice limited to religious orders, or
to the clergy. Wesley upholds a sternly Puritan holiness, but not an
ascetic holiness.
In Wesley's teaching, all "ordinary" believers, if they will but
fully trust their Savior, are called to the highest imaginable, even if
they are surrounded by the pleasures and cares of home and famil y
life, and by the thronging concerns of earning a living in the busy
world. This life of austere religious discipline is called upon boldly
to witness against all the sins and follies and moral compromises of
the secular order, in hope of reforming the whole life of the
nation. Anyone who reads documents such as The Rules of the
Society, and sermons such as "The Use of Money" (44), "On
Spiritual Idolatry" (78),"0n Dissipation" (79), "On Friendship with
the World" (80), "The Danger of Riches" (87), "On Dress" (88),
"On Redeeming the Time" (93), and "On Pleasing all Men" ( l 00),
will be aware that Wesley's ideal for the Methodist Society was that
of a kind of "married monasticism," which should present to the
world the sort of challenge mounted by the monastic orders, but
organized from the basis of the home, the market and the
workshop, not the convent. The true Methodist was to be set apart
from society just as clearly as were the members of a religious
order, or the early Quakers, or the Mennonites, by their regular
devotions, close fellowship, plain dress and austere manner of life,
industry and economy, and plain-spoken rebuke of the mores and
manners of the community. And this was the outward expression
of inward holiness.
Do we say of this ideal, as of the Charge of the Light Brigade,
"It is magnificent, but it is not war"? Is this asking too much of
human nature? Was the cooling down of institutional Methodism
into a denomination of "respectable" but Puritan manners
inevitable? Perhaps in the world of practical affairs it was. The
irony of the situation is that Wesley was commonly dismissed as an
extremist, even as a fanatic . Yet, cooly considered , his doctrine is
the eminently reasonable balance, the salutary comprehension
between extremes. Dr. Outler is surely right in his "Introduction
to Wesley's Theological Foundations" to say that "He was, by talent
and intent, a f o/k-theologian: an eclectic who had mastered the
secret of plastic synthesis, simple profundity .... The elements of his
theology were adapted from many sources" (Library of Protestant
Thought: John Wesley, p. 119.) We do not, however, agree with
the judgment that this position excludes him from "the front
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rank--that select company of systematic thinkers who have
managed to effect major mutation in the Christian mind." "The
faith once committed to the saints" is not seeking "major
mutations," but rather new ways of giving plain statement to old
truths. The renovation of the Christian faith consists in the return
to original positions, including the holding together of diverse
shades of "the manifold wisdom of God" which were in danger of
falling apart in the apprehension of small minds. Wesley's "new
creative synthesis" was creative, but not in fact new, because it
was a return to the position as it was before it was polarized
between Rome and anti-Rome. That is to say, it was scriptural
and apostolical. That Wesley did not appear to so many of that day
to be eminently reasonable and balanced was due to the contrast
between "the train of ideas in the head" and "the disposition of
the heart." Considered as a body of doctrine, the preaching of
perfection is indeed balanced and reasonable. It was the prophetic
conviction with which it came, and the conviction which it evoked,
which was unnerving to conventional minds.
It would appear that the preaching of holiness has sometimes
been brought into discredit by too emotional an approach .
Enthusiastic preachers have encouraged their hearers to expect
some sort of sudden emotional earthquake which would fill them
with ecstasies of joy--and that is the sum of the matter. Clearly, a
firing of the imagination and the affections is a part of the matter.
The dynamic of evangelical perfection is love shed abroad in the
heart, and this of necessity has an emotional content. However,
following Wesley, the primary purpose of the divine gift of
holiness or perfect love is not to make men and women happy, but
to make them morally upright, and fully obedient to God, so that
they may live and serve to His glory. This is an important and
salutary proviso, which will keep the preaching of holiness on a
rational and disciplined track.
Here again is an aspect of the principle that Wesley is a moralist
turned evangelical, and that the evangelical Wesley is a moralist
still. In the great doctrinal sermons on the religion of the heart
there is a constant "war on two fronts." His treatment characteristically has three points. First, he rehearses the praiseworthy
acts of devotion and charity which commonly and conventionally
pass for "religion." This, he says, is not the Christian faith .
Second, the act of faith in appropriating the saving work of God in
Christ is enforced. Third, the praiseworthy acts of charity and
devotion are again rehearsed as essential in the life of the believer,

because they are the necessary fruits of faith. The war on two
fronts is ever carried on against the opposite errors of legality and
antinomianism.
Here is another example of Wesley's central,
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moderate and reasonable position.
A chief reason for Wesley's rejection of the Calvinist theology is
connected with his resistance to antinomianism. A modern liberal
Christian who repudiates Calvinism commonly does so because it
seems to infringe upon the dignity of the human personality, by
denying autonomous free will. We note that Wesley never argues
like this. He is not concerned for the reputation of humanity, but
for the glory of God. Wesley abhors, as a base slur upon God's
justice and goodness, the more extreme doctrine of reprobation ,
that is, that God has positively willed the perdition of those who
are finally lost. There is, however, another point of importance.
One of the chief factors which gave Calvinist preaching its cutting
edge was that it professed a strong doctrine of the assurance of
salvation, based upon the doctrine of the final perseverance of the
saints. This was the teaching that if one was elected to salvation,
and the object of irresistible saving grace, it was impossible finall y
to fall into eternal damnation, even though one might appear
temporarily to slip upon the path of Christian grace.
This
conviction fortified the believer with a most comforting assurance
of salvation.
The element of truth in this position is enshrined in the
traditional lines:
Let me no more my comfort draw
From my frail grasp of Thee;
In this alone rejoice in awe;
Thy mighty grasp of me.
However, Wesley discerned a fatal flaw in the Calvinist
presentation of assurance. It might encourage insensitive people to
suppose that their final salvation was assured solely by the action
of God, and apart from the absolute necessity of bringing forth the
fruits of good moral character and conduct. We are far from
accusing responsible and informed Calvinist teaching of being
antinomian. If Calvinist moral teaching has erred, it is more likely
to have done so in the opposite direction of legality, the stern
religion of the Ten Commandments. However, Wesley was not
concerned to judge the abstract principles of Calvinist doctrine, but
the practical views of some he met who called themselves
Calvinists. Characteristically, he is not debating the theory of
God's government of all human souls in this world, and in glory.
He is concerned for the practical good of simple people in the
Society. Some, on the strength of the proposition "once saved ,
always saved," did seem to sink into presumption, and here was an
error Wesley abhorred. His preaching of full assurance is marked
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by a clear insistence that the foundation of all was a deep
awareness of moral change in the heart of the believer.
In his exposition of the leading text, Romans 8: 16, "The Spirit
Himself bears witness with our spirit," Wesley points out that there
are two "witnesses." There is "the witness of my own spirit,"
which is the common sense moral argument: "Since my conversion
I am so deeply aware of a complete change of inward character and
outward conduct that I cannot doubt that God's saving grace is at
work in my heart" (cf. Sermon X.i.2-6). And there is also "the
witness of the Spirit," which belongs in the last resort to the sphere
of the emotions, the imagination, the affections--that is to say,
"the heart." This "inward impression on the soul - whereby the
Spirit of God directly witnessed to my spirit that I am a child of
God" is by the nature of things mysterious (cf. Sermon X.i.7,1112). When the two "witnesses" chime together, then, and only
then, is the believer granted the privilege of a present full
assurance of salvation.
A point to be remembered, however, and often slurred over in
popular teaching, is that to Wesley the reasonable and moral
"witness of my own spirit" is the essential element. To claim an
assurance of salvation solely on account of "the witness of the
Spirit," that is to say, on the ground of the great joy in believing,
and without the moral change, is to fall into the most dangerous
delusion. Wesley never taught the naive subjective doctrine: "I feel
saved, therefore I am saved." Although the heartfelt "witness of
the Spirit" comes first in time, because we must consciously love
before we can fully obey (i.8), yet the all-important test that the
supposed "witness of the Spirit" is not in fact the delusion of
Satan, is the awareness of the moral change. This is argued with
characteristic emphasis (ii.1-12). We are aware, however, that
Wesley's teaching underwent a certain cautious modification in
light of continuing evangelical experience. In the early days of the
Revival, he was inclined to the position that if one did not enjoy
full assurance one was not in a state of full salvation. This is to
make " the witness of the Spirit" essential. This he realized later
was too rigid a judgment. The effect of this modified teaching is
that if one is aware of the moral change, one may have confidence
that one is indeed on the way of salvation, even though the deep
sense of peace with God, and of joy abounding, is denied.
However, the divine gift of " the witness of the Spirit," and the
full assurance which it brings, is the privilege of all believers ,
intended by God, and to be expected, preached and believingly
prayed for. This privilege is indeed not essential to salvation, but
it is part of the fitting spiritual equipment of the fully useful and
convincing servant of Christ and the gospel. (Cf. the sermon, "The
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Witness of the Spirit--Discourse II," v.3,4.

This is not in the

familiar Standard Sermons .)
Once again we find Wesley in the characteristic position of
teaching a creative synthesis of elements which were in danger of
falling apart in polarization. In this he is the High Churchman
turned evangelist. In England before Wesley the old High Church
party maintained the predominant tradition of the ancient Church,
that saving grace is in principle available to all mankind , because
the means of grace, and in particular the sacramental means of
grace, are open to all. Thus, they did not accept the Calvinist
doctrine of particular election, i.e., that those individuals are saved
whom God has chosen to save. In current controversy, "Arminian"
was used as a term of opprobrium applied to the High Church
party by their Puritan and Calvinist opponents, to indicate that
they were unsound on salvation by grace, and on this account not
proper Protestants. However, though the High Church party in
principle professed universal grace, they were not on that account
evangelists to "all sorts and conditions of men." Their characteristic interest was to uphold the spiritual prerogative and the
power of the bishops, and above all, the king. The image of the
High Churchman is struck in the old ballad, "The Vicar of Bray:"
In good King Charles' golden days,
When loyalty no harm meant,
A zealous High Churchman was I,
And so I got preferment.
To teach my flock I never missed
Kings were by God appointed,
And lost are those that dare resist,
Or touch the Lord's anointed.
And the whole Wesley family were certainly devoted "King's men"!

It is from this background that Wesley lifted to a place of honor
the term "Arminian," just as he had done with the word
"perfection," though there is no evidence that he had actually read
Arminius, or was directly influenced by his teaching. The Church
party had a cautious maxim with which to express human destiny:
"No saved Christians but dead Christians." As saving grace is not
irresistible, it is sadly possible, if the believer did not persevere in
the spiritual and moral discipline of the Christian life, to fall from
grace into perdition. Therefore no one was safe home until he or
she had arrived at a godly deathbed! This is a sober degree of
expectation, well-guarded against presumption. This is the voice
of the Book of Common Prayer at the graveside: "that, when we
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shall depart this life, we may rest in Him, as our hope is this our
brother doth." After all, we can express kindly hope for everyone
in the parish, but not more than hope for anyone! All this is very
reasonable. However, frail humans can hardly launch out over the
awesome gulf between this world and the next on the strength of
the reasonable proposition that "probability is the guide to life."
In the hour of stress we need some stronger word. And this Wesley
has, yet without falling into the presumption of the opposed
maxim, "Once saved, always saved."
He has the comforting
message of a present assurance, "an anchor of the soul, both sure
and steadfast," yet which is not to be presumed upon, for in
principle it can be lost. Of evangelical believers he says: "They are
saved from the fear, though not from the possibility, of falling
away from the grace of God" (Sermon I.ii.4).
The fitting commentary upon this body of doctrine is the
Pilgrim's Progress of John Wesley, as illustrated from his Journal,
and illuminated by his brother's hymns. When the celebration of
the centennial of Methodism was being discussed, some suggested
that the hundred years should be measured from Wesley's
ordination. This would have included the Oxford Methodism of
the Holy Club, and the venture to Georgia, as a part of the
Methodist story. This was refused on the ground that "At that
time Mr. Wesley was not converted."
So the centennial of
Methodism was celebrated in 1838, one hundred years after
Aldersgate Street. This raises the question, "At what point did
Wesley become an effective Christian? When was he 'converted'?"
One sometimes hears an enthusiastic soul use the phrase "Since I
became a Christian." Sometimes this can give one pause for
thought, or even a painful jolt. The speaker may, by implication,
be writing off the spiritual validity of Christian parentage and
baptism, nurture in a Christian home and Sunday school, perhaps
years of regular worship, or even of work as a teacher or steward,
up to the moment of a more recent and blessed "time of refreshing
from the presence of the Lord." One may have a good deal of
sympathy with what the person is trying to say. He is rejoicing in
the splendid newness and power of a great evangelical experience.
Yet the phrase often reflects muddled theology. Even Charles
Wesley slipped at this point. He adorned his mother's tombstone
with some of his less gifted verse, in which he stated that she:
Mourn'd a long night of griefs and fears,
A legal night of seventy years.
This is indeed a ruthless judgment upon the heroic mother of the
Wesleys!
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It is important to observe that John Wesley did not speak like
this. On the one hand, the Aldersgate Street experience clearly
meant a great deal to him. So, in his Journal for May 24, 1738, he
prepares the way for his testimony by giving a careful and very
moving survey of his previous spiritual experience. Yet the strange
thing is, the momentous experience over, he hardly ever refers to it
again, though he often remembers with affection his experience as
an Oxford Methodist. He was not the sort of Methodist who lived
by recounting a conversion experience of ten years ago, of twenty,
or of fifty . There was much of spiritual worth which went before,
and much which came after.
"The experience of the heart
strangely warmed" was an important link in a chain, but not more.
In the autobiographical sketch in the Journal for that momentous
day, we find him first as the child and schoolboy of religious
habits, and then as the High Church Oxford student. On the one
hand, judging himself by the severe standard of later years, he
taxes himself with spiritual blindness. Yet on the other, he is
scrupulous in preparing himself to receive the communion at the
It is significant that the later
required three times per year.
"evangelical" Wesley should have communicated so much more
regularly than the early "legal" one. So he comes to what has been
described as " his first conversion":
When I was about 22, my father pressed me to enter into
Holy Orders.
At the same time the providence of God
directing me to Kempis's 'Christian Pattern,' [lmitatio Christi]
I began to see that true religion was seated in the heart.
So he embarks upon a life of whole-hearted Christian discipline.
" I set apart an hour or two a day for religious retirement. I
communicated every week - I began to aim at, and pray for inward
holiness." And, being appointed a fellow of Lincoln College, he
reads William Law's Christian Perfection and Serious Call to a Holy
Life.
So we have a man who in many ways comes close to the later
evangelical Wesley. He realizes that true religion is inward, he
aspires after perfection, or holiness, and, in that aspiration, waits
upon God in all the means of grace. Indeed, he can salute this
period in a very significant way. Among his Standard Sermons
there is a University Sermon preached in this period, and upon the
very subject of inward religion (XIII, "The Circumcision of the
Heart"). He states that after these years he cannot preach a better,
save that, most significantly he adds to his statement of faith in the
atoning work of Christ a clearer reference to assurance by the work
of the Spirit (XIII.i.7). In theology and moral discipline he has

The Conversion of the Wesleys--1738 Reconsidered

25

everything he needs. The one thing lacking is a sufficient engagement of the heart. He has done everything which a spiritual
seeker, by the assistance of God's grace, can do. And these are the
things which the earnest seeker for growth in grace must do, if he
is to receive more grace.
Wesley would hardly have arrived
eventually at Aldersgate Street unless he had persevered with the
Holy Club, for that was the door of obedience set before him by
God at that stage. The one thing he lacks is the one thing he
cannot do for himself. "The heart" is not fully engaged. He does
not enjoy the fullness of that inherently mysterious "inward
impression on the soul" which only God can give.
Is this man, then, a "converted Christian," or is he not? It must
have been a strangely stirring confrontation with former university
colleagues, who remembered Wesley of the Holy Club, to hear him
paint a portrait in words of himself as "the Almost Christian" in
his University Sermon of July 25, 174 l. It is almost, though
perhaps not expressly, implied that the entirely dutiful, disciplined
and sincere clergyman, and preacher of the atonement and of
salvation by faith, is on the way to perdition (Sermon II.i.1-13 ).
This very severe judgment does rather appear as the triumph of
theological theory over common sense. So we are not surprised
that, after long reflection, the level-headed Wesley comes to a more
moderate judgment in the much later Sermon 89, "The More
Excellent Way." In fact, the "almost Christian" is a Christian after
all, though God has still something further to give him!
It is significant that Wesley's further pilgrimage advanced
through worship rather than through argument.
First, he was
impressed by the Moravians he met on the voyage to America by
their peace of mind and moral courage, by their humility and by
their song (Journal, January 25, 1736). So, in Georgia, he sang
with them, and made those masterly translations into English of
many of their hymns. These are a priceless part of the Methodist
heritage of hymnody, and the chief witness to German Pietism in
English Christianity. In the manner natural to evangelicals who
look back to a pre-conversion state, Wesley takes a severe view of
his spiritual condition, and we cannot doubt his sincerity. We must
also make allowance for the natural and inevitable clash of
temperament between a precise and very zealous clergyman, and a
free-and-easy frontier colony of folk who were certainly not
anxious to be disciplined by him into a model parish! This landed
him in mistakes in human relationships, and many discouragements,
which must have taken a heavy toll of his good spirits .
So he records of this time " In this vile, abject state of bondage
to sin, I was indeed fighting continually, but not conquering.
Before I had willingly served sin; now it was unwillingly." In
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those memorable and bitter words he penned as the ship got back
to England: "It is now two years and almost four months since I
left my native country, in order to teach the Georgia Indians the
nature of Christianity; but, what have I learned myself in the
meantime: Why (what I the least of all suspected,) that I who went
to America to convert others, was never myself converted to God ."
Yet, after the candid confession there is the candid footnote, later
added . "I am not sure of this." And a further footnote reads: "I
had even then the faith of a servant, though not that of a son"
(Journal, February 1, 1738). And one with the faith of a servant is
treading the road to salvation, even if not "saved to the uttermost."
There is, however, another side to this. At this time in Georgia
Wesley translated from the German of Tersteegan:
Thou hidden love of God , whose height,
Whose depth unfathomed, no man knows,
I see from far Thy beauteous light,
Inly I sigh for Thy repose;
My heart is pained, nor can it be
At rest, till it finds rest in Thee.
Each moment draw from earth away
My heart, that lowly waits Thy call;
Speak to my inmost soul, and say,
"I am Thy love, Thy God , Thy all!"
To feel Thy power, to hear Thy voice,
To taste Thy love, be all my choice.
(Hymns and Psalms, 544; M.H.B. 433.)
The man who could be attracted to the original, and translate with
be described as a dull formalist, or a
such feeling, can
"legal" Christian. He is an active and growing soul. Yet the hymn
itself shows evidence of growth in spiritual understanding . The
fourth verse, (omitted in Hymns and Psalms) originally read:
Is there a thing beneath the sun
That strives with Thee my heart to share?
Ah tear it thence, that Thou alone
May'st reign unrivall'd Monarch there;
From earthly loves I must be free
Ere I can find repose in Thee.
So it appeared in Psalms and Hymns, 1738. Wesley later amended
the lines to:
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Ah, tear it thence, and reign alone,
The Lord of every motion there!
Then shall my heart from earth be free,
When it hath found repose in Thee.
This shows the salutary realization that divine love must expel
"earthly love," not "earthly love" be driven out to make room for
the divine. The action is from God, not man.
The finger of divine providence may indeed be seen in the
circumstance that within a few days of Wesley's arrival back in
London Peter Bohler arrived from the Continent, on the way to
America. They were together for only a few formative weeks, for
Bohler left before the Aldersgate Street experience.
We have
already glanced at some of the counsel which took place between
them. We need not suppose that the frustrated missionary to
America came back a beaten man. Like St. Paul, he was "cast
down, but not destroyed." After such cruel disappointment some
would have gone into retreat, to give time for reflection, and who
could blame them? Not so John Wesley, the man of iron! Having
penned his chapter of bitter self-reproach, on disembarking, of the
inn where he spent the first night he writes: "I here read prayers,
and explained the second Lesson, to a few of those who were
called Christians, but indeed were more savage in their behaviour
than the wildest Indians I have yet met with." So much for the
British!
The conversion scene now changes to Brother Charles, the
mercurial, the man of poetic fire, who got there first. In John
Wesley's Journal for May 20, 1738, we read:
The next day, being Whitsunday, after hearing Dr. Heylyn
preach a truly Christian sermon, - and assisting him at the
Holy Communion - I received the surprising news, that my
brother had found rest to his soul. His bodily strength
returned also from that hour.
This account dovetails with Charles Wesley's Journal , a narrative
which is unfortunately much less known among Methodists than
the story of John Wesley's experience. The contrast is most
illuminating, and illustrates how the Holy Spirit performs His
converting work in different ways in men and women of different
temperament and background.
Though God, and His historic saving action in His divine Son,
incarnate, crucified and risen, is always the same, the way in
which this action is brought home to the heart of believers varies
with the variation of human condition. This is why the different
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parts of the Church, despite the things which apparently divide ,
are in fact so largely united, and must be united, in the doctrine of
God, the incarnation, the atonement and the resurrection.
Churches tend to be disunited in doctrine arising from conceptions
of the effect and mode of the means of grace, the worship and
devotional experience of believers, and the ministry and discipline
of the Church.
There is in modern conditions often more
divergence within the various denominations between scr iptural
traditionalists and liberal reconstructions, than there is between t he
official standards of those churches.
For more than a century past the churches of this land have
been deeply exercised in spirit that such a large part of the nation,
the unprivileged, the less educated and the less socially responsible,
have remained obstinately outside their ministry. It seems to have
been this way for centuries, and no one seems to have any solutio n
to this intractable problem. So our hearts warm when prevailing
spiritual revival now and again spans the gulf between the classes.
It is good to know that a plain working man and his wife had a
part in the action at Charles Wesley's conversion . It is a token of
what did happen , at least to some extent, in the early and great
days of the Revival. After Peter Bohler had departed for Carolina,
and had written his good-bye letter from Southampton in Lat in ,
Charles Wesley, the Oxford scholar of good family, but no money,
sat down for pastoral counseling with Mr. Bray, the worker in
brass. The unlearned may understand the things of God, as well as
the learned. Wesley uses a phrase which , in these equalitarian
days, would be interpreted , by some, as patronizing. Taken in the
right sense, however, it is a magnificent tribute.
In his Journal for Thursday, May 11, 1738, C harles Wesley
writes:
I was just going to remove to old Mr. Hutton's, when God
sent Mr. Bray to me , a poor ignorant mechanic , who knows
nothing but Christ; but by knowing Him , knows and discerns
all things. Some time ago I had taken leave of Peter Bohler,
confessed my unbelief and want of forgiveness, but declared
my firm persuasion that I should receive the atonement
before I died. His answer was, "Be it unto thee according to
thy faith." Mr. Bray is now to supply Bohler's place. We
prayed together for faith.
I was qu ite ove rpowered and
melted into tears, and hereby induced to think it was God's
will that I should go to his house, and not to Mr. Hutton's His sister [Mrs. Turner] I found in earnest pursuit of Christ;
and his wife well inclined to conversion. [There is also a
Mrs. Musgrave in the house.]
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Sunday, May 21: I waked in hope and expectation. [Wesley
is in bed with pleurisy.] At nine my brother and some
friends came, and sang an hymn to the Holy Ghost. [Some
investigators think that this was perhaps "Granted is the
Saviour's prayer," Hymns and Psalms, 287, M.H.B. 277.] My
comfort and hope were hereby increased. In about half an
hour they went. - I composed myself to sleep, in quietness
and peace, when I heard someone come in; Mrs. Musgrave I
thought by the voice [it was, in fact, Mrs. Turner], and say
"In the name of Jesus of Nazareth, arise and believe, and thou
shalt be healed of all thy infirmities." I wondered how it
should enter into her head to speak in that manner. - I
sighed, and said within myself, "O that Christ would but
speak thus to me!" I lay musing and trembling: then thought,
"But what if it should be Him? I will send at least to see." I
rang the bell, and, Mrs. Turner coming, I desired her to send
up Mrs. Musgrave. She - said, "Mrs. Musgrave has not been
here." - I hoped it might be Christ indeed. - I felt in the
meantime a strange palpitation of heart. I said, yet feared to
say, "I believe, I believe!" She [Mrs. Turner] came up again
and said, "It was I, a weak, sinful creature, spoke; but the
words were Christ's: He commanded me to say them, and so
constrained me that I could not forbear."
Wesley goes on to say that Bray encouraged him that he had
indeed received faith. He informed Wesley that some days before,
his sister, in a dream, had had a vision of Christ in white, and had
been commanded to go and speak these words to the invalid
upstairs. She had reflected much and prayed about this. The
Journal continues: "On Sunday morning she took Mr. Bray aside,
burst into tears, and informed him of the matter; objecting she was
a poor weak sinful creature, and should she go to a minister? She
could not do it, nor rest till she did." Bray had encouraged her,
prayed with her, and she had gone upstairs with her strange
message.
Tuesday, May 23: I waked under the protection of Christ,
and gave myself up, soul and body, to Him. At nine I began
an hymn upon my conversion , but was persuaded to break
off, for fear of pride. Mr. Bray coming, encouraged me to
proceed in spite of Satan. I prayed Christ to stand by me,
and finished the hymn. Upon my afterwards showing it to
Mr. Bray, the devil threw in a fiery dart, suggesting it was
wrong - when , casting my eye upon a Prayer book, I met
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with an answer for him. "Why boastest thou thyself, thou
tyrant, that thou canst do mischief?" (Psalm 52: l ). Upon this,
I clearly discerned it was a device of the enemy to keep back
glory from God.
Wednesday, May 24: Towards ten , my brother was brought
in triumph by a troop of our friends, and declared, "I
believe ." We sang the hymn with great joy, and parted with
prayer.
The conversion hymn is sufficiently well known that it is hardly
necessary to cite the whole of it. "Where shall my wondering soul
begin" appears as 706 in Hymns and Psalms, and 361 in M.H.B. It
may be presumed that the point at which Charles Wesley feared
that he was being led into pride was the end of verse 2:
Should know, should feel my sins forgiven,
Blest with this antepast of heaven.
"Should know" and "should feel" may almost be taken to represent
the two parts of that which John Wesley expounds from Romans
8: 16 as the witness to full assurance. The reasonable and moral
"witness of my own spirit" is "knowledge," the mysterious
"impression on the soul" is "feeling."
The warm temperament of Brother Charles is so lifted up at this
assurance that he sings of the "antepast of heaven," the "Joy of
heaven to earth come down." Perhaps he is flying too high , into
the dreaded "enthusiasm"! It is the remembrance of those many
who have not yet found "the gift unspeakable" which emboldens
him to continue with his gospel invitation to the world. We may
perhaps quote verses 4 and 6 from the original, as they are less
generally known .
No - tho' the Antient Dragon rage
And call forth all his Hosts to War,
Tho' Earth's self-righteous Sons engage;
Them, and their God alike I dare:
Jesus the Sinner's Friend proclaim,
Jesus to Sinners still the same.
Come all ye Magda/ens in Lust,
Ye ruffians fell in Murders old;
Repent, and live: despair and trust!
Jesus for you to Death was sold;
Tho' Hell protest, and Earth repine,
He died for Crimes like Yours - and Mine.
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We now turn to the more familiar account of John Wesley's
evangelical experience. First, Wesley's conversion, if that is indeed
the right name for it, is the conversion of a scholar, and of a
highly disciplined scholar. We find from his Journal for May 24,
1738, that at five o'clock in the morning he is reading his Greek
Testament. The text which goes to the heart is 2 Peter 1:4. We
observe something of the debit side to modern critical scholarship.
2 Peter has, we feel, been somewhat downgraded by the critics
because it is generally agreed that it is "late," and not by St. Peter,
and because it is written in a pretentious dialect, full of strange
words. Its right to be in the canon has even been questioned.
Such issues were indeed known, and had been discussed, in
Wesley's day, but he is untroubled at his devotions. To him this
epistle is a word from God.
Second, here is the conversion of a musical man.
In the
afternoon he remembers being helped by the singing of De
Profundis as an anthem at St. Paul's. We need not enquire too
closely whether all the choristers were " real Christians," because
the effect of God's word is from God, not from the singers.
However, it will surely encourage all singers, choirmasters and
organists that they were granted a presence in this memorable
action. Why did Wesley go to the religious society in Aldersgate
Street "very unwillingly"? Certainly he was not a man seeking
sensation. There is much significance, however, in the passage of
Luther which was being read, and which was adapted to Wesley's
present condition, particularly as he was later sometimes critical of
some things in the great reformer. We may presume from the
phrase "while he was describing the change which God works in
the heart through faith in Christ" that the passage in Luther's
Preface to Romans was:
·Faith, however, is a divine work in us. It changes us and
makes us to be born anew of God; it kills the old Adam and
makes altogether different men, in heart and spirit and mind
and powers, and it brings with it the Holy Ghost. 0 , it is a
living, busy, active, mighty thing, this faith; and so it is
impossible for it not to do good works incessantly. It does
not ask whether there are good works to do, but before the
question rises it has already done them, and is always at the
doing of them. He who does not these works is a faithless
man.
The significance of this particular passage is that Luther is here
pointing out most plainly that evangelical saving faith holds the
secret of spontaneous moral effort, of morality from the heart.
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Wesley has shown himself to be searching not so much for joy as
for something which will enable him to obey God as He ought to
be obeyed, freely and from the heart, and release the servant from
inward moral frustration into the liberty of a son. Luther is
pointing out just what Wesley required, and the reading was the
trigger which God used to bring the release. The words "I felt my
heart strangely warmed" have unfortunately too much
overshadowed the remainder of this revealing passage in the
Journal:

About a quarter before nine, while he was describing the
change which God works in the heart through faith in Christ,
I felt my heart strangely warmed. I felt I did trust in Christ,
Christ alone, for salvation; and an assurance was given me
that He had taken away my sins, even mine, and saved me
from the law of sin and death. I began to pray with all my
might for those who had in a more especial manner
despitefully used me and persecuted me. I then testified
openly to all there what I now first felt in my heart. But it
was not long before the enemy suggested, "This cannot be
faith; for where is thy joy?" Then was I taught that peace
and victory over sin are essential to faith in the Captain of
our salvation; but, that as to the transports of joy that usually
attend the beginning of it, especially in those who have
mourned deeply, God sometimes giveth, sometimes
withholdeth. - After my return home, I was much buffeted
with temptations; but cried out, and they fled away. They
returned again and again. I as often lifted up my eyes, and
he sent me help from His holy place. And herein I found the
difference between this and my former state chiefly
consisted. I was striving, yea, fighting with all my might
under the law, as well as under grace, but then I was
sometimes, if not often, conquered: now I was always
conqueror.
The contrast between this down-to-earth and sober evangelical
experience with Brother Charles's "antepast of heaven ," is most
significant, though it has not always been sufficiently noticed.
Clearly, what came to Wesley that memorable night was a genuine
measure of full assurance. He received the mysterious "inward
impression on the soul," "the witness of the Spirit" which works
this "privilege" of the believer. There was indeed something of
this morally liberating emotional content to the experience, or he
would hardly have used the phrase " the heart strangely warmed."
However, the impression was peace, rather than "transports of
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joy." The first thing which Wesley discovered was that he was not
as happy as he thought he ought to be. "Where is thy joy?" He
had doubtless been long considering what the Moravians' converts
had been saying about the great joy and peace brought by faith in
Christ, and had built himself up to expect that when the gift came
to him he would be lifted up to heights of happiness. Yet this was
not so. He did not go home that night "treading on air" and
whistling revival choruses. The chief thing he discovered was that
he had been granted power to pray for his enemies, and to
overcome his temptations. The change was chiefly in moral will.
"The witness of one's own spirit" was powerfully reinforced, the
essential constituent to assurance. By the experience of "the heart
strangely warmed" Wesley was lifted powerfully in sanctification,
though it was not entire sanctification, or perfect love.
Wesley's evangelical experience was the conversion of a moralist,
which left him a moralist still, though now a victorious moralist.
If one reads on into the Journal one finds that he continued to
have ups and downs of peace and joy, until, in the spring of the
following year, he was constrained by Whitfield to preach in the
open air. He was then astonished to find multitudes of convulsive
conversions in response to his message (Journal April 2-29, 1739).
It was then, and only then, that his own experience of liberation
came to its climax. This is the measure of the work of God. The
new convincing power was not the outcome of his temperament, or
gifts or preaching approach. The message was the same as before:
salvation by faith, and the pursuit of holiness. Before Aldersgate
Street Wesley's earnestness appeared as fanaticism , and produced
the response of indignant rejection. Now some still rejected, more
indignantly than before, and discerned fanaticism. There is no way
of making all hearers believe. But some began to be powerfully
convinced. The change was that God had decided to work, for the
time was come and the messenger prepared.
It is a symptom of the decay of understanding for these things
in current conventional Methodism that the classic Wesley hymn on
the subject of full assurance was printed in the 1933 Methodist
Hymn Book without the operative verse, and that the hymn was on
the point of being rejected altogether in Hymns and Psalms, had it
not been the subject of special pleading in Conference. Ostensibly
the objection to the hymn was a philosophical one to the phrase
"the signs infallible," though this is Wesley's reference to Acts 1:3.
Speculative thinkers do not like the idea of "infallibility." Clearly
there are some among us to whom the idea of strong religious
certainty, and the confident preaching of Christian doctrine is still
"very horrid enthusiasm." This doubtless is in part reaction against
the common misrepresentation of Wesley's doctrine of assurance as
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simply based on subjective feeling. It may be of interest to quote
a selection from the many verses of this hymn as Charles Wesley
originally wrote them. It will be noted that John Wesley himself
altered the meter for the hymn as it appeared in the 1780 hymnal.
Clearly, no one .. is able to mend either the sense or the verse" of
Brother Charles other than Brother John himself! Compare the
version, no . 114 in The Methodist Hy mnal (1964):
How can a sinner know
His sins on earth forgiven?
How can my Saviour shew
My name inscribed in heaven?
What we ourselves have felt, and seen,
With confidence we tell,

And publish to the sons of men
The signs infallible.
We who in Christ believe
That He for us hath died,
His unknown peace receive,
And feel His blood applied:
Exults for joy our rising soul,
Disburthened of her load,
And swells, unutterably full
Of glory, and of God.
His love, surpassing far
The love of all beneath
We find within, and dare
The pointless darts of death:
Stronger than death, or sin, or hell
The mystic power we prove,
And conquerors of the world we dwell
In heaven, who dwell in love.
The meek and lowly heart
Which in our Saviour was,
He doth to us impart,
And signs us with His cross:
Our nature's course is turned, our mind
Transformed in all its powers,
And both the witnesses are joined,
The Spirit of God with ours.
Charles Wesley's famous hymn "For the Anniversary Day of
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one's Conversion," published originally in Hymns and Sacred
Poems (1740), and given pride of place as the first hymn in the
1780 Hymns for the Use of the People Called Methodists, as in the
British M ethodist Hymn Book (1904 and 1933), and the American
Methodist Hymnal (1964), has been so widely loved and sung , and
included in so many hymnals, that it may be of interest to
reproduce in full the original text. John Wesley opened the hymn
at verse 7, under the title Exhorting Sinners to return to God, and
"dear Redeemer" was later changed to "great Redeemer." Dr.
Henry Bett in The Hymns of Methodism (1913, 1945, p. 95) records
that Peter Bohler said to Charles Wesley, "Had I a thousand tongues
I would praise God with them all!" and gives the German of the
Herrnhut hymn he doubtless had in mind. This great hymn is
Charles Wesley's own comment upon the events we have been
considering.
Glory to God, and Praise, and Love
Be ever, ever given:
By Saints below, and Saints above,
The Church in Earth and Heaven.
On this glad Day the glorious Sun
Of Righteousness arose,
On my benighted Soul he shone,
And fill'd it with Repose.
Sudden expir'd the legal Strife,
Twas then I ceas'd to grieve,
My Second, Real, Living Life
I then began to live.
Then with my Heart I first believ'd,
Believ'd, with Faith Divine,
Power with the Holy Ghost receiv'd
To call the Saviour Mine.
I felt my Lord's Atoning Blood
Close to my Soul applied;
Me, me he lov'd--the Son of God
For me, for me He died!
I found, and own'd his Promise true,

Ascertain'd of

my

Part

My pardon pass'd in Heaven I knew
When written on my Heart.
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0 for a Thousand Tongues to sing
My dear Redeemer's Praise!
The Glories of my God and King,
The Triumphs of his Grace.
My gracious Master, and my God,
Assist me to proclaim,
To spread thro' all the Earth abroad
The Honours of Thy Name.
Jesus the Name that charms our Fears,
That bids our Sorrows cease;
'Tis Musick in the Sinner's Ears,
'Tis Life, and Health, and Peace!
He breaks the Power of cancell'd Sin,
He sets the Prisoner free:
His Blood can make the Foulest clean;
His Blood avail'd for me.
He speaks; and listening to His Voice,
New Life the Dead receive,
The mournful, broken Hearts rejoice,
The humble Poor believe.
Hear Him ye Deaf, His Praise ye Dumb
Your loosen'd Tongues employ,
Ye Blind, behold your Saviour come,
And leap, ye Lame, for Joy.
Look unto Him, ye Nations, own
Your God, ye fallen Race!
Look, and be sav'd, thro' Faith alone;
Be justified, by Grace!
See all your Sins on Jesus laid;
The Lamb of God was slain,
His Soul was once an Offering made
For every Soul of Man.
Harlots, and Publicans, and Thieves
In holy Triumph join!
Sav'd is the Sinner that believes
From Crimes as great as Mine.
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Murtherers, and all ye hellish Crew,
Ye Sons of Lust and Pride,
Believe the Saviour died for you;
For me the Saviour died.
Awake from guilty Nature's Sleep,
And Christ shall give you Light,
Cast all your Sins into the Deep
And wash the Ethiop white.
With me, your Chief, you then shall know,
Shall feel your Sins forgiven;
Anticipate your Heaven below,
And own, that Love is Heaven.
The first major theological point to be observed in this great
hymn is that the full evangelical experience is granted when the
Holy Spirit brings home to the heart a personal realization of the
historic fact of an unlimited atonement for sin in Christ crucified.
This comes out in the repeated phrase, emphasized in italics, "for
me, for me!" This answers to the words used by John Wesley of
his Aldersgate Street experience. A further vital evangelical point
is expressed in the familiar line "He breaks the Power of cancell'd
Sin." Here is the saving union of justification and holiness. The
guilt of sin is first freely cancelled by trust in the atoning work of
Christ. But this essential first step is not by itself sufficient. The
power of sin must also be broken , inwardly and outwardly. The
professed believer is no true believer unless conversion brings a
radical change of character and conduct. We should read with
discrimination the couplet:
Look, and be sav'd, thro' Faith alone;
Be justified, by Grace!
Justification, forgiveness, the cancellation of the guilt of sin, is
indeed "by faith alone," the characteristic Reformation formulary.
There is no place for earning forgiveness, and acceptance with
God, by the merit of good works. The saving work of Christ has
to be received by simple and penitent faith . Yet Wesley does not
say "by grace alone," in the sense that the action of the sovereign
grace of God is the whole matter of salvation. This would be the
Calvinist position. Sinful men and women cannot be saved without
the action of grace. At every stage of the Christian life the
empowering grace of God must go first, or man can do nothing.
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Yet at every stage man must respond to grace with that degree of
free and morally responsible choice which creating and redeeming
grace makes possible.
It is perhaps not superfluous to observe, in light of some recent
and rather pointless controversy, that to be understood these great
scriptural hymns must be read in a scriptural sense. Thus, the
Word "man" in "For every soul of man" does not mean "male" as
the counterpart to "female,'' as though women either can not be
saved, or do not require a Savior! The word has the scriptural
sense of "human being." In the same way, there is no point in the
deaf, the dumb, the blind or the lame being offended at the
twelfth verse. This is implying a reference to our Lord's words in
The cure of the afflicted is a mark of the
Matthew 11 :5.
Kingdom, not a slur on the disabled! Nor can we blame Jeremiah
for being a "racist" for having written "Can the Ethiopian change
his skin, or the leopard his spots? Then may ye also do good, that
are accustomed to do evil" (13:23). This is no more a slur on black
people than on leopards, but a statement of fact!
Both the Wesleys agreed that the due end of the process of
sanctification, that is, "entire sanctification," is to be defined as
perfect love or holiness. John Wesley, as we have seen, strongly
encouraged his followers to believe that perfect love can be granted
by God in this present !ife, and that it is to be expected in a
second dynamic spiritual experience. We have to admit that this
doctrine has sometimes had prejudice generated against it by
unwise and unbalanced advocacy by some later teachers. This has
happened in three ways.
First, the preaching of holiness has
sometimes been too much associated with an unduly emotional
atmosphere in some revival movements. The plain answer to this is
that Wesley's authentic doctrine, though based on the love of God
shed abroad in the heart, is essentially a preaching of moral change
and renewal. The focus is on right doing, personal and social, not
spiritual excitement. Second, there has been an undue emphasis
upon the gift of holiness as a sudden and perhaps convulsive
experience. This has been associated with the notion of "the
second blessing,'' a phrase not very characteristic of Wesley.
However, psychological processes often work up to some sort of
climax, and if a believer, having long waited upon God in spiritual
and moral discipline, is granted some outstanding spiritual blessing,
it is not unnatural to suppose that it may well come in a flash of
sudden insight.
The danger is to suppose that this must be
convulsive. The third difficulty is perhaps the most substantial.
There is the strong feeling that it is either naive, or immodest, or
both, to claim the gift of holiness for oneself, or for one's religious
circle. It is an essential part of goodness to be modest about one's
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goodness! To most people it seems plain common sense that "They
who fain would serve Thee best are conscious most of wrong
within."
The answer to this third prejudice is that holiness is not to be
thought of as a sort of individual and permanent possession, to be
gloried in as a mark of spiritual status. This attitude is very
offensive. Wesley clearly teaches that even those few who do come
to the gift of perfect love can fall away, if they grow slack in
moral and spiritual discipline. The gift is not to be presumed
upon. Also, it is not a purely individual experience. The essential
background to all Wesley's teaching on the subject is that those
who are seeking holiness are joined together in the inner circle of
the Society, in the Band meeting, with its unsparing discipline of
confession and mutual criticism. Anyone who could face that
discipline would have had any faults pointed out! Members would
take a modest view of their own attainments. This was of the
essence of the business, which is why Wesley so constantly insists
upon humility, teachability and modesty as marks of discipleship.
The approved model is surely Fletcher of Madeley, the
acknowledged saint of early Methodism. He did apparently become
aware that God had granted him the gift of perfect love, and he
dare not deny the gift. But he would only mention it with deep
hesitation, and in quiet tones, and in private moments. If the gift
can be claimed it must not be claimed loudly and self-confidently.
Another difficulty is a purely logical one, which will appeal to
systematics. Any system of moral and spiritual discipline to be
lived by real men and women in this world must contain provision
for growth through experience. And a "perfection" which can be
"improved," the critic will say, is a contradiction in terms.
It belongs to
Perfection is by definition timeless and static.
heaven! The issue depends on what is meant by "perfection." To
Wesley, holiness is "perfect love," not perfect performance. It is
certainly not "sinless perfection." Once again we are driven back
to what we mean by various terms. If "sin" is anything in human
nature which is at variance from the moral perfection of the holy
God, and for which frail humans may feel shame in the presence
of God, then, of course, freedom from sin is impossible in this
world. However, if we follow Wesley in the common sense moral
view of sin, that it is "an actual, voluntary transgression of the
law, - of any commandment of God acknowledged to be such at
the time" (Sermon XV.ii.2}, then complete victory over sin in the
heart of the believer is at least possible in principle, if God can

indeed "save to the uttermost."

Yet, "acknowledged as such"

speaks of an elastic standard, for believers can grow, and may be
expected to grow, in understanding of God's will, in light of
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continuing experience and discipline. The idea of 11 perfect love"
answers to a heart and will entirely going out in obedience to what
is seen to be the will of God. It does not follow from this that the
believer is possessed of instant and infallible knowledge of what
the will of God in fact is. Thus there is room for learning.
The believer may indeed have a heart filled with love, and
desire to obey, but in a very mixed and puzzling world, moral
guidance is not always easy to come by. Particularly is this the
case if one is taken in unaccustomed circumstances, or by surprise.
Then there are all those hard cases where legitimate calls of right
pull in opposite directions.
Also, however close be Christian
fellowship, we cannot always see into the hearts and motives of
other people, so we may misjudge them. The mark, surely, of the
"perfect" Christian is that as soon as the disciple is aware that "sin
lieth at the door," it is not weakly welcomed in a little, dallied
with, and then repented of. That is a sadly common experience,
even among sincere Christians . Rather does the whole heart turn
away from temptation with loathing. The incipient error is swiftly
recognized, and gladly corrected. The lesson of that experience is
well and truly learned, and vigilance increased. Furthermore, with
" perfect love" human personality and temperament is not lifted
clean above all limitation.
Thus, for example, a completely
devoted preacher who is somewhat lacking in that precious gift of
a winning personality is not by divine grace turned into a different
person, but is kept by grace from allowing disability to get the
better of him, so that he is less than fully useful to God.
Holiness may be defined as entire victory over all known and
wilful sin. It is not freedom from temptation, or superhuman
character, or perfect performance. Thus the perfect still need to
come to God in penitence, and are dependent upon supporting
grace. And they can grow in grace. A treatment of this process of
growth is given in Sermon Vlll.ii.4-13, and LXXVI.
The
distinction between those who are justified, and growing in grace,
and those who have been granted perfect love is set out in the
"Plain Account of Christian Perfection" (Works , XI, p. 379).
"They are freed from evil thoughts, so that they cannot enter into
them, no, not for a moment. Aforetime, when an evil thought
came in, they looked up, and it vanished away. But now it does
not come in, there being no room for this, in a soul which is full
of God." However, practical account had to be taken of the
circumstance that the majority of devout Methodists, whose final
salvation it was uncharitable to question, had not come to this
experience. So Wesley had to teach that these would be granted
holiness in the hour of death . This is really a way of saying that
the matter is shrouded in mystery. So, in the Methodist Minutes
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for August 2, 1745:

Q. What will become of a man - if he dies without being
thus sanctified?
A. He cannot see the Lord. But none who seeks it sincerely
shall or can die without it, though possibly he may not attain
it till the very article of death.
Q. But ought we not to expect it sooner?
A. Why not? Although we grant: That the generality of
believers whom we have hitherto known are not so sanctified
till near death.
(See also Methodist Minutes, June 17, 1747, QQ 1-17,
particularly 2.)
There was a certain difference of op101on between John and
Charles Wesley at this point. Brother Charles viewed perfection as
virtually of an absolute kind , and therefore only possible at death.
Perfection comes slowly, as a result of painful self-abegnation.
(See the 1960 Cambridge dissertation by James Dale , The Poetry of
Charles Wesley .) It has to be admitted that, within the mainstream
of Methodism, Charles Wesley has largely carried the day, because
the effective witness to the preaching of holiness among Methodists
has been through the singing of his great hymns on the subject.
These are all-aspiring prayers for the gift of perfect love .
Nowhere is there a claim to have attained . Whatever may be true
of the private experience of individuals, this attitude surely is the
proper ethos for general congregational worship. It is significant,
also, that neither of the Wesleys ever claimed that the gift had been
granted to them . In general, then , perfect love is something to be
accepted as the proper goal of serious Christian discipleship, to be
believed in, prayed for, and expected, but not claimed for oneself.
Perhaps the most widely loved of all Charles Wesley's great
prayers for the gift of perfect love is "Love divine, all loves
excelling" (The Methodist Hy mnal, p. 283) . The original form of
the second verse merits discussion , on account of its great
theological interest:
Breathe, 0 breathe Thy loving Spirit
Into every troubled breast,
Let us all in Thee inherit,
Let us find that second rest:
Take away our power of sinning,

Jn
Lk
Rom
Heb

20:22, 2 Tim 1:17
24:38
8:17
4:8-9
1 Jn 3:9

Alpha and Omega be,

Rev 1:8

End of faith as its beginning,
Set our hearts at liberty.

Heb 12:2
Ps
119:32 (B.C.P.)
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The phrase which has caused m1sg1vrng is "Take away our power
of sinning."
This, as Dr. Frank Baker observes, "implies an
extreme view of Christian perfection" (Representative Verse of
Charles Wesley, p. 95).
A phrase having similar implications,
which has also disappeared in modern Methodist hymnals, occurs in
the original text of "O come and dwell in me" (Hymns and Psalms,
293, M .H.B., p. 554):
The original offence
Out of my soul erase,
Enter Thyself, and drive it thence,
And take up all the place.
Original sin is that bias in common human nature which renders
temptation seductive, and evil in general easier to do than good,
and which secures that, unless supported by divine grace, all men
and women inevitably commit sin , and are by nature alienated
from God . For this bias to be entirely eliminated by divine grace
would indeed be the highest degree of perfect love.
The difficulty in "Take away our power of sinning" has been
commented upon by no less an authority on holiness than Fletcher
of Madeley:
Mr. Wesley says second rest, because an imperfect believer
enjoys a first inferior rest: if he did not, he would be no
believer. "Take away the power of sinning?" Is not this
expression too strong? Would it not be better to soften it by
saying "Take away the love of sinning"? (or the bent of the
mind towards sin .) Can God take away our power of sinning
without taking away our power of free obedience?
In line with this suggestion, American Methodist hymnals have
read "Take away our bent to sinning" (The Methodist Hymnal,
1964, no. 283), thus preserving a fine verse. John Wesley avoided
the difficulty by omitting the verse in his hymnals of 1761 and
1780.
The issue depends on what is meant by "liberty."
In the
ordinary secular sense of the word, "liberty" means autonomous
moral choice. The mental picture is that I have my hand on the
wheel, and am completely free to choose between "the high road"
and "the low road." The Christian agrees that this is a part of
liberty. As Fletcher observes, one cannot have responsible moral
choice without some measure of it. However, the "liberty" spoken
of in the New Testament is surely much more than this, a bare
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power of indifferent choice. The Christian picture of spiritual
liberty is that when one has used the wheel to steer on to one's
chosen course, one finds that one is in a high-power car on the
motorway, with no obstruction in sight. One then enjoys the
freedom to open out full throttle, mile after mile! Christian liberty
is the release of that fatal frustration of the divided heart which
prevents us from moving effectually upon that course of life which
our higher and "real mind" has resolved upon. It is the ending of
that condition diagnosed by St. Augustine, that the mind commands
the will, but the will disobeys, because the mind does not fully
command (Confessions , viii.21). By contrast, the unregenerate man
has indeed that degree of free moral choice which makes him
morally · responsible, but he is like the motorist with his hand on
the wheel , but who cannot move because he is in a traffic jam.
There is a nominal but painfully fettered freedom. However, if
the love of God and one's neighbor, shed abroad by the influence
of the Holy Spirit, is such as wholly to fire the imagination and
move the affections, so as to dominate the moral will, and make
obedience instant, constant and glad, this is holiness . Clearly, the
climax of this holiness would be a character and personality
entirely confirmed in good, so that the residual freedom of the will
to choose evil would be a purely nom inal freedom . It would be
present, as the theoretical condition for moral responsibility, but it
would not be exercised. Let me quote part of the note written
upon this hymn in my book, The Wesley Hymns as a Guide to
Scriptural T eaching:
The very bold petition "Take away our power of sinning" is
a reference to a famous passage in St. Augustine (De civitate
Dei, xxii, p. 30) in which he is discussing the spiritual
condition of unfallen Adam, as compared with the better
conditon of the redeemed. "The first immortality, which
Adam lost by sinning, was the ability not to die (posse non
mori); the new immortality will be the inability to die (non
posse mori). In the same way, the first freedom of choice
conveyed the ability not to sin (posse non peccare); the new
freedom will confer the inability to sin (non posse peccare). It surely cannot be said that God Himself has not freedom of
choice, because He is unable to sin?" Thus unfallen Adam
was morally free in the sense that he was not fated to sin.
The perfected in Christ will be morally free in a higher and
fuller sense. They will share in the moral freedom of God,

who, being entirely good, cannot sin. - The difficulty which
has troubled some is that whereas St. Augustine is talking
about the condition of the perfected saints in glory, of which
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this is doubtless true, Charles Wesley is praying that it may
happen on earth! Is it indeed possible for the believer to
speak as though the love and joy of heaven has actually come
down to earth? We observe, firstly, that Wesley's line is an
aspiring prayer that this degree of holiness may be granted,
And
not a presumptuous claim that he had attained.
secondly, a raptured poet must not be expected always to
express himself in the language of common sense, such as
may be taken literally. Even hymn writers may be allowed
on occasion some degree of enthusiastic poetic licence!
Nevertheless, the phrase is perhaps over-bold.
A prayer from the venerable Sarum Use speaks in a more
moderate tone, and framed in matchless English , but it joins in
voicing the petition for the divine gift of perfect love:
Almighty God, unto whom all hearts be open, all desires
known, and from whom no secrets are hid; Cleanse the
thoughts of our hearts by the inspiration of thy Holy Spirit,
that we may perfectly love thee, and worthily magnify thy
holy Name; through Christ our Lord. Amen .

Holiness Thought and the
Moral Image of Man
EDWARD H. MADDEN
Toward the end of the eighteenth century Christianity was at its
lowest ebb in the history of the American settlements. Moral
repugnance against Old School Calvinism had in large part made
deistic views of the Enlightenment an acceptable alternative to our
founding fathers. To the mass of people, however, the natural
theology of the Enlightenment soon proved to be as unpalatable as
Calvinism. So it was that, at the turn of the century, a new brand
of evangelical, freewill Trinitarian ism began to flourish and attract
converts by droves. Barton Stone, Alexander Campbell, Asa Shinn,
John Rankin, and Asa Mahan were active ministers on the
frontier- -that is, Kentucky, Ohio and what is now West Virginia-while Lyman Beecher preached the New Light doctrine in
Connecticut and Charles Grandison Finney preached through upper
New York State and produced, among others, the great Rochester
revival. I
The freewill Trinitarians, entirely interdenominational, were
completely dependent on Thomas Reid and the Scottish realist
tradition for their rebuttals of Calvinistic determinism and for their
agent causality interpretation of free will (which meant that man is
the cause of his own acts and nothing causes him to act the way he
does, for motives are not causes). The Americans were mainly
influenced by Reid and Dugald Stewart and, shortly after, by
Victor Cousin and Theodore Jouffroy, French advocates of much
of Reid's thought. We will examine in some detail the Trinitarians'
critique of Calvinism and their own concept of agent causality
since they constitute the crucial elements of the Reidian moral
image of man and hence of the freewill Trinitarians who grounded
their views in the Scottish tradition.2 Before beginning my detailed
examination I need to point out that the Holiness Movement is a
sub-class of freewill Trinitarianism. Holiness advocates, to be sure,
held the Reidian view of agency, like any other members of the
freewill Trinitarian tradition; but not all of the latter, of course,
held the holiness view of sanctification.
So it follows that
everything I say about agency will be true of the whole class.
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Those aspects of the moral image of man unique to holiness
thought we will examine a bit later.
I

Asa Mahan, first president of Oberlin College and deep in the
holiness tradition, ardently criticized Old School views; they make
moral responsibility impossible and turn God into an unjust tyrant.
If men have no power whatever to choose or act differently than in
fact they do, then the concepts of merit and demerit, and the
consequent propriety of reward and punishment, become
meaningless and inapplicable . And God is transformed into a
tyrant when he admonishes men to give up their sinful ways since
He is demanding of them the impossible. God must be seen on
Judgment Day as eternally damning certain souls and saving others
when none of the lot supposedly could have done other than they
did, and so merit no judgment at all. 3 Dr. Emmons' Old School
view is the oddest of all since he was an occasionalist and believed
that all things considered to have been done by human beings were
in fact done by the direct agency of God. Hence God is conceived
as punishing men for His divinely instituted acts. Do not all of
these strange consequences constitute a reductio ad absurdum of old
School Calvinism? Mahan answered "yes" unequivocally; but he
still needed to show that later Edwardsian efforts to make
determinism compatible with freedom and moral responsibility-what has come to be called "soft" determinism in contrast to the
" hard" determinism of the Old School--were unsatisfactory and
failed to do the job.
According to Jonathan Edwards, freedom means the power or
ability to do as one pleases. One is unfree only if he is compelled
to do other than he wishes. A man is not responsible for what he
is compelled to do, but he is responsible for what he does when he
is not coerced. After all, in such cases he is the one who does as
he pleases and so is responsible.
Mahan objected that this
argument confuses several senses of the word freedom, a confusion
made evident by comparing "freedom" with the concepts of
servitude and determinism.
Freedom contrasted with servitude
means that a man can do as he pleases because he is not in chains
or forced by other constraints to do other than he would . Freedom
contrasted with determinism means that a man can please (or will)
to do one thing rather than another; he is under no constraint to
will or choose the way he in fact does. Freedom in the second
sense is what is required for the ascription of responsibility.
Edwards allowed only freedom in the first sense and offered it,
irrelevantly, as sufficient grounds for ascribing responsibility.
Mahan summed up the point succinctly: determinism is identical
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with Fatalism "in its worst form"; they both alike affirm that man
can "do as he pleases" and both agree that "man cannot but please
to do as he does." 4
It might be supposed that the defense of free will, as in Mahan's
case, would invariably be directed against the Calvinists, and there
is much truth in such a supposition. However, some medics,
physiologists and chemists occasionally used their scientific
determinism against religion, and such scientists as well as the
Calvinists had to be dealt with by the New Lights. The defense of
free will against scientific determinism fell to the lot of Alexander
Campbell in his great debate with Robert Owen. 5
Owen failed to see, Campbell averred, that the concept of cause
is not applicable to human actions. To act as an agent "is quite
different from the running of water, the blowing of the wind, or
the revolution of a mill wheel." A cause necessarily produces its
effect while motives do not, for it is "up to the person" to decide
in any given case what motive, among many possible ones, will be
chosen and will explain why he acted the way he did . It is in this
sense that a person initiates an act, does something that makes the
future in part different from what it otherwise would be, and
prevents him from being simply a link in an infinite causal chain.
Frequently rational motives win out, though that need not be the
case. Choosing freely, Campbell wrote, "is sometimes to go with
our feelings, and sometimes against them." 6 But, whatever is
chosen, the fact remains that a person is able without any change
of character to choose and act differently at different times even
though the conditions, except for time, are identical.
Determinists objected that Campbell's view leads to
indeterminism and chaos. There would be no reliability in human
action if a person could act differently in two identical situations
and without a change in character to make the different responses
understandable. Campbell was unimpressed by the change-incharacter doctrine, part and parcel, as he saw it, of the whole
determinist misconception that motives are causes. What specific
counter-examples did Campbell have in mind? Something like the
following ones are implied by what he said in more general terms.
Man is not omniscient; he can misjudge the nature of an act one
time and judge correctly another. Or he might act perversely
toward moral rules, or even against his own legitimate interests, the
second time, say, just to prove, as Dostoievski would have it, that
he is not a set of piano keys to be played upon by external forces .
Or a person might intentionally allow a selfish motive to rule in
one case since sainthood is not demanded of him. He was helpful
to the needy last time; this time he passes by the needy and
indulges himself. Some people, to be sure, simply refuse to act in
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any consistent manner, choosing willy-nilly at the whim of the
moment.
Other people, it must be emphasized, act perfectly
consistently and predictably according to principles which they
have chosen to guide their lives. 7
Campbell would claim that none of these cases leads to
indeterminism or chaos but that they are perfectly understandable
in the agent causality framework and do not require invoking a
change in the agent's nature, the last resort in the determinist's
decline.
That the concept of cause is not applicable to human actions is
the theme of the whole Scottish tradition . A few writers in the
tradition, notably Dr. Gregory, tried to formalize the difference
between the cause-effect and motive-action relations, one of the
most successful being the conceptual-connection argument, still
promulgated in the twentieth century by such able philosophers as
A. I. Melden and several of Roderick Chisholm's students. 8
According to this argument, a cause and effect can be described
independently of each other, while a motive and an act cannot be
independently described since they are conceptually connected.
Motives provide the point of an action, and the action is to be
understood by this point--hence the two are conceptually or
intentionally related.
Not many figures in the early tradition
accepted this formal differentia, whatever its merits may be, since
it seems to depend upon a Humean view of causality but mainly
because Dugald Stewart thought such criteria unnecessary. There
is, he thought, a more direct way of making the distinction, which
involves knowledge of the Scot's metaphilosophy.
According to Asa Shinn, articulating the work of Reid , the mind
of man is not a tabula rasa but has nativistic epistemic import into
knowledge claims. 9 The concept of space, for example, cannot be
learned from experience inasmuch as it is a prerequisite for all
perceptual knowing and hence must be nativistically basic. The
same is true for agency theory. A person is directly aware of
acting freely and responsibly. This claim is universal and catholic,
and these criteria suggest that this awareness is basic and part of
the epistemic input of the intellect itself. Moreover, such a belief
is unavoidable in the sense that while one may reject it in his
philosophical study he immediately reverts to it in the market
place. That Hume and other skeptics admitted this fact speaks
highly of their honesty but not their consistency. Now, if a belief
is unavoidable it is necessary, but necessities cannot be learned
from experience. Hence the belief is part of the original epistemic
input of the intellect itself.
Kant later called such original
epistemic input the transcendental esthetic and the categories of the
understanding . Reid, however, being a natural realist, avoided
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Kant's distinction between phenomenal and noumenal and hence
avoided Kant's skepticism in advance.
It must not be supposed that the advocates of agent causality
thought man is always an agent, an initiator of events; far from it.
They believed that some human behavior, as distinct from an act,
is caused by events over which a person has no control. Thomas
Upham, professor of philosophy at Bowdoin College, and a stalwart
in the holiness tradition, stressed this point. 10 He was the most
psychologically sophisticated member of the Reidian tradition.
According to Upham, the McNaghten rule of insanity is pernicious.
On this rule, a person is insane if he does not know the difference
between right and wrong and cannot reason in the sense of relating
means to ends. Upham saw that such a rule was a disaster. He
was close to the mark when he insisted that a person can reason in
a perfectly acceptable way, adapting means to ends, but that this
ability is pointless when it proceeds from crazy premises. Such a
person is not responsible and yet, according to the McNaghten Act,
he can be condemned to death.
Moreover, the ascription of
insanity and commitment to an asylum is such a serious matter that
it must never be undertaken lightly, particularly since morally
depraved individuals have endeavored to fasten the charge of
insanity upon others in order to control them and their money.
Finally, Upham said, compassion toward people with mental
problems is essential. It is clearly the moral duty of society to see
that those who are legitimately committed are treated humanely.
Let us now sum up the moral image of man that emerges from
our discussion. An agent is dynamic and active, is not simply
acted upon, but initiates actions, is not epiphenomena! but makes a
crucial difference in the world . The agent is not a link in an
infinite causal chain but makes a genuine difference in what the
future will hold. He produces something new and original in the
universe by virtue of his free will. Agency is defined volitionally
and existentially; it is "up to a person" to decide what he will do
and what sort of person he will become. While one has motives
which suggest opposite kinds of acts, one must choose among them;
one must decide what will give meaning, whether good or bad, to
what one does or to the life one adopts. An agent is spontaneous,
and may even act perversely just to prove that he is not a piano
key to be played upon. An agent does not act rigidly; but may act
differently under identical conditions without chaos or the need of
introducing the change-of-character theme. His mind is not a
tabula rasa but is itself active and provides, along with releasing

occasions, its own explanation of his basic experience of freedom.
Finally, the agent is, or should be, compassionate, guarding the
unfortunately impaired ones to see that they are treated humanely.
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II
Having restored freedom to their satisfaction, the freewill
Trinitarians relied again on Reid and Stewart--and Butler, too--to
formulate a moral philosophy, something the Old School Calvinists
could not do given their "hard determinism ." The moral image of
man conceived by the Holiness Movement is identical with that of
the whole freewill Trinitarian tradition. As we shall see, they all
agreed in condemning classical utilitarianism, as well as the
Edwards-Finney variant of this doctrine . They generally espoused
instead a fitting-relationship and voluntaristic view of moral
philosophy. We must wait a bit longer before we d iscuss those
elements of the moral image of man unique to the holiness
tradition.
Francis Wayland, president of Brown University, was perhaps
the most relentless critic of classical utilitarianism . What follows is
only a small sample of his arguments, but even these cannot be
evaluated in our time span. 11
1. Children are perfectly aware of the differences between
right and wrong without being capable of comprehending, let
alone calculating, the greatest amount of happiness for all
people affected by an act.
2. We are frequently ignorant of what will happen in the
future; hence any moral judgment based on the consideration
of likely consequences is doomed to fail.
3. Every act has infinite consequences. Where, short of
infinity, can the utilitarian draw the line and make his
judgment?
4 . Crimes sometimes have the happiest results-- indeed,
given the utilitarian view, "we must award to the treac hery
of Judas the praise of the greatest virtue." 12
5. The utilitarian is unable to distinguish between specific
virtues; they are all taken up into the single virtue recognized
by utilitarians. Most duties depend upon fitting relations
among human beings . Gratitude and benefactor fit together,
and yet all fitting relationships are wiped out by the
utilitarian.
While evangelist C. G . Finney was an ardent critic of Calvinism,
he nevertheless, surprisingly, held a moral theory precisely like that
of Jonathan Edwards. 13 He was one of the very few New Lights to
accept Reid's agency theory but abandoned the moral theories of
the Scottish tradition. As we shall see , Finney wanted his view to
be distingu ished carefully from all forms of utilitarianism, though
it seemed to some of his peers that this was prec isely what it
amounted to.
Finney distinguished between a right intention and a derivative
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right act. He called the latter an "outward act" and said the only
reason for doing it is that one intends to promote universal wellbeing and this act will probably do so. He also called the intention
of the agent an act--it is the choice or decision to want to promote
universal well-being, and the only reason that justifies this choice
is the intrinsic goodness of the end envisioned. This "ultimate act"
must not itself be justified by any reference to utility. For Finney
that is precisely what utilitarians do--they fallaciously try to
justify the ultimate act. The worst "justification," he thought, was
Paley's wholly egoistic one to the effect that one should choose to
help others in the expectation of reward in the afterlife for doing
so!
It is certainly understandable that Finney did not want his view
associated with Paley's. However, those commentators on his moral
philosophy who called it a form of utilitarianism had no intention
of identifying it with Paley's system. The critics realized that
Finney's views were not identical with any other view (with the
exception of Edwards's) but argued that in the long run all
utilitarian or teleological systems have a common core of meaning.
They all insist that only one thing is intrinsically valuable--be it
pleasure, happiness, or well-being for me, you, or everyone,
including God--and that all other acts and events in the world are
valuable only insofar as they are conducive to achieving this end.
Finney's most intimate critic--his colleague Asa Mahan--focused
on what he took to be the essential point, namely, that there are
many basic obligations of life which cannot be reduced to one allinclusive principle. Obligations, duties and rights depend upon
perceiving certain "fitting relationships" in the web of social life.
Even Finney realizes, Mahan wrote, that there is a fitting
relationship between virtue and happiness. After all, who could
deny that Finney believes in the Final Judgment? Thus he must
believe that only virtuous people deserve to be happy. But then
Finney's single principle of right and wrong is already lost. 14 He
has at least one non-teleological sense of moral duty which is
incompatible with his general utilitarian views .
Tappan and Mahan claimed that no justification of moral rules
is possible--whether utilitarian, Kantian or any other--since they
all involve giving a non-moral reason for doing one's duty. We do
not give reasons why acting fairly is right; we simply see that it is
a fitting relation among all people, or, again, that it is part of a
web of social responses that constitutes a shared life, which may be
freely accepted and experienced. Just so, a person is free to reject
that way of living and, as contemporary advertisements have
stressed, "Dare to take it all." Tappan's and Mahan's views, we
might say, borrowing from contemporary usage, are existential.
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For the import of this word seems to fit precisely the freewill
claim that volition defines man, not reason or sensuousness. It
must be kept in mind, of course, that the freewill Trinitarians
insisted that the reasonable life is the moral life and they highly
regarded its control over sensuous motives. However, reason was
not coercive for them as it was for the post-Kantians. A man may
choose to adopt a reasonable motive, to accept the fitting
relationships, or choose a sensuous one to guide his actions; but in
either case he is responsible for his choice. He is responsible for
the kind of person he is to become.1.5
Let us see how the freewill Trinitarians fared on some basic
moral issue--and what issue could be more basic than the crime of
slavery?
We will consider in this context Campbell , Mahan,
Wayland, Finney, Fairchild and John Rankin. We will see how the
Reidian and utilitarian responses to the issue contrast.
Campbell's case is the saddest. He began as a Reidian in moral
philosophy and was actively anti-slavery in his earlier years. Then
the abolitionists came along--Weld, Garrison, Rankin, Mahan and
Luther Lee--and said that slavery was a sin, that sin cannot be
eliminated gradually, and that slavery, therefore, must be done
away with at once. Campbell agreed that if slavery were a sin then
immediate emancipation was necessary. But he then reasoned on
utilitarian grounds that emancipation was fraught with evil , would
disrupt the economy of the nation, and perhaps lead to civil war.
Hence he felt he must deny the premise and say that slavery was
not a sin. But on what grounds to sustain this denial? Campbell
decided to drop all philosophical morality and to put in its place a
biblical criterion of morality according to which slavery was not a
sin since the Bible condones it in several places and nowhere
rejects it explicitly as sinful. 16
One might have objected to
Campbell's claim and said that slavery seems out of harmony with
the whole spirit of the New Testament. Mahan, however, would
have none of these piecemeal responses. He considered all attempts
at biblical justifications of slavery as so much chaff in the wind.
He clearly did not believe that the Bible in any way condones
slavery. Mahan went to the heart of the matter when he said that
if one could clearly prove that the Bible condoned slavery he would
not have shown that slavery is right but that the Bible is wrong. 17
Wayland, sharing Mahan's moral philosophy, went at a slower
pace. He was anti-slavery always; but due to the violence of the
Dorr Rebellion--which concerned the issue of whether people
without property should have voting rights--he became frightened
of the abolitionists. However, his disgust with the Mexican War,
the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850, bleeding Kansas and numerous
other events, finally convinced him that slavery had to be done
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away with at whatever cost.
For a while he supported the
abolitionists only by "speaking the truth as he saw it" and
becoming active in the Free Soil and Republican parties.
Eventually, however, he fed, housed and clothed a runaway slave
and sent him safely to freedom. In 1859 he could not even bring
himself to condemn John Brown; he admired the "bravery,
coolness, and evident sincerity of the old captain." 18
Finney was clearly anti-slavery, preaching, as he did, against
slavery and occasionally taking active measures against it. Though
he was not necessarily opposed to his abolitionist colleagues, he was
by no means their leader.
Through the years fewer Oberlin
students became professional abolitionist lecturers, many having
been dissuaded from the task by Finney, who wanted to push
James H.
revivalism and regeneration of the soul instead.
Fairchild, third president of Oberlin and devoted follower of
Finney, was extremely conservative and during his presidency led
Oberlin out of the Holiness Movement. He was also orthodox in
political matters; e.g., he fought against women's suffrage to the
end.
Mahan, ardent abolitionist, was quite different from his cautious
colleagues. When Mahan was appointed president of Oberlin in
1835, the tradition started of flouting all fugitive slave laws,
whether state or federal. Oberlin was an extremely important part
of the underground railroad. Through the years many hundreds of
slaves found shelter in Oberlin, some staying indefinitely and
others pursuing the journey to Canada. Most of the Oberlin
community cooperated with this type of civil disobedience.
President Mahan's house was one of those in which runaway slaves
were regularly hidden. Mahan is reported to have said that should
the authorities attempt to capture the fugitives he and other
members of the community would fight until the last. While this
report came from Delazon Smith, an unreliable source, there is
nevertheless probably a small kernel of truth in it. 19
John Rankin, one of the greatest abolitionists, founded an antislavery society in Kentucky at the astoundingly early date of 1818.
As late as 1832 the Lane Seminary students in Cincinnati were
prohibited from having an abolitionist society. Rankin served two
pastorates in Carlisle, Kentucky, and subsequently moved to
Ripley, Ohio, not far from Cincinnati, where Rankin was well
known to Weld, Mahan and Lyman Beecher. Rankin did more
than preach and lecture against slavery. He was not content with
only trying to regenerate people's souls so that slavery would

eventually disappear; far from it.

Rankin was active in the

Underground Railroad and was perfectly located at Ripley to
receive runaway slaves on their flight to freedom . According to
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the National Cyclopedia, "He it was who assisted the colored
woman and her child, the originals of Eliza and her boy in Uncle
Tom's Cabin, to escape from slavery." 20 There is a John Rankin
House State Memorial in Ripley, a fine tribute to the real pioneer
among abolitionists.
Intransigence, boldness and volitional autonomy constitute the
moral image of man arising from the specific moral commitments
of the freewill Trinitarians. The agent absolutely rejects happiness
as the sum mum bonum and commits himself, uncoerced, to the
web of fitting relationship that constitutes a shared existence. He
emphasizes the fitting relationship between what a person does and
his just desserts. We must do our duty even if the consequences
are extremely painful. And so Mahan, John Copeland, Calvin
Fairbanks, Henry Cowles and Luther Lee, among others in the
holiness tradition, boldly opted for abolitionism. Many others in
the tradition worked actively in anti-slavery circles even though
they were not abolitionists. The agent never tries to prove that he
should act morally. To try to do so is to step out of the moral
realm . However, the agent remains volitionally autonomous. It is
"up to him" whether to step into the web or to stay out of it. The
agent must decide between conflicting motives; he must decide
what kind of person to become.
There are no acts without
motives, to be sure, but motives are not causes. The agent must
decide, sometimes early on, whether to act morally or "dare to take
it all."
III

The holiness tradition is extremely complex and does not lend
itself to anything like an adequate analysis in a few pages . The
complexity is suggested by the variety of names used to describe
the tradition: for example, scriptural holiness, Christian perfection ,
the second blessing, sanctification, the higher life, perfect love, full
consecration, the baptism of the Holy Ghost, the rest of faith , and
the enduement of power.21
While some of these expressions have been interpreted in
different ways, they have, nevertheless, a common Pentecostal
element since they stress the weakness and frailty of human agents
and their need for the indwelling Spirit to reach higher spiritual
levels. Through the grace of God, the indwelling Spirit is available
through deeply earnest and sincere prayers. The results of this
Presence are manifold: victory over sin, consolation in affliction,
sustainment of heavy burdens, transcendental joy in the presence
of God , and an enduement of power to work effectively for Him-to preach beyond one's own natural powers and thereby to be
wondrously successful in revivals and conversions in general.
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Scriptural holiness, Christian perfection, the second blessing,
sanctification, perfect love and full consecration generally referred
to victory over sin; baptism of the Holy Ghost and the "rest of
faith" to consolation and sustainment; and "the baptism" and the
enduement of power to doing God's work beyond one's natural
abilities.
The latter two expressions are the most strictly
Pentecostal referring, as they do, to the descent of the Holy Spirit
upon the apostles. 22
Let us pursue in some detail the sanctification, scriptural
perfection and full consecration strand in the Holiness Movement.
According to these doctrines, in order to achieve victory over sin,
the indwelling presence of the Holy Spirit must be sincerely prayed
for; and the grace of God brings about the indwelling Presence.
With the indwelling Spirit one becomes wholly sanctified and is
capable of a perfect commitment to follow God's commandments.
It must not be supposed, however, that a sanctified or fully
consecrated person necessarily acts perfectly. We must distinguish
between a sanctified will , which characterizes an agent, and
objective rightness or wrongness, which characterize an act. A
person is holy or perfect only if he is wholly committed to God's
commandments; an act is perfect if, in addition to the agent's
sanctified intention, the act itself is just, right or appropriate.
That a sanctified will seems attainable is not unlikely, since it
would be odd for a Christian knowingly to consecrate himself to
God only partially. But no person is able to act perfectly since no
one except God is infinitely wise.
Given one's imperfect
knowledge, a person is bound to produce out of ignorance acts that
are strangely wrong or unjust even though one's will is genuinely
sanctified. However, unjust acts resulting from ignorance are sins,
and the person's will not sanctified if the requisite knowledge is
available.
The distinction between the instantaneous sanctification of the
will and the growth in holiness through increased knowledge of the
will of God and to increased sensitivity to the casuistic dimensions
of morality is an important distinction and helps to clarify a
specific point of John Wesley's teaching. Sometimes he wrote as if
sanctification were instantaneous while at other times he seemed to
think of it as a gradual process. 23 It is not unlikely that Wesley's
problem resulted from not first distinguishing between the
sanctification of the will and the increase in holiness through
increasing knowledge. Sanctification of the will can then be
characterized as instantaneous and holiness as gradual, growing as

the knowledge of God's will, through the guidance of the Spirit,
becomes increasingly evident.
Calvinists asked if an allegedly sanctified individual would never
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be subject to temptation, which is itself a sin. In response, holiness
advocates pointed out that on this reasoning Christ himself would
count as a sinner since He was tempted--certainly a reductio ad
absurdum of the Calvinist thrust. "The fact that Christ was thus
tempted, and yet without sin, absolutely implies that mere
temptation to sin is not sin in anyone." Only temptation yielded to
is sin. "Temptation promptly resisted and overcome implies the
purest and brightest virtues known in the universe of God. " 24
The advocates of holiness, perfection and sanctification had
constantly to fend off the criticism that the movement was
antinomian in import. The critics thought that the inward presence
of the Holy Ghost amounts simply to the supplanting of human
agency by divine agency; and hence whatever a person does, since
the Spirit of Christ is operative, is right no matter if it contravenes
what we ordinarily mean by morality.
How is the holiness
tradition, they asked, different from Humphrey Noyes's antinomian
perfectionism which justified, on the grounds of the inward spirit,
such reprehensible practices as "complex marriages." And we can
only say that his followers who criticized Noyes did not see the
heart of the moral issue when they complained that their leader
usually got the most appealing complexes.
The Holiness Movement replied that antinomianism, the
displacement of human agency, is completely inapplicable to the
concept of sanctification since it denies what the movement insists
upon, agent causality, a strong formulation of the freewill doctrine .
Man is weak, to be sure, but free agency is involved in all holiness
transactions. A person sincerely prays, wholly uncoerced, for a
new nature capable of complete dedication to God's
commandments. The indwelling Spirit replaces a heart of stone
with a heart of flesh, and the agent has a new character for which
he freely asks: and, moreover, he is not coerced to keep this nature.
Again, keeping it must be of his own free choice. A wisely
sanctified believer is continuously watchful and, like the careful
sentry, is never for a moment off guard. It must never be
forgotten that the advocates of holiness and sanctification, given
their volitional outlook, believe that at every moment it is "up to
the person" to decide what to do, to choose what kind of person to
be, what sort of nature to have. 25 They may decide in different
ways, but if they choose sanctification it is as freely done as if
they had chosen to "dare to take it all ."
There are other ways of avoiding the charge of antinomianism.
Sanctification, said some people in the movement, results from the
united actions of the human agent and the indwelling Spirit. To be
sure, man is weak, but not wholly hopeless. Sanctification, rather,
can be conceived as a cooperative effort between the human and
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divine being: one tries one's best, and the other brings out the best
that is possible--and the best that is possible with the Spirit's aid is
perfect love and total commitment to God's commandments.
However, other people in the movement, holding even less
flattering views of humanity, tried to avoid antinomianism in still
another way. Some people in the movement had not rejected the
whole of Calvinism but believed that man is not simply weak but is
utterly depraved. Anything a human being did in conjunction with
the Spirit is bound to fail since corruption of any kind entails
falling to sin, not victory over it. The kind of cooperation needed
is a more humble one. A baptism of the Holy Ghost occurs only if
a person chooses to seek it, decides to ask for its bestowal as a free
gift from the grace of God. This much impact man has in the
transaction, but not a whit more. According to one commentator,
"It is our part, as the revealed condition of receiving the blessings
provided for us, to 'inquire of God to do it for us' ....By the free
assent, and consent, the full choice of our heart of hearts, Christ
thus dwells in our hearts." 26
There is still a problem on this view in spite of the emphasis on
the free and uncoerced supplication to the Spirit. Even if the
Spirit enters the heart of a person by devout invitation and
supplication, the agency of the person subsequently seems to be
supplanted by the agency of the Spirit. The holiness advocates
rejected this consequence and in order to avoid it had to introduce
a further role for human agency. The agent can always succumb to
previous sinful ways and thus lose the Spirit's guidance in !ife.
Our first parents and the fallen angels were once completely pure,
or sanctified, and still they were tempted and fell. "So, when we
have attained to a similar state, we are subject to the same
liabilities, and, without watchfulness and prayer on our part, 'as
the serpent beguiled Eve through his subtilty, so our minds will be
corrupted from the simplicity (perfect purity) that is in Christ.' " 27
The moral image of man that emerges from the theological
commitments of the Holiness Movement is something less flattering
than that derived from their philosophical views. Man is weak and
feeble and unable to conquer sin, sustain himself in troubled times,
do the work of God effectively in parish work or revivals, and so
on. According to some members of the tradition, man is not only
feeble and weak but utterly depraved . He needs the active support
of the Spirit to overcome sin , sustain heavy burdens and to advance
God's work beyond his natural abilities. We no longer hear that an
agent acts spontaneously, makes things happen, makes a difference

in how the future will turn out. There is no longer a refere nee to
nativistic moral input but many references to increased moral
knowledge through the Holy Spirit. Is there an incompatibility
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between the philosophical views on freedom and moral knowledge
and the theological views on the same topics held by the advocates
of the holiness tradition? I do not see that the views are strictly
incompatible but certainly I see a different emphasis, indeed a
strain, between the two contexts. Nevertheless, freedom remains
absolutely essential to the Holiness Movement in order to avoid
antinomianism.
Yes, freedom is still basic but not in its
philosophically dramatic form where one initiates actions and helps
bring to pass one of several potential futures. Finally, the sources
of moral knowledge in the philosophical and theological contexts
are quite different; however they need not be incompatible . But
has anyone shown what their relation is? No one with whom I am
acquainted has successfully explained the relationship.
IV
Mahan, Finney, Upham, W. E . Boardman, Luther Lee, Lucy
Stone, John G. Fee, John Copeland and Sallie Cowles, among
numerous others, were moral stalwarts in the holiness tradition in
America. They rarely seemed guilty of a rationalization to avoid
doing their duty.
Are the current members of the holiness
tradition, and those who are not within it but have great respect
for it, as steadfast? Or are they more prone to rationalize away
improper behavior? Consider a student at a Wesleyan seminary
who appropriates a book from the library on the grounds that he is
graduating and will need it much more than anyone else and will
use it more effectively than anyone else in his writings, dedicated,
as they are, to advancing God's work.
There is much
rationalization here to avoid calling the act what it really is:
stealing.
Some of the older stalwarts in the tradition were radical in a
sense which seems to be missing in the tradition currently. For a
number of them evil and sin had to be rectified no matter how
painful the consequences may have been. There were numerous
adamant abolitionists and most others in the tradition were at least
anti-slavery. 28 Have conditions changed or have people in the
tradition changed? I remember distinctly the deeply moving chapel
talk of Dr. William Abernathy in which he sensitively traced his
journey out of darkness into light, from an early racism to a
commitment in his maturity to the welfare of blacks. It remains
within the contemporary tradition the best rejection of segregation
and espousal of equal opportunity that I know. And we must keep
firmly in mind that Dr. Abernathy meant equal opportunity, not
reverse discrimination. Have we heeded what this fine gentleman
had to say? How many black people are there on the faculties of
holiness colleges around the country?

Holiness Thought and the Moral Image of Man

59

We must not lose perspective. There are many stalwarts in the
tradition today.
And not everyone in the early days of the
movement was saint-like. Robert Pearsall Smith's behavior was a
severe blow to the tradition. His moral behavior was shabby, to
say the least, and was the cause of a number of dropouts from the
movement. However, this is an isolated case, and the question still
remains, do we measure up to the founders?
Mahan died in poverty, though he managed to edit Divine Life
until his death. Are there many of us willing, like him, to emulate
poor Jesus for the sake of helping others?
Have any in the tradition tried recently to alleviate the tension-though not contradiction--between their philosophical views on
agency and their theological views on combatting sin? Or what are
the contemporary views?
All of these questions are difficult to answer, but they may be
summed up in a final question: would Jesus of Nazareth be
saddened by man's use of his gracious gift of freedom?
Particularly now? 30 Though the answers are difficult and not
obvious, it seems the duty of anyone in the tradition, or deeply
sympathetic with it, to raise these questions in a spirit of loving
care. Finally, I should like to express my admiration and respect
for the stalwarts in the tradition today. They carry on the best
f ea tu res of the tradition and are clearly and beautifully filled with
the presence of the Holy Spirit. I cannot work these matters into
my own metaphysics, but neither can I deny what is evident.
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Understanding God Incarnate
THOMAS V. MORRIS
The doctrine of the Incarnation is the central Christian
conviction that the man Jesus of Nazareth was and is God
Incarnate , the Second Person of the divine Trinity, God the Son, a
properly divine individual, in human nature. In Jesus, we are
confronted by one person in two natures, human and divine. Since
being formulated carefully at the Council of Chalcedon in 45 l A.O. ,
the two-natures view of Christ has served as a cornerstone of
Christian faith through all subsequent centuries, up until the
present day.
But like many other fundamental, traditional
Christian convictions, in recent years it has undergone a barrage of
severe criticism and has become a focus of widespread controversy.
A great deal of that controversy has arisen in England where on
occasion it seems that nearly everyone with an education and a
typewriter has a penchant for theological disputation. Recall for
example the publicity surrounding Bishop John Robinson's book
Honest to God, whose publication in 1963 set off an explosion of
reviews, response articles and letters to the editors of professional
journals, popular magazines and newspapers.
In 1977, the
publication of The Myth of God Incarnate, edited by John Hick,
had the same sort of result, generating and focusing much of the
controversy that currently surrounds the doctrine of the
Incarnation . Within months of its appearance, The Myth of God
Incarnate was answered by another collection of essays entitled The
Truth of God Incarnate. This soon was followed by another book
The Myth / Truth of God Incarnate, and another called simply God
Incarnate, with one more entitled Incarnation and Myth: The
Debate Continued hot on its heels, and so on, and so on.
In America, it seems that the only religious controversy we have
had even approaching these dimensions is the evolution-creation
debate, and that has attained its level of publicity only because of
the practical and legal questions of what should be taught in the
schools.
In general, we have tended to keep our disputes in
philosophical theology modestly confined to a few professional
journals. However, the recent attacks on Christian orthodoxy now
threaten to enter the popular press and the pubic arena on this side
of the Atlantic as well. To illustrate this let me quote from, of all
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things, a diet book published by a popular American
months ago, with the rather ambitious subtitle How to
and Change the World.
Paging through this little
shopping mall bookstore, I found sandwiched between
fat and roughage the statement:

press a few
L ose Weight
book in a
chapters on

Christian dogma contains a number of flagrant contradictions,
such as: that the same thing is both one and three things (the
Trinity) ... and that something can be both human and divine
(Christ).1
Now, how such a claim finds its way into a diet book I won' t
linger to explain. But let me comment on the specific charge that
this author, in common with many others, makes; the charge that
there is something logically or conceptually wrong with the
doctrine of the Incarnation . In particular I want to examine the
structure of that charge, sketch out one defensive strategy fo r
turning it back, and then outline two interestingly diffe re nt
attempts to explicate the doctrine coherently by elaborating on the
metaphysics of the Incarnation.
The charge of flagrant contradiction, or, more cautiously, of
incoherence, or even more cautiously yet, the charge of
metaphysical impossibility, has been repeated in various forms
quite often in recent years by critics of the doctrine of the
Incarnation . Basically, the sort of argument most of them seem to
have in mind is roughly something like the following: On a
standard and traditional conception of deity, God is omn ipote nt,
omniscient, incorporeal, impeccable and necessarily existent, among
other things.
Moreover, by our definition of "God," such
properties as these are, so to speak, constitutive of deity--it is
impossible that any individual be divine, or exemplify di vinity,
without having these properties. To claim some individual to be
divine without being omnipotent, say, or necessarily existent ,
would be on this view just as incoherent as supposing some
individual to be both a bachelor and married at one and the same
time. By contrast, we human beings seem clearly to e xe mplify the
logical complement (or "opposite") of each of these constitutive
divine attributes.
We are limited in power, restricted in
knowledge, embodied in flesh, liable to sin and are contingent
creations. Jesus is claimed in the doctr ine of the Incarnation to
have been both fully human and fully divine. But it is logicall y
impossible for any being to exemplify at one and the same time
both a property and its logical complement. Thus, recent c ritics
have concluded, it is logically impossible for any one person to be
both human and divine, to have all the attributes proper to deity
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and all those ingredient in human nature as well. The doctrine of
the Incarnation on this view is an incoherent theological
development of the early church which must be discarded by us in
favor of some other way of conceptualizing the importance of Jesus
for Christian faith.
He could not possibly have been God
Incarnate, a literally divine person in human nature.
As I have addressed this challenge to the doctrine of the
Incarnation in great detail elsewhere, in The Logic of God
Incarnate, I shall give only a relatively brief indication here of how
it can be answered.2 A lengthy response is not required in order
for us to be able to see how this currently popular sort of objection
can be turned back.
A couple of very simple metaphysical
distinctions will provide us with the basic apparatus for defending
orthodoxy against this charge, which otherwise can seem to be a
very formidable challenge indeed.
As it usually is presented, the sort of argument I have just
outlined treats humanity and divinity, or human nature and divine
nature, as each constituted by a set of properties individually
necessary and jointly sufficient for exemplifying that nature, for
being human, or for being divine. Such an argument most often
depends implicitly on a sort of essentialist metaphysic which has
been around for quite awhile, and which recently has experienced a
resurgence of popularity among philosophers. On such a view,
objects have two sorts of properties, essential and accidental.
Roughly speaking, a property can be essential to an object in either
of two ways. It is simply part of an individual's essence if the
individual which has it could not have existed without having it. It
is a kind-essential property if its exemplification is necessary for
an individual's belonging to a particular kind, for example, humankind. Human nature, then, consists in a set of properties severally
necessary and jointly sufficient for being human. And the same is
true of divine nature. The critic of the Incarnation begins with the
simple truth that there are many properties humans have which
God could not possibly have, goes on to assume that these
properties, or at least some of them, are essential properties of
being human, properties without which no one could be fully
human, and then concludes that no divine being could possibly
become a human being. The conclusion would be well drawn if
the assumption was correct. But it is this assumption we must
question.
Once a distinction between essential and accidental properties is
accepted, a distinction employed in this sort of argument against
incarnation, another simple distinction follows in its wake. Among
properties ordinarily characterizing human beings, some are
essential elements of human nature, but many just happen to be
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common human properties without also being essential. Consider
for example the property of having ten fingers. It is a common
human property, one possessed by a great number of people, but it
clearly is not a property essential to being human. People lose
fingers without thereby ceasing to be human . Further, consider a
common property which safely can be said to be a universal human
property, one had by every human being in history--the property
of living at some time on the surface of the earth. Obviously this
is not an essential human property either. It is clearly possible that
at some time in the future, human beings be born, live and die on
a space station, or on another planet colonized by earth, without
ever setting foot on the earth itself. So it is not a safe inference to
reason simply from a property's being common or even universal
among human beings that it is an essential human property, strictl y
necessary for exemplifying human nature.
The relevance of this distinction to the doctrine of the
Incarnation should be obvious . It is certainly quite common fo r
human beings to lack omnipotence, omniscience, necessary
existence, and so on. I think any orthodox Christian will agree
that, apart from Jesus, these are even universal features of human
existence . Further, in the case of any of us who do exemplify the
logical complements of these distinctively divine attributes, it may
well be most reasonable to hold that they are in our case essential
attributes. I, for example, could not possibly become omnipotent.
As a creature, I am essentially limited in power. But why think
this is true on account of human nature? Why think that any
attributes incompatible with deity are elements of human natu re,
properties without which one could not be truly or fully human ?
It's important here to draw another distinction. An individual is
fully human just in case that individual has all essential human
properties, all the properties composing basic human nature. An
individual is merely human if he has all those properties plus so me
additional limitation properties as well, properties such as that of
lacking omnipotence, that of lacking omniscience, and so on.
It is the claim of orthodox Christology that Jesus was fully
human without being merely human. He had all properties strictly
constitutive of human nature, but also had higher properties as
well, those properties distinctively constitutive of deit y. What is
crucial to realize here is that an orthodox Christian perspective on
human nature will just categorize all human properties logically
incompatible with a divine incarnation as, at most , essential to
being merely human, or, more exactly, as individually-esse ntial , not
kind-essential, properties of those of us who are merely human.
No orthodox theologian has ever held that Jesus was merely huma n,
only that he was fully human. It is held that the person who was
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God Incarnate had the full array of attributes essential to
humanity, and all those essential to divinity.
I am suggesting that, armed with a few simple distinctions, the
orthodox Christian can clarify his conception of human nature in
such a way as to provide for the coherence and metaphysical
possibility of the traditional doctrine of the Incarnation. But I am
sure it will be objected by many that to use these distinctions to
explicate what Chalcedon and the rest of the church has had in
mind about Jesus is to land oneself in some well-known absurdities.
On the Chalcedonian picture, it seems, Jesus was omniscient,
omnipotent, necessarily existent and all the rest, as well as being an
itinerant Jewish preacher. But this has appeared outlandish to most
contemporary theologians. Did the bouncing baby boy of Mary
and Joseph direct the workings of the cosmos from his crib? Was
this admittedly remarkable man, as he sat in a boat or under a fig
tree, actually omnipresent in all of creation? Did this carpenter's
son exist necessarily? These apparent implications of orthodoxy
can sound just too bizarre for even a moment's consideration,
despite any amount of what critics often see as no more than
metaphysical magic, or hypostatic hocus-pocus, we might engage in
to save the doctrine.
At this point we face two distinct problems. First, it may be
difficult to imagine how anyone could be genuinely human from
first to last while exemplifying the full array of divine attributes.
It may be just simply beyond belief that such an individual would
share the human condition. Second, when we study the biblical
portrayal of Christ, we do find ourselves presented with an
extraordinary individual, but as a matter of fact the Jesus of the
Gospels seems not to have been exemplifying all those impressive
Was he omnipotent?
He grew tired.
divine attributes.
Omniscient? On at least one occasion he indicated there was
something he did not know. Omnipresent? At one time he was in
Jericho; at another time in Jerusalem. He walked from one place
to another.
By means of the sorts of distinctions I have already sketched
out, we can defend the orthodox doctrine of the Incarnation against
direct charges of logical inconsistency. But we need much more
than this if we are to make sense of the doctrine, if we are to
come to any significant understanding of what it could mean for
Jesus to be God Incarnate. What we are forced to consider is
whether an account of the Incarnation can be provided which will
on the one hand recognize Christ as a properly divine being in

accordance with conciliar orthodoxy, and yet on the other hand
clearly allow his earthly sojourn a genuinely human quality, such as
what we find portrayed in the Gospels. I want to present the
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outlines of two very different attempts to provide such an acco unt,
and along the way indicate some of my own grounds for preferring
one to the other.
In the nineteenth century a view was developed which has come
to be known as "kenoticism" (from kenosis, the Greek word for
emptying; see Philippians 2:5-8). The central claim of kenotic
christology is that in order to enter the earthly stream of huma n
life, God the Son voluntarily and temporarily laid aside, or emptied
himself of, all those metaphysical attributes of deity which
Some people
otherwise would preclude such an incarnation.
understand kenoticism to involve the claim that the Son gave up all
the distinctively metaphysical attributes of deity for his time among
us, while yet retaining all the moral qualities which are prope rl y
divine. But of course it is just impossible that all the me taphysica l
attributes of deity be temporarily laid aside. No individual could
possibly cease to be eternal, or immutable, or necessarily existent,
for a brief period of time, not even a being with the most
astounding powers of self-limitation. But it can be argued in
defense of a kenotic christology that the kenotic maneuver need
not be applied to these properties. For example, relying on the
distinction between common and essential human properties, and
the distinction between being fully human and being merely
human, we can argue (I think, quite plausibly) that the properties
of coming into existence at some time (a contrary of eternality) and
contingency (the contradictory of necessity) are just not kindessential properties for being fully human. Thus, the individual
who was Jesus could have been both necessary and eternal in bas ic
metaphysical status while taking on the nature of a full y human
being. Furthermore, there are construals of divine immutability
which will allow the possibility of a divine incarnation, although
none of them will allow a movement of kenosis with respect to
immutability itself. But this is unnecessary anyway, since on the
sort of understanding of immutability clearly compatible with a
divine incarnation, God the Son could perfectly well retain his
proper immutability while yet exemplifying the fullness of human
nature. In short, it can be argued that, armed with the distinctions
we have drawn concerning human nature, we can see that any
divine attributes which do not allow of kenosis do not require it
either in order to be compatible with an incarnation into hum an
nature.
But I need to say something about how Jesus' hav ing these
kenotically recalcitrant metaphysical attributes need not have any
absurd implications for orthodoxy. First, it is an ancient, and
independently plausible, claim that no person is strictly identical
with his body. Even a modern materialist who holds that all
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personality is necessarily embodied need not deny this. So the
necessary existence of God the Son, with its implications that He
cannot have begun to exist and cannot cease to exist, and therefore
is eternal, does not entail that the earthly body in which He
incarnated Himself had these properties. His body was conceived,
and grew like any other human body.
Likewise, the kenotic
theologian must hold, a person is not identical with any particular
range of conscious experience, or any particular set of belief states,
he might have . So the eternality of God the Son need not entail
the comprehensive continuity of His cognitive states from His preincarnate mode of existence as God into His earthly childhood.
The kenotic theologian thus allows that the earthly mind-set, along
with the earthly body, came into existence and grew. Nothing
about the necessity, eternality or immutability (in a sense to be
explicated) of the divine Son need preclude this.
It is a standard kenotic claim that God the Son temporarily gave
up His omniscience for the course of the earthly stage of the
Incarna tion. From all eternity, He had been omniscient. For
roughly three decades He was not. But upon His Ascension, and
for all eternity future, He continues now to enjoy that maximal
noetic state once again. This is the kenotic story about God the
Son's knowledge. Clearly, it allows both the orthodox claim that
Jesus was God, and the biblical claim that He grew in wisdom as a
child.
It is fairly easy to explicate coherently the kenotic allegation that
the Son voluntarily and temporarily gave up His omniscience, later
For consider Shorty, a spy who is going on a
to regain it.
dangerous mission in which he will have to pretend to be a great
scientist with amnesia. So that he will not succumb to questioning
under torture if suspected, Shorty is given a limited- amnesia
producing pill, and an antidote for later use. Clearly, such a
scenario seems perfectly coherent. And in relevant respects it
parallels the kenotic claim about Christ.
Temporarily failing to exemplify the property of omniscience
thus seems, at least so far, to be a possibility. But what of
omnipotence and omnipresence? Perhaps the best understanding of
the attribute of omnipresence is that of its being the property of
being present everywhere in virtue of knowledge of and power
over any and every spatially located object. A divine being would
then presumably divest himself of that attribute by divesting
Omnipotence,
himself of the requisite power or knowledge.
however, may not so simply fit into the kenotic scheme. It, like
immutability, is what we might call an internally modalized
attribute. Being omnipotent is, very roughly, being able (having
the power) to do anything it would be logically possible (in the
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broadly logical sense) for a maximally perfect being to do. Now,
let us attempt to describe a case of fully voluntary kenosis with
respect to this property. A being, S, is omnipotent from ti to t2,
voluntarily divests himself of this property from t3 to t5, and
regains it at t6. What exactly is the state of S's power or abilities
at t4 , during the period of kenosis? If the state of kenosis is
entirely and thoroughly voluntary, at t4 S has the ability (an ability
which he freely refrains from exercising) to re-exempt ify
omnipotence. But at t4, if S can be such that he can do anything
logically possible for a maximally perfect being, then at that time
he can do anything logically possible for such a being--in other
words, it seems he is still omnipotent. If he cannot at t4 take up
his omnipotence again , he is not in a state of the thoroughl y
voluntary, temporary relinquishing of it.
If the kenotic theologian is committed to the complete
voluntariness of the state of the Incarnation, he thus may not be
able to hold that God the Son temporarily ceased to be omnipotent.
But if the Son then lacked at least omniscience, one piece of
knowledge He may be said to have lacked is the knowledge of His
being omnipotent. And anyone who has restricted his knowledge
of the range of his own power may be argued thereby to have
restricted the exercise of his power, since, presumably, no one
usually draws on resources he does not believe he has.
By maneuvers such as this, kenoticism can attempt to explain
how it is that:
l. Omniscience, omnipotence and omnipresence are properly
divine attributes;
2. Jesus was divine as well as human; but,
3. During the decades of His time among us on earth, this
individual appeared to have none of these attributes.
The kenotic strategy has had many critics, but most of them have
failed to appreciate the subtleties of a limited kenotic picture with
elements such as these. When combined with the distinctions we
have drawn concerning human nature, the kenotic maneuver
applied to the attribute of omniscience alone can appear to go a
significant way toward ridding orthodoxy of any apparently absurd
implications.
I do not, however, find the traditional kenotic strategy full y
plausible, or even very attractive. I'll mention here only a couple
of problems I think it faces. First, given any traditional and
standard analysis of the divine attributes, kenoticism requires a
general view of the modalities of those attributes which is less than
fully satisfactory. Second, on the same condition, it necessitates
abandoning any plausible, substantive metaphysical ascription of
immutability to God, of even a quite moderate form .
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The first point about modality is this. As I mentioned earlier, it
is a fairly standard theistic view that there are properties essential
to being God, attributes which can be considered to be constitutive
of deity. Omnipotence and omniscience are clear and relatively
uncontroversial as examples of such properties. It is impossible, on
this view, for an individual to be God, or to be literally divine,
without being omnipotent and omniscient. Many orthodox theists,
in particular many of those who endorse an Anselmian conception
of God , go further and hold that omnipotence, omniscience and the
other attributes constitutive of deity form not only something like
the kind- essence of deity, but also serve as components of the
individual-essence of any being who is God. Moreover, many also
go on to hold the even more stringent and exalted view that no
individual can possibly count as God unless it is essentially
possessed of maximal power, and likewise for the other attributes
constitutive of deity.
On this view, there is a collection of
attributes an individual must have, and must have essentially, in
order to be strictly, literally divine.
It should be clear that on this modally exalted view of deity,
divine kenosis as I have explicated it so far would be an
impossibility. No individual can give up temporarily a property he
has essentially. If any being who is divine must have all the
metaphysically distinctive attributes of deity essentially, none of
them could be given up by him temporarily, while he yet
continued to exist. If omniscience is an essential property of God
the Son, He could not have given it up temporarily. If it is merely
a requisite of deity, but not a part of His individual essence, He
could have given it up, but He would thereby have ceased to be
God. So the earthly period of the Incarnation would not, after all,
have presented us with an individual with the two natures of
humanity and divinity simultaneously. On either understanding of
the modal status of omniscience, the traditional kenotic strategy as
so far presented cannot be used to explicate and defend the
orthodox doctrine of the Incarnation.
Now consider for a moment the ascription of immutability to
God.
A number of prominent theists throughout history have
understood God's immutability to be the property of being
absolutely incapable of undergoing or engaging in any sort of real
change whatsoever.
It's obvious that this extreme sort of
immutability would disallow the possibility of a divine kenosis.
But what is important to note is that even moderate construals of
immutability would render kenosis impossible.
Consider, for

example, the conception according to which divine immutability
consists in simply the impossibility of any individual's beginning to
have or ceasing to have any of the attributes distinctive of deity,
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such as omnipotence or omniscience.
Such a conception is
moderate in that it allows many sorts of change in the case of God,
but it is nonetheless a conception of divine immutability because it
disallows the possibility of basic change with respect to the
exemplification of the distinctively divine attributes. This is a
view I think many traditional theists, including Christian theists,
would endorse, and it is also a view which rules out the kenotic
strategy for defending the doctrine of the Incarnation, at least in
So again at this point, traditional kenotic
its standard form.
christology is incompatible with a view which is otherwise very
attractive to theists.
But why accept any of these views about the modal status of the
divine attributes? It has been suggested by some very traditional,
conservative theists that these modal claims are untrue. Stephen
Davis, for example, has claimed to see no reason to think that
omniscience is necessary for being divine. Other philosophers have
suggested that on a certain view of the Trinity, the divine persons
may differ in the modal status of their attributes; for example, it
could be that God the Father is essentially omniscient, and that
God the Son exemplifies that property only contingently, being
capable of ceasing to have it for a while. If we make less than the
most modally exalted claims for deity, the standard kenotic strategy
will be a live option for displaying the coherence of the
Incarnation and explicating some of its features. But it seems to
me that there are plausible grounds of an Anselmian sort to make
such strong modal claims for deity as those I have mentioned. If
such claims clearly prohibited an incarnation, I would join Davis
and others in relinquishing them. For any Anselmian intuitions on
which they are ultimately based are after all defeasible. But I am
inclined to think that these modally maximal claims can be made
for God and can be reconciled quite well with the evident facts of
the career of Jesus that kenoticism tries to accommodate. If I can
go some distance toward showing this, I can thereby provide some
reason for thinking that the modal background of standard
kenoticism represents at least an unnecessary weakening of the
claims many traditional theists otherwise want to make about God.
I want to sketch out an alternative to kenoticism which accords
with a modally exalted conception of deity. It is a perspective
which may even comport with the most extreme understanding of
divine immutability, if that construal is compatible with any divine
agency in a world such as ours. It is clearly a perspective which
stands fully consistent with the more moderate version of divine
immutability most theists are prepared to endorse. In many ways it
seems to me to offer a picture, or model, of the Incarnation which
is superior to that provided by a kenotic view. The view I want to
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present can be called, succinctly, if possibl y somewhat
misleadingly, " the two-minds view of Christ." It is an ancient
view which has been relatively neglected for a long time. I believe
some distinctively modern perspectives can be drawn upon to
explicate it and display its plausibility.
Recall first of all a claim needed for kenoticism, the claim that
no person is identical with any particular range of conscious
experience, or collection of belief states, he might have. I think
that the truth of this claim will follow from any modally plausible
and metaphysically careful account of what a person is. With this
in mind, we can begin to appreciate the early view that in the case
of God Incarnate, we must recognize something like two distinct
ranges of consciousness. There is first what we can call the eternal
mind of God the Son with its distinctively divine consciousness,
whatever that might be like, encompassing the full scope of
omn1sc1ence.
And , in addition, there is a distinctly earthly
consciousness which came into existence and grew and developed as
the boy Jesus grew and developed. It drew its visual imagery from
what the eyes of Jesus saw, and its concepts from the languages he
The earthly range of consciousness, and selflearn ed.
consciousness, was thoroughly human, Jewish and first century
Palestinian in nature.
We can view the two ranges of consciousness (and, analogously,
the two noetic structures encompassing them) as follows: The divine
mind of God the Son contained, but was not contained by, His
earthly mind, or range of consciousness. That is to say, there was
what can be called an asymmetric accessing relation between the
two minds. Think, for example, of two computer p rograms or
informational systems, one containing but not contained by the
other. The divine mind had full and direct access to the earthly,
human experience being had through the Incarnation, but the
earthly consciousness did not have such full and direct access to the
content of the over-arching omniscience proper to the Logos; only
such access, on occasion, as the divine mind allowed it to have.
There thus was a meta physical and personal depth to the man Jesus
lacking in the case of every individual who is merely human.
T his account allows for the apparent intellectual and spiritual
growth of Jesus in His humanity to be a real development. And
when it is used in connection with the distinctions we have drawn
concerning human nature, we have in principle a full a nd adequate
account of the basic features of the metaphysics of the Incarnation.
In particular, this view allows us to avoid the absurdities to which

orthodoxy has always seemed vulnerable. On it, we have in the
person of Jes us no case of a God merely dressed up as a man. We
have an individual who is fully human, and who shares in the
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human condition, experiencing the world in a human perspective.
Nor is it
No docetic absurdities are implied by the view.
Nestorian.
Nor Appolinarian. There is one person with two
natures, and two ranges of consciousness. He is not the theological
equivalent of a centaur, half God and half man. He is fully
human, but not merely human. He is also fully divine.
The two-minds view seems to me, further, to be a clear
improvement over standard kenoticism. When He became a man,
God the Son did not give up anything of deity, He merely took on
the nature and condition of humanity. We can capture full well
the New Testament claim that in the Incarnation, God the Son
humbled Himself, without following keno tic christology in holding
that He gave up any metaphysical attributes distinctive of deity.
His humbling consisted rather in His rendering Himself vulnerable
to the pains, sufferings, aggravations and agonies which became
His as a man but which, in His exclusively divine form of
existence, could not have touched Him this way. It is not by virtue
of what He gave up, but in virtue of what He took on, that He
humbled Himself. This sort of divine kenosis was a feature of the
Incarnation, but so understood, it is a f eatu re which accords
logically with strong claims concerning the modality and
immutability of the attributes distinctive of, and traditionally held
to be constitutive of deity. No kenotic move with any of those
attributes is required for ridding orthodoxy of any appearance of
absurdity.
But can we really understand what it is to attribute two minds,
or two ranges of consciousness, to one person? That depends on
what is required for understanding the claim. Can we know what
it is like to be a God-man? Well, can we know what it is like to
be a bat? It is hard, if possible at all, to imagine what a sonarconsciousness is like. Likewise, we do not, and cannot, know what
it is like to be God, at least not in the way we know what it is like
to be a human being. It is no objection to my suggestions that it is
impossible in this sense to know what it would be like to be a
God-man with two related but distinct ranges of consciousness.
But as a matter of fact, we can fill out some significant level of
understanding concerning the claim by way of some analogies.
I have suggested already a computer or artificial intelligence
analogy. Consider two or three others. First, an interesting, and
interestingly parallel, dream phenomenon is reported by many
people. It is an experience I think I have had myself on more than
one occasion. The dreamer is having a dream with a large cast of
characters.
The dreamer himself is one of those characters,
pe rceiving the internal environs of the dream and taking part in its
action "from within." But, at the same time, the dreamer "as
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sleeper" is somehow aware, in what could be called an overarching
level of consciousness, that it is just a dream that is going on, in
which he is playing a role as one of the characters. If in fact there
is in such an experience a twofold consciousness, one "within" the
dream, the other "outside" the dream simultaneously, then we
have, if not a model, then at least an analogy of some value in
helping us to get some imaginative grip on the two- minds picture
of the Incarnation. It is possible, though, that in such experiences
the dreamer is very rapidly alternating between two perspectives.
And of course this would provide no model or particularly good
analogy at all.
Consider the common claim in twentieth-century psychology
that there are various strata to the ordinary human mind. The
postulated unconscious, or subconscious, mind would stand in an
asymmetric accessing relation to the conscious mind somewhat
parallel to that postulated between the divine consciousness and the
earthly consciousness of God Incarnate. If modern psychology is
even possibly right in this postulation, one person can have
different levels or ranges of mentality. In the case of Jesus, there
would then be a very important extra depth had in virtue of His
being divine.
Finally, there are cases of commissurotomy, multiple personality
and even hypnosis, in which we are confronted by what seems to
be, in some significant sense, a single individual human being, one
person, but one person with apparently two or more distinct
strea ms or ranges of consciousness, distinct domains of experience.
Now, of course, there are philosophers who claim that in many if
not all cases of multiple, simultaneous ranges of experience
associated with the stimulation of one human body, the requisite
conditions are Jacking for judging there to be a single person who
is the ultimate bearer of the disparate sets of experience. Some
theorists identify each discrete range of consciousness in the
commissurotomy patient, and each personality in the case of a
multiple personality, as a person. Such a claim is less often made
with respect to different levels of consciousness or divergent
streams of awareness associated with cases of hypnotism. But, in
any case, the sort of identification can be argued to be implausible.
If one troubling, aberrant personality is eliminated therapeutically
from the behavioral repertoire of someone afflicted with multiple
personalities, the therapist surely need not see the effect of his
work as the killing of a person. Moreover, it is plausible, and
indeed illuminating, to view normal persons as either having or
even being systems of systems of mentality or experience. And,
again, if it is even conceivable that one person have,
simultaneously, such distinct ranges of mentality, we may have
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here, in at least some of the more unusual cases, vivid, partial
analogies which can help us to gain some firmer understanding of
the two-minds view.
As a matter of fact, in some cases of multiple personality, there
exists one personality with apparently full and direct knowledge of
the experiences had, information gathered, and action initiated by
one or more other personalities, a sort of knowledge which is not
had by any other personality concerning it. In other words, there
seem to exist asymmetric accessing relations in such cases
interestingly, though of course not perfectly, parallel to the sort of
relation claimed by the two-minds view to hold between the divine
and human minds of Christ.
Does the two-minds view then present the Incarnation as a case
of split-personality on the part of God the Son? And if so, should
not the recognition of this alone suffice for a rejection of the view
as an unworthy, demeaning characterization of Christ? Does what
initially can appear to serve as a partial explication of orthodoxy
end up amounting to no more than a gross impiety?
First of all, the reference to some phenomena of multiple
personality here is intended only to provide a partial analogy for
some of what the two-minds view claims to be true in the case of
Christ. It is to have no more than the limited, but hopefully
helpful, function of providing some understanding of, and
imaginative grip on, the central elements of the two-minds view.
It thus is intended to serve the same function as the computer (AI)
analogy, the dream analogy, and the reference to the classic
distinction between the conscious and unconscious, or subconscious,
mind . It is not intended to be a complete modelling of the noetic
f ea tu res of the Incarnation.
Furthermore, the analogy or partial parallel is in no way
demeaning to God the Son. To see this we must ask exactly what
it is about the phenomena of multiple personality generally which
renders the state of exhibiting such phenomena a bad state to be in
for a human being, a state which it would be better to be without.
The answer is, I think, quite simple. Typical cases of multiple
personality exhibit two negative features: they are not mental
states, or arrangements, voluntarily entered into by the person who
exhibits the phenomena, and they are not mental states, or
arrangements, conducive to the attainment of goals valuable to the
person involved.
Both these features are, on any orthodox
deployment of the two-minds views, absent from the case of
Christ's exemplification of two minds. His taking on of a human
mind was entirely voluntary. And, given any traditional account of
the purpose of the Incarnation, it was conducive to, if not in fact
necessary for, the attainment of goals valuable to God. So it seems
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to me that we have no reason from this quarter to hesitate using
whatever parallel phenomena we find in psychologically unusual
human cases to help us to understand the relevant aspects of the
Incarnation.
The two-minds view of Christ allows us to take seriously the
human limitations of the earthly career of Jesus without incurring
the metaphysical and modal costs of kenoticism. I believe it is a
very powerful picture, and that it can be an important ingredient
in philosophically explicating the orthodox doctrine of the
Incarnation and defending it against all forms of the contemporary
incoherence challenge.
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The Moral Obligation of Belief
JERRY L. WALLS
I

The "ethics of belief'' is a much discussed topic in modern and
contemporary philosophy. It is fairly common to see discussion of
what we ought to believe, are warranted in assuming, should
conclude, and so on. Phrases such as these clearly indicate that
morality and epistemology overlap in some very interesting ways.
Indeed, epistemology and ethics converge in many cases in
everyday life when we assess beliefs and judgments in terms of
blame or approval.
Perhaps the most extreme example of assigning blame to beliefs
is in the Christian tradition. A classic passage illustrating this is
Romans l, where Paul says that those who do not believe in God
are morally culpable. But the Christian tradition goes further and
requires more specific beliefs. For instance, the Athanasian Creed
which expounds in detail the doctrines of the Incarnation and
Trinity, begins with this sober claim: "Whoever will be saved,
before all things it is necessary that he hold the Catholic Faith.
Which Faith except everyone do keep whole and undefiled, without
doubt he shall perish everlastingly." The idea here is that certain
beliefs are essential for salvation, and that those who do not accept
them are damned. Surely damnation is the ultimate form of blame
for wrong belief. Moreover--and most significantly--the notion
that belief is important for salvation can be supported by Christ's
own words. In the Gospel of John, for example, He is reported as
saying "if you do not believe that I am the one I claim to be, you
will indeed die in your sins" (John 8:24).
It is not surprising that this element of Christian teaching has
proven offensive to many. Some would even say that this very
teaching provides a good reason not to believe Christianity. The
idea that one's beliefs about Christ could be culpable strikes some
as simply outrageous.
Richard Robinson expresses this view
pointedly:
It is most important to reject the view that it is a sin not to

believe in Jesus; for the view that a belief can be sinful is
very harmful and wrong. It destroys the whole ideal of
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knowledge and reason, and prevents man from achieving the
knowledge in which much of his dignity and much of his
safety lie . No belief is as such morally wrong; but it is
morally wrong to form one's beliefs in view of something
other than truth and probability; and Jesus demanded this
moral wrong ... .It is terrible to think how many million people
have, as a result of those passages in the gospels about having
faith, done what probably each of us here did in his
childhood, tried to hypnotize himself into some particular
belief and to disregard whatever scraps of judgment he
possessed. The fine things in Jesus' preaching have been and
will be greatly harmed by this blasphemy against reason.1
This passage well expresses the aversion which many have felt to
the Christian view that it is wrong not to believe in Christ.
Robinson's general point is that beliefs as such are not fit subjects
for moral evaluations. No belief is itself wrong in the moral sense.
What is right or wrong is how one forms beliefs. Robinson's view
is that beliefs should be formed in view of truth and probability,
and Christ violated this ideal in demanding belief in Himself. In
his experience, to believe in Christ is to try to "hypnotize" oneself
to so believe, in defiance of what he actually judges to be true .
Given this picture, it is no wonder that many have recoiled from
the idea that one must believe certain things in order to be saved.
Indeed, it is noteworthy that Christian thinkers, too, have
backed away from the claim that beliefs about God and Christ are
blameworthy. Nor should this surprise us, in light of the steady
stream of attacks which have, since the Enlightenment, been
levelled against Christian belief in general.
In previous ages
Christian thinkers were generally confident that it could be known
and shown that God exists, that Christ is His Son, that Christ was
raised from the dead, and so on. Given this confidence, it is easy
to see why those who did not believe were considered
blameworthy, for the evidence for God's existence and other
Christian doctrine was thought to be clear and compelling.
Now, however, it is generally agreed that there is no compelling
argument for God's existence, let alone for the deity of Christ. In
this intellectual climate there is accordingly much greater
For if there is no
reluctance to think unbelief is culpable.
substantial reason to believe in God, there hardly seems to be any
warrant for thinking anyone might be held accountable for
unbelief. Related to this, I suggest, is the quiet abandonment of
the doctrine of hell among Christian thinkers in favor of
universalism.
However, the doctrine of hell remains a thorny problem which
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cannot be so easily ignored. As Peter Geach claims:
We cannot be Christians, followers of Christ, we cannot even
know what it is to be a Christian, unless the Gospels give at
least an approximately correct account of Christ's teaching.
And if the Gospel account is even approximately correct,
then it is perfectly clear that according to that teaching many
men are irretrievably lost.2
And, as we have already noted, Christ has traditionally been
understood as teaching that unbelief is one of the sins which leads
to damnation.
I want to insist that this is an issue which Christian thinkers
must face.
Unless they are willing frankly to argue that the
Christian tradition has misunderstood Christ and is mistaken in
teaching that unbelief is blameworthy, and may even lead to
damnation, they should offer some account of why unbelief is
culpable. For the remainder of this paper I will assume the
Christian tradition is correct in teaching that unbelief is morally
culpable and even leads to damnation.3 I will attempt to defend
and make sense of this claim. My purpose is not to argue for the
existence of God or the truth of Christian doctrine. I only suggest
the lines of argument which underlie the notion that unbelief is
blameworthy.
II

Let us approach this problem by considering in general terms
the fact that we do sometimes judge beliefs to be morally wrong.
The question is, when do we judge a belief to be morally wrong?
Why do we sometimes render this verdict?
Consider a few examples. In the state of Indiana there have
recently been cases of parents who were found guilty in court
because they neglected to get medical care for their children, who
consequently died. An interesting thing about these cases is that
the parents are members of a religious cult which believes that it is
wrong to seek medical attention. Now it may be that what is
blameworthy in these cases is not the belief that it is wrong to seek
medical attention, but the action which follows from it, namely,
keeping children from needed medical care . However, these cases
illustrate one of the reasons why beliefs are sometimes culpable:
because they are the basis for actions. Indeed, the relationship
between belief and action is so intimate that the action cannot be

blamed without also blaming the belief. For the action does not
stand alone. It is a direct consequence of the belief.
Or take the case of a tobacco company executive who denies
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that smoking is hazardous to health. We suspect that his belief is
prompted by financial motives and that he has ignored or
suppressed the substantial evidence that smoking is harmful to our
health .
More directly culpable would be a physician who continues to
use a drug for treatment which research indicates has very negative
side effects. If she has heard of the research, but has not bothered
to check it, we would say she is blameworthy for believing the
drug harmless, especially if it turns out otherwise. We would be
particularly justified in blaming her if she has ample opportunity
for keeping up on the research, but spends all her free time, say,
playing tennis.
It is worth stressing here that, in this case, the physician's belief
is a consequence of an action, namely, neglect of the research .
This contrasts with our example above of the parents whose actions
were the consequence of their belief. These examples illustrate
that there is a two-way street between belief and action and that
beliefs may be blameworthy either because they are the basis of
wrong actions or the consequence of wrong actions.
Now consider the case of a person who hears and believes
v1c10us gossip. Let us say Quine tells Quinn that Quinton is a
fraud and a liar. Suppose also that up to that point, Quinn has had
good reason to believe Quinton is a good and honest man . If
Quinn simply accepts Quine's word and henceforth believes that
Quinton is a fraud and a liar, I think we would blame him for this
belief. We would think he should have investigated the charge
before accepting it. We think beliefs about the character of other
persons are serious matters and should not be arrived at carelessly
or casually .
Think now of a person who is informed of an alleged duty.
Suppose Gray is running for public office and hears from a friend
about the requirement in the law to keep an account of all
campaign expenditures. Suppose further that Gray does not bother
to confirm or disconfirm what is heard. He goes on in the belief
that it is not important to keep such an account. Later, if Gray
runs into trouble with the law for illegal campaign practices, we
would think him culpable for believing it unnecessary to record his
expenditures.
Finally, consider the extreme case of someone who believes
there are no moral distinctions, that the whole idea of morality is
superstitious or just plain silly. Most of us would judge such a
belief to be not only mistaken, but also corrupt. Why is this so?
Alvin Plantinga offers this explanation:
A part of what is involved in our blaming people for holding
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corrupt beliefs, I think, is our supposing that the normal
human condition is to reject them, just as the normal human
condition is to accept modus ponens, say, as valid. We think
a normal human being will find injustice--the sort depicted,
for example, in the story the prophet Nathan told David-despicable and odious. In the face of this natural tendency or
prompting, to accept the view that such behavior is perfectly
proper requires something like a special act of will--a special
act of ill will. Such a person, we think, knows better, chooses
what in some sense he knows to be wrong.4
In this quote, Plantinga puts his finger on one of the main reasons
why we can evaluate beliefs in moral terms: because some beliefs
are chosen. Some of our beliefs are like actions in this sense, and
most would agree that we are responsible for our actions.
But it may be doubted whether our beliefs really are like
actions . For most, if not all, of our actions are under our direct
control. For instance, we voluntarily and directly perform such
actions as turning our head or pointing our finger. But can we
choose to believe things in the same direct way as we perform
basic actions? The answer, I think, is generally no. With respect
to most of our ordinary beliefs we are passive rather than active.
Our perceptual beliefs, for instance, are not chosen . We simply
believe many things as the immediate result of seeing and hearing
the sights and sounds around us. Similarly, we believe many other
things because they seem true to us, apart from any choice we have
made.
So generally we do not directly choose our beliefs. However,
this still leaves open the possibility that we may indirectly choose
what we believe. For instance, if I want to believe a certain
proposition, P, I may cultivate belief in P by performing certain
actions. For instance, I may gather and reflect on evidence which
is relevant to P or read books by people who believe P. I may
consciously try to modify my other beliefs so they are compatible
with P. Eventually, I may find myself believing P.
In a similar vein, consider how someone may cultivate wrong
moral beliefs by making wrong choices. For instance, a person
who performed a number of unjust actions may come to believe
that actions which almost all of us would regard as wrong are
actually right. That person may modify his or her previous moral
beliefs in order to believe-those actions were justified.
Of course, it may be objected that a person would already have

to believe that an unjust action was acceptable in order to perform
it. This points up again that there is a two-way street between
belief and action, and it is not always easy to tell which direction
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the traffic is moving. However, the point still stands, I think , that
we do choose some of our beliefs, if not directly, then indirectly.
With these examples before us, we turn to the more specific
question of how beliefs with respect to God may be blameworthy.
I will deal with this question by considering two well-known
accounts of religious belief in contemporary philosophy of religion,
namely, those represented by Alvin Plantinga and Richard
Swinburne. My main concern is to point out the implications of
each of these concerning our moral obligation to believe in God.
III
Let us begin by considering Plantinga's view that belief in God
may be properly basic. In taking this view, Plantinga is following
a number of Reformed theologians who have held that belief in
God is not inferred or deduced from other beliefs. Rather, it is a
belief which we hold spontaneously like our beliefs "in the
existence of other persons, an external world, or the past."5
Why is this so? The Reformed theologian does not try to argue
that God exists; however, he does give us an account of why we do,
in fact, believe that God exists. In the first place, God has created
us with a strong tendency to believe in Him. Our very nature,
then, accounts for the common persistence among human beings to
believe in God. John Calvin put it this way:

To prevent anyone from taking refuge in the pretense of
ignorance, God himself has implanted in all men a certain
understanding of his divine majesty.
Ever renewing its
memory, he repeatedly sheds fresh drops. Since, therefore,
me n one and all perceive that there is a God and that he is
their Maker, they are condemned by their own testimony
because they have failed to honor him and to consecrate their
li ves to his wilJ.6
This quote from Calvin also indicates the second reason Reformed
theologians give for taking belief in God as basic: namely , because
God is "ever renewing" our awareness of His existence through the
witness of nature. The entire world around us is an ever-present
reminder that God exists.
To be more specific, our inclination to believe in God when we
are impressed or affected in certain ways by nature is a
circumstance which justifies or grounds our belief.
Plantinga
e xplains this point by comparing what it is that justifies our
ordinary perceptual beliefs. For example, if I believe I see a tree,
I am justified in this belief because (to use language Plantinga
borrows from Chisholm) I am " appeared to treely." Unless I have
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reason to believe my perceptual equipment is misleading me, this
circumstance justifies my belief that there is a tree before me. I
do not deduce that there is a tree before me. I believe it directly
upon being appeared to treely. That is why it qualifies as a basic
belief.
Belief in God is basic in an analogous way. Not only are we so
made that we immediately believe I see a tree in certain
circumstances, we also naturally believe in God-given certain
conditions. "More precisely, there is in us a disposition to believe
propositions of the sort this flower was created by God or this vast
and intricate universe was created by God when we contemplate the
flower or behold the starry heavens or think about the vast reaches
of the universe."7
Plantinga's development of the Reformed view of religious
epistemology is certainly intriguing and demands careful
assessment.
My purpose here, however, is only to ask what
implications this view has for evaluating unbelief in God as
The above quote from Calvin spells out these
blameworthy.
implications quite clearly. As he saw it, not only is there no
excuse for not believing in God, there is no excuse for not living a
!ife of devotion to Him, since He has revealed Himself so clearly to
all of us.
It is not clear how far Plantinga wishes to follow his Reformed
predecessors on this point. The implications of his view, however,
surely point in the direction Calvin took. For if God has created
all of us with a strong inclination to believe in Him, and we are
surrounded by circumstances which renew this tendency, it is hard
to see what more God could do to have us believe in Him without
imposing such belief on us. Of course, it may be suggested that
there are other ways of explaining why belief in God is properly
basic.
But it seems to me that something like the Reformed
account of human nature, and of how the world of nature inclines
us to believe, is required if belief in God as properly basic is to be
adequately accounted for.
If belief in God as properly basic is accounted for in such
terms, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that those who do not
believe in God only do so by an act of will similar to that of
persons who believe there are no moral distinctions. That is to say,
we are pushed toward the conclusion that those who do not believe
in God actually know better, but have chosen not to believe.
Thus, the Reformed account does far more than show that belief
in God can be basic for those who want to believe; it shows that

belief in God is , in fact, basic for all.

In other words, the

conditions which are sufficient to justify belief in God as basic
also d emand belief in God. Those who do not believe in God must
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suppress and deny what all persons naturally believe. Unbelief,
then, is an unnatural condition brought about by a sinful act of
deliberate choice. Therefore, it is culpable.
But is unbelief always culpable? Are there not cases when our
inclination to believe may be thwarted in such a way that we
should not be blamed for unbelief? Suppose a person was inclined
to believe in God and even wanted to believe. But suppose further
that that person was forced to undergo systematic brainwashing by
persons who did not believe in God. In this instance, the person
involved might come not to believe, but it would not be because he
chose not to believe. It would hardly make sense in such a case to
blame the person for unbelief.
And in a similar vein, we can imagine cases where a person
might have good grounds for thinking his belief in God was
illusory. Suppose a person who believed in God was given a
detailed psychoanalytic account of why people believe in God, and
was told that his own belief could be fully explained in such terms,
even though God does not exist. Suppose that upon reflection this
person became convinced that the psychoanalytic account did
accurately describe his belief in God. Maybe he comes to see his
belief in God as nothing more than neurotic wishful thinking. He
would then have some reason to believe his apparent perception of
God was misleading.
Would this person not be irrational to
continue to believe in God? And could he be culpable for giving
up an irrational belief?
The latter case is more ambiguous, for it may be the
psychoanalytic account of belief in God was accepted too easily.
Furthermore, even if belief could be adequately explained as
wishful thinking, it does not follow that all belief in God can be
accounted for in this way. And it certainly does not follow that
God does not exist, just because some persons believe in God
because of wishful thinking. So it may be the case that this person
should give up his present belief in God , but then go on to
consider whether the re are other grounds for such belief. To
simply abandon belief in God in this case would be much too hasty
a judgment on such an important matter.
Before moving on, perhaps we should pause to stress the point
that beliefs may be blameworthy because they lead to wrong
actions. This is especially so if wrong beliefs are deliberately
chosen, as in the Reformed view. For beliefs are a basis for action
and certain beliefs require certain actions. For instance, a bus
driver who is "appeared to treely" has an obligation to steer the
bus so as to avoid hitting the tree. If he chooses not to believe
there is a tree in front of him, he may wreck the bus and bring
harm to himself and his passengers. Likewise, a person who
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chooses not to believe in God may not perform the actions which
belief in God requires. This, I think, is the point of Calvin's claim
in the quote above, that persons who do not consecrate their lives
to God are morally accountable.
IV
Now let us turn to another account of religious belief and
rationality. In this section I want to consider the view that belief
in God is rationally supported by evidence and arguments. This
view has been recently defended by Richard Swinburne, who
argued in The Existence of God, that, on balance, it is more
probable than not that God exists. Once again, it is not my
purpose here to expound this view in detail, but only to consider
what implications it may have for the notion that belief in God is
an intellectual obligation.
In this view, the existence of God is not so starkly obvious, as
in the Reformed view. Rather, the situation is more ambiguous ,
but reason, if properly exercised, will lead us to conclude that God
exists. That is to say, God's existence is not immediately evident,
but we can quite properly infer it.
Interestingly, this view also, like the Reformed view, involves a
certain view of human nature. In the first place, reason points to
God's existence because reason is a gift of God.8 This is akin to
the Reformed idea that God has made us so that we have a strong
tendency to believe in Him. Here, however, it is not a direct
tendency so much as a faculty which , when properly exercised,
supports belief in God. Also akin to the Reformed view is the
notion that the world of nature justifies belief in God. Here,
however, nature does not simply trigger a disposition to believe.
Rather, it is part of the total evidence which reveals God, and can
be assessed by reason.
There is another assumption about human nature operating in
this view. It is that "all men want long-term well- being and deep
well-being: that is, they want to be for long in a supremely
worthwhile situation doing actions of great value."9 Such wellbeing, moreover, is o nly found through a relationship with God.
To sum up then, we have a God-given desire for deep and lasting
well-being. This desire can be satisfied only through knowledge of
God. And the evidence around us, when properly evaluated, will
lead us to belief in God.
With this background in place, let us go on to focus on the
question of how unbelief may be blameworthy in this view. The

first general suggestion here is that people who are uncertain of
God's existence should investigate whether there is a God and what
implications there might be for our lives if there is one. For, in
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our society at least, we are often confronted by the claims of
different religions which promise deep and eternal well-being to
their adherents. Since we naturally desire such well-being , it is
plausible to suppose that we should pursue the claims of religion to
find out whether any of them are in fact true. Moreover, it is
widely believed by "the man on the street" that there must be a
God. Even if this belief is not properly basic, it is still commonly
believed that God exists and that somehow He gives meaning to
life. Those who believe this ought to seek to find out what they
can about God and His purposes.
I am using the word "ought" here in a fairly strong sense. For
"if there is a God and he has made and sustains the world and
issued commands to men, men have moral obligations which they
would not otherwise have."10 Such commands might pertain to how
to use our lives, how to treat other people, how to treat the natural
order, and so on. We should want to discover whether there are
such commands, whether we have disobeyed them, whether we can
obtain forgiveness, and so forth.
Among man's duties is the duty to find out what his duties
are. He must therefore find out whether the world is his to
use as he pleases, or whether it belongs to someone else;
whether he is indebted to anyone for his existence, to whom
he owes acknowledgement and service. The duty to pursue
religious inquiry is a particular case of the duty to check that
we owe nothing to any man.11
So then, the general starting point here is the possibility that there
may be a God, that we may owe Him something by way of
obedience and worship, and that our ultimate well-being may
depend on knowledge of Him .
It is because these issues are so important that we are responsible
fo r having true beliefs about them. The more that is at stake in
something , the more important it is that we have true beliefs about
it. Given the importance of the issues which are at stake in
religion, it is incumbent upon us to seek the truth of the matter
wi th diligence and honesty.
It is not, however, easy to define exact standards for adequate
investigation. Consider the question of God's very existence. The
arguments surrounding this issue have been rather sophisticated for
some time. In our day, some of these have become so technical
that untrained persons could not possibly evaluate them. Is it then
necessary, if one is to investigate with integrity the question of
God's existence, that one must first undergo considerable
philosophical training?
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Surely not. The evidence regarding God's existence must be
such that a basic grasp of it can be had by untutored minds as well
as philosophers. Sophisticated arguments, we may suppose, only
spell out in greater detail what can be recognized by anyone at a
more intuitive level. Thus, it is reasonable to believe that all
persons may have an intelligent belief concerning God's existence.
However, religious inquiry cannot stop here. For if one comes
to believe there is a God, he should go on to find out more about
what God is like. What are His purposes? What is His will for
man?
Has God revealed himself in specific ways? To ask
questions such as these is to ask which, if any, specific religious
creed is true. And to ask this question is to raise again the
practicality of serious religious inquiry. For it would be virtually
impossible to make an exhaustive investigation of all religious
claims. Besides the major world religions, there are countless cults
and sects. The task of serious religious investigation may thus
seem impossible.
However, our investigator may plausibly assume that if there is
a God, the truth about Him is to be found in some religion which
has had substantial success in winning adherents throughout the
world. For the truth about something so essential to all men should
commend itself to a broad range of persons and not just an isolated
few.u
It is because we should seek more detailed knowledge of God
that beliefs about Christ are important. For the Christian claim is
that God's highest act of self-revelation was given through His Son,
who became incarnate in Christ. If Christ is God's Son, our
worship is due Him. Moreover, His teaching is essential for
knowing God's will which leads to our eternal well-being. Thus,
to fail to believe that Christ is God's Son may result in failure to
properly worship and obey God, and ultimately lead to a loss of
eternal well-being.
At any rate, investigators should gather what evidence and
information they can by reading, talking with adherents of
different religions, and so on. They should pursue the available
evidence and reflect on it until they reach a settled conviction
about which, if any, religious creed is true. Perhaps the key to
what is to count as sufficient investigation of religion is to be
determined by comparing the standards a person applies to other
matters. For:
Although a man may think that he has devoted enough time

to such investigation, even by his own standards he may not
have done . He may have devoted far less time to it than the
importance which he believed the matter to warrant by his
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normal standards of how much time you ought to devote to
investigating things.n
For instance, suppose a person painstakingly and thoroughly
researches all the options available before investing money.
Furthermore, he makes it a point to keep up with financial news
by regularly reading business reports, market analyses, and so on.
Suppose further that this person's religious beliefs are based on
investigation which is superficial and perfunctory compared to the
research on financial affairs. In this case, I think the person
involved could be held culpable for carelessness in forming wrong
beliefs on a matter of supreme importance. And carelessness on
such a matter is not easily excused.
Of course, this raises questions about cases of persons who
investigate religious matters carelessly, but who happen to come to
right beliefs anyway. And, on the other hand, there may be cases
of persons who are diligent in religious inquiry but who arrive at
erroneous beliefs. Perhaps in their investigation, they came across
only weak presentations of Christianity, but impressively argued
apologies for some other religion . In this case, it is hard to see
how a person could be faulted for not believing in Christ. Indeed,
perhaps in a situation like this it would be logically impossible for
a person honestly to believe in Christ, at least without further
research and reflection. Such a person should not, as Robinson put
it, "hypnotize" himself to believe, against his better judgment.
Certainly honesty is crucial to genuine religious inquiry. And
honesty requires us to be led in the direction the evidence points.
To refuse to be led by the evidence is blameworthy, especially if
one is wrongly motivated. For instance, a person may be inclined
by the evidence to believe in Christianity, but may refuse to do so
because he or she is unwitting to face up to the moral demands of
the Christian faith. As Swinburne comments:
Men have no doubt down the centuries cultivated unbelief or
allowed themselves to slide into atheism on various bad nonrational grounds--e.g. in order to be able to commit other
sins without a bad conscience. But this is surely one kind of
unbelief which the Christian religion has stigmatized as a
great sin. t4
Now then, let us summarize the argument of this section. I have
been sketching the grounds for holding that unbelief is culpable
given the assumption that the overall evidence shows not only that
it is probable that God exists, but that the more specific Christian
creed is true. The general idea here is that it is our duty to engage
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in religious inquiry because it is at least initially plausible that God
exists and we may have obligations to Him . Our ultimate wellbeing may depend on having true beliefs about God. To engage in
religious inquiry is not, however, to assume from the outset that
any religion is true.
Culpability may stem from two things: either failure to
investigate religious claims seriously or dishonesty in weighing the
evidence. If it is indeed true that the evidence supports not only
the existence of God, but also the Christian creed, then honest
investigation should lead most people to believe the Christian faith.
This assumes, of course, that the relevant evidence is accessible to
the investigator and that the collected evidence is representative.
That is, the evidence must accurately portray the religions in
question, and the amount of rational support they in fact enjoy.
Given these assumptions, belief in Christianity would be the
natural outcome of investigation. Not to believe in God, or to
believe in some other religion would have to be a choice made in
spite of good reason to believe otherwise. There is thus another
point of contact with the Reformed view: seeing unbelief as a
choice. The difference, of course, is that in the Reformed view
unbelief must fly in the face of an immediate, strong, natural
tendency to believe. In this view, the tendency to believe is not so
immediately strong, but results from investigation and reflection on
the evidence.
The move to blameworthiness is thus more tenuous and open to
objection at a number of points. The very first step may be
contested in that it may be doubtful whether we have a duty to
find out what obligations we may have to God if we are unsure
whether God even exists. Thus, one may simply opt out of
religious inquiry from the outset. If this decision is to be judged
culpable, it seems that it must be insisted that the initial obligation
to seek out our duties is fairly evident or intuitive.
Moreover, if it is to be claimed that unbelief is universally
culpable, then it must be maintained that there is evidence
universally available. Obviously, however, all the relevant evidence
is not evenly distributed. There are, for instance, numerous places
where Christianity has not spread. In such places, it is hard to see
how anyone could be held accountable for not believing in Christ.
This difficulty may be met by the suggestion that God only
holds us accountable for whatever evidence or information is in
fact available to us. This is not a modern expedient for an
embarrassing problem, but a reasonable response which has been

proposed by Christians of earlier generations. For instance, John
Wesley held that failure to believe in Christ is only blameworthy
among those to whom the gospel has been preached. He urged that
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we should leave the fate of others up to God, who can be trusted
to judge such men "according to the light they have ."15
If there is at least some "light" available to all persons in all
places and circumstances, then all may be required to have at least
a rudimentary belief in God. Fortunately, we can follow Wesley's
counsel and leave it in God's hands to determine how much belief
is required. But if it is true that some evidence is available to all,
then it is fairly clear that unbelief may be a choice which is
universally culpable.

v
As we noted at the outset, the line of argument we have been
considering is offensive to many. To think that anyone's beliefs
could be blameworthy even to the point of leading to damnation
may seem to bespeak a certainty, nay a dogmatism, which is not
only unwarranted but despicable as well.
Kant expressed this
sentiment in a rather pointed, but delightful passage:
The very man who has the temerity to say: He who does not
believe in this or that historical doctrine as a sacred truth,
that man is damned, ought to be able to say also: If what I
am now telling you is not true, let me be damned! Were there
an yo ne who could make such a dreadful declaration , I should
advise the conduct toward him suggested by the Persian
proverb concerning a hadji: If a man has been in Mecca once
(as a pilgrim), move out of the house in which he is living, if
he has been there twice, leave the street on which he is to be
found; but if he has been there three times, forsake the city
or even the lands which he inhabits!l6
Certainly the notion that religious beliefs may be blameworthy has
bred fanaticism , persecution , crusades and even wars. Kant is
right to point out that zeal for religious beliefs can be dangerous.
But what about Kant's assertion that no one should claim anyone
is damned for unbelief unless he is willing himself to be damned if
it turns out he is wrong? Again, I think Kant's point is well taken
if he means to remind us that judging the fate of others is not a
human prerogative. But beyond this, is it wrong to believe that
other persons may be damned because of their beliefs? Ironically,
Kant turns the table by suggesting that those who believe that the
beliefs of others are damnable, may themselves hold a damnable
belief!
But let us come back: is it wrong to believe others may be
damned because of their belief? In considering this question, it is
important to keep in mind that this belief is part of a larger web
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of beliefs, namely, the traditional beliefs of Christian theism.
More exactly, this belief follows from the beliefs that Christ is the
Son of God, that His teachings are authoritative, and that He
taught that unbelief is a sin which leads to damnation . If there is
nothing wrong in believing Christian theism in general, it will be
hard to show that it is wrong to believe this particular aspect of
Christian teaching.
I have also tried to emphasize in the discussion above that one's
beliefs are not isolated from one's behavior. Rather, they are the
basis for actions, values, attitudes, and so on. In short, they are an
integral aspect of a total way of life. Perhaps it is important to
understand something of this in order to rightly hold that beliefs
are blameworthy.
It is also important to grasp the connection between
blameworthiness and the ground of belief. Jn the accounts we
examined above, belief in God was grounded in such a way that
unbelief was a culpable choice. As we noted at the beginning,
those who think there is no positive reason to believe in God have
tended to abandon the claim that unbelief is blameworthy. I think
this is appropriate. Those who think the evidence is neutral, and
who do not think belief in God is properly basic, have no basis for
holding that unbelief is culpable. Even many Christian thinkers
grant that atheists can give perfectly rational explanations of
everything which requires explanation. If the evidence is thus
neutral, those who want to believe in God may have the right to
believe, but it is hard to see how anyone could have an obligation
to believe . But, on the other hand, those who think that belief in
God is properly basic or who think the evidence positively supports
belief in God can hardly avoid the implication that unbelief is
culpable.
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Language, Logic, Logos
STANLEY L. JAKI
PHILOSOPHY OF MACHINES AND
MECHANISTIC PHILOSOPHY
The title of this essay• may seem to contradict the rule that
logic should come first. The rule may be particularly appropriate
in connection with artificial intelligence, a topic synonymous with
computers, or logic machines as they are often called.
Very
recently, the Nobel-laureate biologist Gerald M. Edelman spoke of
computers as logic machines in order to distinguish them from the
human brain: "What a computer can do is an effective procedure.
What you can describe beforehand in a meaningful way, it can deal
with. A computer is a logic machine. The brain is more than a
logic machine ." Immediately following this came the phrase, " It
[the brain] can deal with novelty," which, though the words of the
reporter, obviously reflected the thinking of Edelman. Not content
with emphasizing the d ifference between the brain and the
computer, Edelman made a parting shot at reductionists: "I know
that people have tried to reduce human beings to machines, but
then they are not left with much that we consider truly human, are
they?" In fact he went so far as to claim that " individuality is not
an epiphenomenon; it's at the very center of our humanness." 1
In making these statements Edelman could hardly be unaware of
those who nowadays see in human intelligence a subspecies of
artificial intelligence, or AI for short, an intelligence already
embodied in computers and with unlimited future potentialities.
But he seemed to be unconcerned about the way he used the word
" meaningful" and, more importantly, about the inconsistency of his
own work: a simulation by computer programming, called Darwin
III, of the working of nerve connections in the brain. Those
• Based on an invited lecture at the symposium on "The Human
Dimension in Artificial Intelligence" sponsored jointly by Asbury
Theological S eminary and the University of Kentucky, L exington,
KY, April 6-9, 1988.
Dr. Stanley L. Jaki, A Hungarian-born Catholic priest of the Benedictine order,
with doctorotes in physics and systematic theology, is disti11guished university
professor at Seton Hall University (South Oronge, NJ) and the 1987 recipient of
the Templeton Prize.

Tl IE ASBURY THEOLOOICAL JOURNAL

VOL 43No. 2

1988

96

Jaki

connections, along which information passed between various parts
of the brain, were too numerous in his view to be predetermined
by the genetic code.
Edelman's failure to define the word "meaningful" in a context
relating to computer programming will reveal its problematic and
symptomatic character as the argument of this essay is developed.
More obvious should seem the inconsistency in his method: If the
brain processes in question are too numerous to be physically
specified, then how could they be simulated by a computer
program which contains a set of steps exceedingly limited by
comparison? When inconsistency can work itself into the very start
of the reasoning of a scientist who is most eager to avoid the
pitfalls of equating the mind with a machine, it should not be
surprising that inconsistencies run amok in the writings of those
who glory in the "mind equals machine, machine equals mind"
proposition , which is the very cornerstone of Al as a mental
construct.
A careful look at whether one's first move is logical may not be
really necessary if one dealt with mere machines. Machines, if
properl y constructed, require no more than plainly worded
operating manuals that are useful in the measure in which their
writers make no pretense to philosophical sophistication. Indeed
very little can be written about the philosophy of machines, unless
one is ready to take prolixity for substance. In the philosophy of
machines the essential point can be made, pace Mumford , in a few
lines . Chesterton's dictum, "There must in every machine be a
part that moves and a part that stands still ," is philosophy of its
deepest kind, partly because it is followed by the unwavering
generalization: "There must be in everything that changes a part
that is unchangeable."2
The profundity of Chesterton's dictum becomes obvious as soon
as one considers that in a world of change rational, that is,
meaningful judgments must assume a connection between the
starting and end points of any process. This, however, makes sense
onl y if something remains identical while the process or change
runs its course. The merit of this consideration is recommended
not only by its balanced character, but also by the vertiginous
stances to which any tinkering with that balance inevitably leads.
One such stance is occasionalism or the claim that all events,
Needless to say,
physical or mental, are strictly disconnected.
occasionalism was not referred to when computers were given the
first opportunity, in connection with machine translation, to prove
that they embody some intelligence, even if purely "artificial."
Advocates of Al, who hardly ever demonstrate a serious concern
for basic philosophical problems, let alone their very long history,
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would not, of course, be embarrassed on that score. They are
determined to go about those problems ambulando, that is, in
Diogenes' way of coping with one of Zeno's paradoxes or sophisms.
Nevertheless, the philosophical presupposition that language is
decomposable into strictly separate units has always been a cardinal
tenet in the ideology underlying AI programs including machine
translation. The ideology reveals its Ockhamist character by the
very fact that those units, artificial to be sure, resist efforts aimed
at grouping them into a coherent intelligible whole, such as any
plain discourse.
Those disdainful of wider views would do well to recall four
chief advocates of occasionalism, al-Ashari, Ockham, Malebranche
and Sartre. Being so widely separated from one another in time
and space (and culture), their identical options should seem to
represent a pattern of the inner force of logic. That science and
the making of machines are not germane to occasionalism is amply
illustrated by the virulently antiscientific dicta of al-Ashari and
Sartre. That Ockham and Malebranche were keen on scie nce has
not failed to give headaches to those students of theirs who easily
overlook the ineradicable call of human nature for intellectual
coherence.
The other departure from that balance advocated by Chesterton
is the denial of real change standing for real differences . As will
be see n, spokesmen of Al fall back time and time again on the
claim that intelligent or ultraintelligent machines are poss ible
because the various manifestations of " intellect"-- from amoebas
through rats and dolphins to men- -represent no real differences.
The idea that all events, ideas, things and perceptions lie along an
unlimited continuum and smoothly fuse into one another, has also
been an invariable feature of Al ideology, although it clearly
contradicts the one outlined above. In the thoroughly materialistic
views of Al advocates, novelties are merely the critical points
whe re the gradual accumulation of quantities appears, however
illogically, as a really new grade or quality. Marxists would nod in
agreement. That machines are impossible to make in terms of the
former, or occasionalist, stance, that allows no connectedness,
should seem obvious. It is still to be widely realized that the
making of machines (electronic or not), where parts must be
different in spite of their connectedness, also becomes a logical
contradiction within the continuum principle as embraced in the
ideology of Al.
So much about the philosophy of machines which is very
different from mechanistic philosophy and from the philosophical
or eth ical problems posed by the use of machines and of making
more machines. Mechanistic philosophy came to the fore in the
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second half of the eighteenth century in the wntmgs of De la
Mettrie, d'Holbach, Helvetius and other phi/osophes. In the world
picture they offered man was a mere machine, which, if true,
implied that machines could in principle turn into men, or at least
into the kind of humans that have already been deprived of their
humanness. The machines of the mid-eighteenth century, so many
elaborations on medieval technological breakthroughs, were too
crudely mechanical to appear human, however embryonicall y. Still
too heavily mechanical were the steam engines, the mainstay of the
Great Exhibition of 1851, to appear to be more than powerful tools
of humans rather than their potential competitors. The coming of
electric motors brought some relief from smoke and soot but no
real departure from the markedly non-human unwieldliness of
machines.
The disparity in size between man and machine has not changed
with the transformation of purely mechanical computers, operating
with gears and rods, into the first generation of modern computers
that were huge sets of vacuum tubes. Even the so-called secondgeneration computers, introduced in the 1950s, following the
inventio n of transistors, still occupied much of a large room that,
in addition , had to be air-conditioned.
Only when integrated
circuits allowed the elimination of wires, did computers (their third
generation) begin to shrink. They became similar in size to human
brains only when the introduction of silicon chips gave rise to their
fourth generation . No further major miniaturization seems to come
with their much talked about fifth generation.3 Few users of
typical desk computers, now almost a household commodity in the
USA, have seen, of course, that small brain-size unit that gives
them moments of exhilaration as well as occasional despair. At any
rate, the typical work station can at least by its size give the
impress ion of a possible symbiosis between an artful intellect and
an "artificial" intelligence.
The wide availability, since the early 1970s, of desk co mputers
parallels the flood of writings, most of them boldly assertive, on
the ad vent of Al.
A section on AI, a section distinct from
co mputer manuals, is now a staple feature in major booksto res. So
much about the inexorable logic whereby the celebration of
l'homme machine by Julien Offroy De la Mettrie, 4 leads, o nce
opportunity arises, to widespread belief that some artifacts think as
huma ns do. What is meant here by artificial intelligence is very
different from mere computers and of software called "expert
systems." Had the latte r been called, say, complex data channels, a
possible misunderstanding might have been nipped in the bud .
Awareness about the danger posed for understanding by careless
use of wo rds may in itself commend the merits of starting with
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language, instead of logic, and also may help keep in focus that
those "expert systems" are no more expert in channelling data than

are gutters and canals in hydrodynamics as they drain rain and
marshes.
To forget this is to repeat the pattern whereby "natural
selection" and similar expressions, suggestive of a personal
"Nature" that "selects," have created endless equivocations about
evolution.
Metaphorical attributions of human capabilities to
machines have been greatly responsible for creating the belief
about the existence of electronic feedback mechanisms that are
"experts" and about the reality of a new type of intelligence,
although it is a mere artifact. Expertise, properly so-called , is
synonymous with the ability to think and to plan. That ability is at
the very core of the claim that there are now artifacts that have
intelligence in a manner in which humans do and will soon outdo
all humans in the art of understanding.
In promoting their mechanistic philosophies, the late eighteenthcentury philosophes brazenly exploited the marvels of classical
physics in plain disregard of the anti-mechanistic views of great
eighteenth-century physicists and of Euler in particular. In the
same way the extravagant claims about artificial intelligence
became a vogue only after the creators of analog and digital
computers had done their pioneering work. John von Neumann
who- - no less than H. H. Aiken and Vannevar Bush- - had no use
for "thinking" computers,s had been dead for two years when, in
1958, A. Newell and H. Simon claimed that "there are now in the
world machines that think, learn and create." Most readers of that
phrase were far less startled by that stupendous claim than by its
sequence, namely, that the ability of those machines "to do these
things is going to increase rapidly until--in the visible future--the
range of problems they can handle will be co-extensive with the
range to which the human mind has been applied."6 An age like
ours, which is defiantly contemptuous of basics, can hardly
appreciate the insight demanded by the construction of the first
wheel. Much less would it recognize the enormous superiority of
that insight over the mere cleverness of making better wheels and
many more of them.
It is still to be widely perceived that
understanding does not primarily consist in its vastness but in its
very fact, small as its momentary range may be.
THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
Failure to appreciate that difference has invited ever bolder

appraisals of AI that now constitute its cultural "phenomenology."
In the process popularizers were greatly encouraged by experts. In
1959, Simon predicted that within ten years "the digital computer
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would be the world's chess champion, unless the rules bar it from
competition."
This contemptuous proviso, so expressive of
confidence in the computer, could appear all the more justified
when presented as a follow-up to a remark of Mikhail Botvinnik,
world chess champion at that time. He not only held that "in the
future the machine should surpass the grandmasters," but also that
parallel to championships among them there would be also one
among chess playing computers. Both Simon and Botvinnik were
quoted in John Pfeiffer's The Thinking Machine,' a book based on
a one-hour program on CBS TV, hardly a stage for serious
thinking. Pfeiffer glibly developed the inability of "experts" to
determine the limits of the computers' "thinking ability" into the
cla im that the further "evolution of computers" will become a
" significant part of human development." 8 Reinforcement did not
fail to come from the experts. Before too long, Newell and Simon
spoke of the programmed computer and the human problem solver
"as two species belonging to the genus 'Information Processing
System'." 9 On behalf of the correctness of that perspective they
offered but the vague generality that both men and computers were
" adaptive."
Once those who in the Al field were known above all for
technical writings had struck a "philosophical" chord, colleagues of
theirs with a visionary zest got emboldened. Caution was nowhere
in sight as a wide sampling of that zest reached the public in late
1970 when Li/e magazine carried an article that, in view of the
shakiness of its reasoning, was aptly titled "Meet Shaky, the First
Electronic Person."10 There Marvin Minsky, a chief protagonist of
Al at MIT, who subsequently turned to computer-generated music,
was quoted as saying that "within three to eight years, we will have
a mac hine with the general intelligence of an average human
being ." (Others who found Minsky's timetable too optimistic, we re
willing to bet on a mere fifteen years!) The really telling aspect in
Minsky's prediction is not that it dismally failed to become true,
but rather the force of logic it reveals. Once a basic though proper
understanding is granted to a computer, no limit can be set to its
self -education. Moreover, that self-education would come with an
explosive speed. Once there is on hand, Minsky contended , a
"machine that will be able to read Shakespeare, grease a car, play
offi ce politics, tell a joke, have a fight," it "will begin to educate
itself with fantastic speed. In a few months, it will be at genius
leve l, and a few months after that, its power will be
incalculable. "11
The only logic in all this was the recognition that the
"incalculable" may contain, like anything truly incalculable , a
terrifying prospect. Once machines achieved, in Minsky's words,
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"immense mentalities," they could hardly be kept under control by
human minds, puny in comparison.
Actually, those machines
would control us and, to continue with Minsky, "we would survive
at their sufferance. If we're lucky, they might decide to keep us as
pets." Logic was quickly honored in the breach when Minsky also
voiced confidence that though "the machine dehumanized man , it
could rehumanize him." Those willing to live with reversals of
logic would then indulge in a masochistic savoring of the
destruction of human intelligence. R. Quillian, described in that
Li/e report as a computer memory expert and a "nice warm guy
with a house full of dogs and children" (in that hardly logical
order), was in fact found to face up intrepidly to the chilling
choice: "I hope that man and these ultimate machines will be able
to collaborate without conflict. But if they can't, we may be
forced to choose sides. And if it comes to a choice, I know what
mine will be. My loyalties go to intelligent life, no matter in what
medium it may arise."U Once more the medium turned out to be
the message.
The inexorable force of logic was at work in the fact that the
"intelligent life" in question did not fail to be described as
universal intelligence, embodied, of course, in the medium of the
Ultra Inte lligent Machine, or UIM for short, a phrase coined in the
early 1970s. One such machine, predicted to be ready by the
1990s, was quickly envisioned as the key to "all major political
decisions, including matters of war and peace."13 Whether the
price of that achievement, "the piecemeal conversion of people into
UIPs" (ultraintelligent people), to say nothing of the "conversion of
the world's population into a single UIP,"14 is worth being taken, is
not the point at issue for the moment. Here the immediate task is
to register a runaway logic: once a computer is granted to
unders tand a single word, the world, or the very cosmos or
universe, becomes the only limit to Al. If holders of distinguished
chairs in Al departments could wax prophetic, their students could
hardly be blamed for seeing visions. Speculation about AI work
elsewhere in the galaxy prompted Hans Moravec, a graduate
student at Stanford University's AI laboratory, to predict that the
Ultra Intelligent Machine would "convert the entire universe into
an extended thinking entity." 15 Roger Schank, computer scientist
at the University of California, was not so modest as to count on
extraterrestrial cooperation: "I think there'll be an all-knowing
machine someday. That's what we're about" (italics added).16
The expression "all - knowing" attached to mere machines may in

itself indicate those deepest roots in AI ideology that are distinctly
theological though hardly in the sense Christians and believers in
an infinitely perfect personal God would take that expression.

102

Jaki

When materialism becomes mystical, the result is a replay of ageold pantheism. Some Greek sages of old, some A verroists (Muslim
and Latin), then Bruno, Spinoza, and Jacobi, and finally Rudolf
Steiner and Arthur Koestler are echoed when an AI devotee, in
innocent ignorance of an age-old pattern, speaks of "the gradual
erosion of individuality, and [the] formation of an incredibly potent
community mind" all across the universe.17 Formerly, the process
was predicated on the "unicity of intellect," or the cosmic mindrepository from which all individual minds emanate at birth and
into which they return after death.
The "unicity of intellect" is a very refined notion in comparison
with the easy metaphors grafted on computers as " all-knowing"
mac hines a nd harbingers of "the elixir of life"l8 or plain
immo rtality. Such implicitly theological metaphors easily take on a
sarcastic hue in the diction of AI protagonists. A case in point is
A. Turing's reference to man's creating the ultra intelligent machine
(UIM), a performance whereby humans act "as instruments of
God's will providing mansions for the souls that He creates."19
Contempt for matters theological shows through E. Fredkin's
pu zzlement over God's failure to make artificial intelligence. The
making of AI would have alone been worthy of that G od whom
Fredk in, tellingly, did not credit with two other events "of equal
importance," or the creation of the universe ("a fairly important
event" in his magnanimous concession) and "the appearance of
life."20
Yet even in this post-theological and post-Christian era, it is
difficult to assume that the idea of a substitute "God" is not at
least subconsciously on the mental horizon when one attributes a
most specific kind of knowledge to "all-knowing" AI machines. It
is not merely knowing all but also knowing all about oneself: "One
artificially intelligent device can tell another not only everything it
knows in the sense that a human teacher can te ll a student some of
what he knows, but it can tell another device everything about its
own des ign , its make-up--its genetic characteristics , as it were-and abo ut the characteristics of every other such creature that ever
was."21 Here, too, logic is inexorably at work as misplaced
presuppositions are allowed to have their full implications
unfo lded.
Again, if AI is taken for the latest and best example of the
human be ing's effort to rise to a "metahuman" level , 22 the soaring
will have its own perils. One of them is the charge, often used
agai nst the "old" religion but now returning as a boomerang against
the "new-fangled" one, that man is merely caught in futile selfprojectio n.
That ultimately all insights of man may be but
thinking abo ut models man makes of himself and of things and not
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about himself and the things around him is the gist of Minsky's
remark: "When intelligent machines are constructed, we should not
be surprised to find them as confused and stubborn as men in their
convictions about mind-matter, consciousness, free will and the
like, for all such questions are pointed at explaining the
complicated interactions between parts of the self-model. A man's
or a machine's strength of conviction about such things tells us
nothing about the man or about the machine except what it tells us
about his model of himself."23
In a less sophisticated way, the same futility is acknowledged
when the reality of AI is predicated on its eventually becoming as
bored with itself as humans become with themselves.24 Finally,
there is the fearful possibility, hardly exorcizable on the basis of
AI ideology, that man, in inventing things, is but the dupe of a
blind runaway process. The testimony of Turing should seem to be
impeccable as the "Turing's test" still lingers on as the ultimate
touchstone of truth for Al. As he discussed with his friend, the
mathematician A. H. Newman, the construction of a large digital
computer known as MADAM (the Manchester Automatic Digital
Machine at Manchester University), also present was Mrs. Newman
who, though much of the conversation was above her head,
suddenly picked up a remark of Turing: "I suppose when it gets to
that stage we shan't know how it does it." In reporting this to
Turing's mother, Mrs. Newman added that the remark "sent a
shiver down my back."25 Nothing is so fearful as an all-knowing
being that becomes a complete mystery.
The claims about Al reaching pseudo-theological heights have
been recalled here at the outset as an illustration of the merciless
manner whereby logic exacts its due. The claim that a machine,
once sufficiently sophisticated, does think, has innumerable
consequences. Since these include not only their philosophical,
psychological, and sociological but also their theological varieties, a
theological reflection, of a very different kind of course, on Al
should seem entirely legitimate even on the basis of mere parity.
But there is, as will be seen, a justification for that reflection far
more serious than the one assured by the rules of civilized
debating .
In the second half of the 1960s, when my Brain. Mind and
Computers was researched and written, not much was yet visible of
the rising tide of interest in Al and much less that it would turn
into an infatuation that blocks sensitivity for plain logic. An
illustration of this is Pamela McCorduck's admission that "if the

effort to make artificial intelligence has taught us one thing, it is
that natural intelligence is a formidable and woefully underutilized
resource."26 Had she utilized that resource more effectively, her
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book may not have ended on a love affair with anti-intellectualism .
For if her foregoing statement has any coherence, she cannot be
consistent in stating that "the accomplishments [of AI research)
have been significant and the promises are nearly beyond
comprehension. "27
Contrary to McCorduck, inconclusive arguments and selfcontradictory reasonings cannot be settled by references to the
difference between Hellenic and Hebraic minds, the former not
subject to brooding and the latter given to it. (It is indeed strange
that so many Hebraic, though wholly secularized, minds in the Al
establishment are most vociferous with their disclaimers of having
second thoughts on the matter. Or do they protest too much?)
Nor will those arguments and reasonings become non- existent by,
to quote McCorduck, " claiming fortitude, exhibiting courage," and
by "pausing to savor the thrill of sharing in something awesome."28
Such declamations set the tone (distinctly unintellectual) of nine
out of ten books on AI nowadays displayed in any large bookstore.
The prospects they conjure up are awesome, not because of the
chances, absolutely nil, of the coming of intelligent machines.
(A bout that dream world in which those machines exist, one thing
should , however, be noted. There they cannot help being locked in
an "awesome," blind, life-to- death struggle with themselves and
with us according to that Darwinist ideology which, because it rests
o n the continuity of all, heavily supports dreams about AI). The
actual awesomeness of those prospects pertains to the intellectual
and not to the biological level. Were the human body threatened
by fa ntasies about Al, the Food and Drug Administration could
eas ily move in, as it did recently on finding that leading producers
of cosmetics have taken to marketing their magic facial creams and
other "elixiric" ointments under scientific labels as if they were
well-tested drugs. Such creams have for time immemorial been
harmless though very costly make-beliefs about make-up. Those
who can afford spending large sums on unguents that act as elixirs
of lege ndary fountains of youth, are free to deceive themselves.
Equa ll y, the producers of those " miraculous" chemicals are free to
be part of a lucrative game of mutual self-deception. But when
scientific labels came to be used to abolish the difference between
rea lity and fantasy, the F.D.A . decided that society deserved to be
protected.29
THE REALITY OF FIRST BASE
No such action is, of course, conceivable in matters purely
intellectual. The harm to the intellect may be the greatest of all
harms, but it is neither legal, nor culturally respectable, to call for
censo rship. The marketing of AI under scientific label will only
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increase in decibels if this is possible at all. Momentary admissions
about "chronicling the history [of Al] as one of the most wrongheaded human follies in existence"30 are artful means of disarming
the typical reader's suspicion that both sides of the coin have been
equally presented. Little does that reader realize that as far as
reasoning is concerned the cards have been heavily stacked against
reason . Even less would that reader guess the farce which is latent
in the game played with the mechanism that carries the ploy. The
mechanism is language which, if carefully considered, may through
its very terms, reveal the fallacy of a logic according to which
some, let alone all, machines have intelligence.
That language is a subject that eludes a simplistic approach
should have been amply clear to those who in the 1950s tried to
make the breakthrough to Al along the lines of machine translation .
The evidence, which only gained in strength since then, was plain
about the chronic failure of linguists to find a primitive language.
In fact, languages of all primitive peoples have been found to
display syntaxes as complex as is the case with any modern
language. For the most part rank amateurs alone keep constructing
futile schemes in which basic words of all languages are made to
appear as close parallels to sensory experiences stretching from
hardness to softness, from suddenness to slowness and so forth.31
Only with a touch of amateurism can one disregard a by-now-old
story which shows that the decomposition of languages into
atomistic units is indeed a futile exercise.32 Only wishful thinking
can make one overlook the fact that Darwinist evolutionary theory
is caught in a petitio principii whenever it tries to cope with the
problem of the origin of language.
The pattern made its first and dramatic appearance shortly
before Darwin completed The Descent of Man. There he merely
paraphrased the imperious No! (hardly a scientific argument) which
he had penned on the margin of a paper that Wallace published
shortly beforehand. Wallace correctly argued that if language had
its origin in the need for survival, the larger brain that makes
possible linguistic operations had to be available to pre-hominids
before they sensed the need for language.33 Nothing essentially
new was added to this observation (a warning about the futility of
trying to lift oneself by one's bootstraps) when N. Chomsky dressed
it up with the claim that special neuronal networks have to be
present in the brain before it can serve as a vehicle of that only
form of language which operates with sentences. 34
All these considerations, so many exposures of the shortcomings

of the scientific method, fail to touch on the true nature of
language. Being a reality, steeped in the use of the intellect,
language requires for its proper appraisal an epistemology if it is
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really about episteme or understanding and not about mere
formalisms of it. But even on a purely empirical ground, it should
be clear that language is a communication of something understood
to somebody capable of understanding. Although propagandists of
Al have always been wary about confronting this elementary
feature of language, they recognize it by their use of language as
they talk in private or in public about their favorite subject. They
may speak of language as if it were a mere skeleton, but in doing
so they still "press the flesh," that is, they want to be understood
by flesh-and-blood intelligent beings.
In that fact of understanding, as verbally communicated, there is involved a procedure
which goes far beyond mere formalization . The latter can become
its own object and retain no meaningful tie with the object of
which it was the formalization in the first place . Understanding
always bears directly on its object, the very reason why any talk
becomes a mere shooting of the breeze unless it is about something.
Verbalization is a connection between the subject who
understands and the object which is understood. That connection
between the object and the subject is a tie between two existents,
with the tie being not only conceptual but also existential, though
not in the sense given to that word by Sartre and his followers .
They voiced contempt for arguments that implied validity beyond
the moment, while they failed to notice that they meant their brand
of existentialism to have a validity for each and every mome nt.
More importantly, as they wanted to be understood through their
discourses, they served evidence that language as an intellectual
communication is a primary datum, not explainable in terms of
something else, and certainly not in terms of a language which is
not intellectual.
Language is not the only datum which is primary or primiti ve.
Other such data or factors are no less important to list, especially
in a debate with Al propagandists whose basic strategy is to set up
a very special game aimed at skirting around the very first step.
Thus, to use baseball as an analogy, they try to make it appear that
starting from the second base is not a break of the rules. Implicit
in that strategy is the assumption that any earlier step, such as
facing the pitcher and producing a hit that allows the runner to
reach first base, let alone second base, is not a matter of truly valid
rules. Translated into epistemology, the analogy means that basic
or primary questions need not be asked, and in particular the
question of what it means to know anything before one can reflect
about formalizable aspects of that knowledge. In trying to make
their intellectual game appear creditable, the propagandists of AI
act very much for a purpose, though in terms of their " rules of
game" they are not entitled to do so. Such is a further serious
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chink in their armor to be discussed shortly.
Since few champions of Al have given evidence of familiarity
with basic epistemological questions, it may not be useless to spell
out the thrust of that game analogy.
Since the advent of
rationalism, Cartesian and Kantian, to say nothing of the
skepticism and pragmatism it generated, it has become a sign of
cultural sophistication that basic epistemological questions about
understanding the real have no validity. The alleged reason for
this is that to raise those questions is not a "scientific" procedure.
Invariably overlooked in that reasoning is that science deals only
with the forms of already existing things and much less does it
provide those forms, let alone the things. So much about the
genesis and merits of the claim that intellectual pursuit must start
from second base where the formalizable or quantitative aspects,
solely useful for scientific purposes, are already available.
That the real as the carrier of those aspects cannot be accounted
for by the rules of that new-fangled epistemological baseball game
has a telling impact on the thinking of those fond of its "rules."
The impact is all too often observable in the writings of logical
positivists, almost invariably the only kind of philosophers read by
devotees of AI. Some logical positivists have indeed been logical to
the point of realizing that their disdain of reality traps them in
their own world-building, a sort of solipsism .35 One "hacker"
made the point bluntly: " You can create your own universe, and
you can do whatever you want within that. You don't have to deal
with people."36 Except, of course, when the "hacker" wants to
market his software about his private universe so that he may have
access to the non-private mini-universe of a supermarket for the
daily bread.
Mere logicism or solipsism cannot be refuted on its own
grounds. The only effective argument against solipsists must rely
on the reality of language as an intellectual tie with the real outside
the subject. On that basis alone can one point out to the solipsist
that he has no right to leave his own universe by talking to others
about it. The only right solipsists (including their Al brand) have
is to cherish their own dreams.37
Only when that point is made clear can one call attention,
without the danger of being trapped in mere voluntarism or
subjectivism, to another primary factor, the sense of purpose.
Acting for purpose is different from mere instinct evident, say, in
the unreflective pulling back of one's hand after it has come into
Unlike an instinctive act, an
contact with a hot object.
intellectually perceived action is to be acted on by a conscious will
if the sense of purpose is to arise. This alone should make it clear
why the argument that although Al may cope with knowledge it
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cannot cope with purpose, is no real threat to speculations about
it. 38 The argument cannot forestall the counterargument that if Al
can imply an understanding of the real , then its understanding of
the purposeful action may become tantamount to being possessed of
real purpose as well. Similarly, machines cannot effectively be
denied self-awareness, unless emphasis is laid on the fact that selfawareness is not a mere idea, but a real perception of the subject
insofar as it is its own real object, and that this perception
presupposes awareness of objects separate from the self.39
Purposeful action involves not only an intellect whose nature is
to know things, but also a will that is a mere instinct if it is not
free. The freedom of the will, another primary datum that cannot
be circumvented or leapfrogged, has always been a source of
nightmares for those dreaming about a purely "scientific" or
strictly deterministic state of affairs fully engulfing man. Those
dreams, as long as they are mere games with the intellect, have
always been less repulsive to common sense than plain denials of
free will. This is why AI ideology contains more fantasies about
the fusion of all intellects into one than about the sublimation of
all free wills into one Will that no argument can make appear
free,40 so that the wills participating in It may have this share of
freedom.
Undue preoccupation with scientific evidences had for some
time been undermining sensitivity about much more immediate
evidences before Al came to the scene. This is not to suggest that
this process, mostly psychological, has resulted in lessening the
weight of evidences much more immediately available than their
scientific kind. One of them is one's immediate awareness about
one's ability to move one's little finger at will. About the weight
of this evidence no less a physicist than A. H. Compton noted that
it inte nsely outweighs all evidences of Newtonian physics. In fact,
he held the disparity so great that he preferred the abandonment of
that physics, were it to contradict the foregoing evidence about
free will.41
Newtonian physics, which is very different from mechanistic
philosophy, or from materialist determinism, can be no more in
opposition to the freedom of the will than quantum mechanics can
be a support for it. In both cases the limitations of the scientific
method foreclose that this or that law, formalism, or experimental
result of physics should have legitimate bearing on the reality of
free will. Tellingly, no physicist who subscribed to materialist
determinism has ever claimed that his work in physics was not a
free activity. There was at least one early interpreter of quantum
mechanics, Eddington, who publicly recognized the nonsensical
character of his claim that quantum mechanics made first possible a
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rational belief in the freedom of the wilJ.42
Unfortunately,
countless is the number of physicists who, from Heisenberg on,
declared the abolition of causality in the name of quantum
mechanics. They all failed to perceive the fallacy in the inference
that an interaction that cannot be measured exactly, cannot take
place exactly. The inference is fallacious because "exactly" taken
in an operational sense is very different from "exactly" taken in an
ontological sense.43
Possibly, the literature promoting Al is lacking in references to
Heisenberg's uncertainty principle because of a lopsided
preoccupation there with mere patterns in logic. 44 Unfortunately,
one cannot assume that advocates of AI--so much the prisoners of
various current intellectual fashions--would remain free of that
pervasive fashion which confuses quantum mechanics, a marvelous
physics, with its Copenhagen interpretation , a most fallacious
philosophizing.45 An interpretation, which is most germane to
sheer phenomenology or to mere pragmatism, will not fail to appeal
to protagonists of AI as in both only knowledge about aspects or
forms of th ings is allowed but no knowledge about the very things
The better-known result of this is a decrease of
existing.
confidence in the objectivity of knowledge, accompanied by the
stultifying claim that the observers create reality. They certainly
create--the multiworld theory of quantum mechanics is witness46-their own subjective worlds or universes. The lesser-known but no
less instructive result is the inevitable reification of mere aspects
and relations as if they had an existence of their own. It is on that
basis that, as so often happens in endorsements of AI, the sign is
taken as equivalent to the thing signified.
That non-realist, non-objectivist philosophies are driven , as if
by an inexorable logic, to reinstate, however illogically within their
perspective, the objectivity of knowledge, is an illustration of the
fac t that picket lines, useful as they may be elsewhere, are
powerless against the reemergence of age-old truths. Among these
is the view of knowledge as a mental act to know things. Merely
to know, without knowing something, is impossible. Moreover,
that some thing has to be a real object before it can become a
conceptual object in the act of knowing.
THE DYNAMISM OF KNOWLEDGE
He rein lies a crucially important aspect of knowledge with
respect to Al. The act whereby one becomes a knower is the
forging of a dynamic tie between the mind and an object. Such a

tie is not a conceptual or static relation between the concept of the
mind and the concept of something else. Were the latter the case,
thinking would be resolvable into conceptual analysis. This is not
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to suggest that thereby a royal road would be open to Al. As will
be seen, most concepts have supple contours that cannot be
accommodated within the cubbyholes of binary algebra or of any
mathematics for that matter. Still, it cannot be emphasized enough
that knowledge is above all an act that establishes a dynamic unity
between the object and the intellect. The unity is not a reduction
of the object to the subject, nor of the subject to the object. The
former case should easily be recognizable as Kantianism, the latter
as a variant of Platonism . Both, in their own ways, block access to
external reality and by the same stroke spark doubts about the
mind as it is being turned, against its nature, into a source of
reality (in Plato) or of its structure (Kant).
Nothing may be more logical at this point than to recall Aristotle
as the erstwhile protagonist of the epistemological stance which
consists in the resolve to render both mind and matter their due.
Such a recall is especially appropriate at a time when a return to
Aristotle is advocated as a remedy to the "closing of the American
mind." 47 Its author failed to list AI ideology among the sickly
symptoms to be cured by an exposure to Aristotle. That the
remedy will not be easily found may be gathered from the rank
misconstruction of Aristotle's philosophy in the most widely read
critique of Al ideology by one holding a Ph.D. in philosophy from
a prestigious American university. More of this later.
Even more revealing than a recognition of that remedy was the
cryptic admission that Aristotelianism, owing to its being taught in
Catholic colleges, did not become entirely unknown in America.
That in a book written by an academic mostly for fellow academics
the survival of Aristotelianism was not specified any further has
more to it than what meets the eye. In those Catholic colleges
Aristotle was kept alive because of belief in Someone who made a
far greater impact in history than did Aristotle. For reasons that
should not be difficult to fathom, Christ is not to be acknowledged
as a gigantic fact of history in a culture that boasts about its
respect for facts alone. At any rate, the Aristotelianism taught in
Catholic colleges, seminaries and universities is an Aristotelianism
that was saved by faith in Christ from Aristotle himself.48 How
Aristotle's thinking can turn into a self-defeating straitjacket
received ample illustration in Averroes and the A verroism he
started. Averroes found nothing repulsive in Aristotle's lack of
resolve to save the individual intellect from being submerged into
one "cosmic" mind.
Nor was Averroes agitated by Aristotle's
hes itation to recognize the freedom of the will. If the reaction to
Aristotle on the part of medievals, and especially of Thomas, was
so different on those two points (and on some other crucial points
as well), 49 it was due to their unswerving allegiance to the gigantic
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fact of Christ, which reveals the true God in true man.
This is not the place to recount a story, vastly documented in
researches on medieval philosophy during the last hundred years.
The story tells about the immense debt which Christian philosophy,
or moderate realism, owes to its allegiance to dogmatically defined
tenets about Christ as a union of two natures (divine and human)
in one divine person. Those tenets, which include the survival of
C hrist's true human soul (or mind) after his bodily death on the
cross, were so many unfoldings of what is contained in the
principal ecclesial dogma, issued at Nicea in A.D. 325, about Christ
as th e Incarnate Divine Word, or Logos, consubstantial with the
Father.5° Nothing would be more mistaken than to take for a
purely philosophical proposition the unflinching resolve with which
the dualist doctrine about man is maintained in genuine Christian
ambience, and not also for a most considered reflection on the
gigantic fact which is Christ.
Non-Christians (and even liberal, well- nigh secularized
C hris tians) will hardly appreciate this Christological perspective of
a doctrine about the nature of man. Excuse themselves as they
may on "religious" grounds, they have no such liberty when it
comes to that doctrine's epistemological fruitfulness . The latter
extends even to taking a proper measure of the true merits of AI.
The doctrine implies a dualism, though certainly not its Cartesian
kind , where the soul or mind is never truly united with the body
but me re ly attached to it. According to that dualism, the mind is
not a ghost in a body-machine,51 elevated as the latter is to the
status of a "computer that happens to be made out of meat," to
recall a crude phrase of a champion of AJ.52 The mind is rather in
the most intimate symbiosis with the body and carries out its
activity in the utmost dependence on the body.
This means, on the one hand, that the acts of knowledge are
trul y inte llectual, that is, they transcend the limitations of material
entities. This is why any knowledge of any material entity has a
uni versal bearing, or in technical terms, the intellect perceives the
uni versal in the particular and that this is its only way of knowing
particular things. Herein lies the fundamental and only ground for
den ying the claim that machines, composed of truly singular items
and singular in all their workings, can know as much as a single
word or symbol. Herein lies also the justification of the view that
unless such knowledge is denied to a computer, there is no way of
d enying to it the ability to know all words, symbols and their
syntactical combinations. Failure to make recourse to this kind of
knowledge leaves the critics of AI with lame alternatives. They
will either limit Al to knowledge as distinct from purpose, will and
emotions,53 or they will say that there can be an Al about ordinary
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knowledge but not about creative knowledge and wisdom.54
The view of knowledge as the active recognition of the universal
in the singular has its proof in each and every word--noun, verb,
adjective. None of them can be restricted to a single thing, action
or quality. All of them are universals that can be seen only by the
mind's eye in any singular sensory perception. Any word is a
magic tool whereby a concrete limited item appears in a limitless
perspective. In that sense no book is so systematically packed with
metaphysics as is any ordinary dictionary. There word after word
bespeaks of that wondrous ability which is to generalize. To
restrict any word to a singular empirical item can only be done
with the help of two most generic words, this and that. Every use
of them (on countless occasions in each and every day) witnesses
the working of the mind's dynamism that alone, by its existential
presence, can turn the singular item to useful account even from
the strict pragmatist viewpoint. The mind's presence should seem
even more in evidence when it effectively describes most particular
situations and relations by a word it, possibly the most nondescript
word of them all and yet a word which the mind can invest with
overpowering weight.SS
A WORD ABOUT WORDS OR SYMBOLS
About that dynamic or existential manner which is present in
the use of words as means of reaching the real world, two remarks
are in order. One is that it reflects the same dynamic quality that
has already been noted about the act of knowledge itself. Words
are not the mechanical images of things physical, or of physical
actions and qualities. Precisely because of this they can only serve
as means of reaching the real insofar as it can be understood .
Whatever else words are, they cease to be words unless they are in
the active service of the intellect. In fact, all of them are the
intellect's free creations as shown by the incredible variety of
languages. (No Jess evident is this fact in a facet present in each
and every language: one word--the example of the English "bit"
will be discussed shortly--can denote a bewilderingly wide variety
of objects and actions). This is why words exist only inasmuch as
the intellect uses them as signs that mean something only because
the intellect actually signals with them things, actions and qualities.
Nothing is indeed more dangerously misleading than Popper's
turning of the world of phonetic and written symbols (and all the
cultural plethora resting on them) into a "third world"; that is, into
a realm on equal footing with the mind and the purely physical
realm. As will be seen shortly, it is precisely because of this that
Popper's stance versus Al is a mere evasion.
Symbols or signs are, however, very tangible items. In an almost
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literal sense they embody what is intelligible in the concrete
particular. Therefore they take part in that fundamental characteristic of each concrete thing which is to have form. Herein lies
the source of an unlimited opportunity for computers and also of
their radical limitedness.
No limit seems to be set to the computer's receptivity in those
areas where the formal aspect is almost identical with its content.
Such areas are mathematics and geometry, with their manifold
ramifications and vast range of applicability. Units, fractions,
points, lines, angles, areas, volumes, coordinates, transforms,
logarithms, functions and series have a meaning that is almost
exhausted in their "forms." Hence the stunning measure to which
computers can be programmed to correlate very complex set of
numerical data, a measure which is made even more impressive by
the speed with which the task is executed.
In any problem in which words relating to quantitative data
dominate , as they do in many problems of business and
engineering, the effectiveness of computers can indeed be made so
great as to create the impression that they do an "expert" job. But
in the measure in which one departs from the strictly quantitative
or geometrical realm, words, always the carriers of meaning, offer
fewer and fewer formal aspects of things and ideas they represent.
This is already evident in words denoting plain physical entities,
such as a stone or a stick. Even their weight, density and hardness
are far more than so many numerical measures. This disparity
between physical reality and its formalizable aspects becomes still
more striking when complexity and vastness are part of that reality,
let alone when it is the source of an aesthetic experience, as is the
case, for instance, with a human figure or a sky bathed in the rays
of the setting sun. An even more perplexing disparity between
form and content is latent in negative terms, such as invisible or
intangible. A debilitating problem for AI may be posed, for
instance, by the term "atom," if it really stands for something that
cannot be cut or divided. Any formal representation of an "atom"
by an extended symbol or signal, which is always divisible, implies
Similarly
a contradiction with the idea to be represented.
instructive is the impossibility of adequately formalizing the
process involved in "going to the limit" in integral calculus. In
that respect the square root of - I should seem to take on an added
measure of irrationality.56
When one moves to the area of words dominating everyday
discourse that are not primarily quantitative, the formalistic aspects
no longer have the definite contours that most mathematical
concepts have. While much of mathematics may be built up from
the juxtaposition of units, and much of geometry from similar
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operation with an extended point (leaving aside the problem of
formalizing a non-extended point), other areas of discourse rely on
words with no strict contours. This is why defining most words in
any dictionary is always an unfinished job. Even in the case of
objects with markedly geometrical forms, the "extent" of their
meaning can indeed be rather indefinite.
Thus the word "bench" is defined in The Random House
Dictionary as "a long seat for several persons." The definition does
not give the exact measure where a seat becomes a bench. Nor
does the definition specify the word "several." Whereas "two" can
mean "several," a "love-seat" does not thereby become a bench.
When a word, which is often the case, carries several
me taphorically different meanings, their respective formalizations
may have no similarities at all. Here it should be enough to think
of the widely different formalizations called for when, say,
"bench" stands for judicial authority, or for the judges themselves,
or for substitute players, or for a good or bad team, or for a shelflike area of rock with steep slopes above and below. Further
differences in formalization will arise when "bench" is used as a
verb.
Even more bewildering differences come into view whe n, as is
the case with "bit," homonymous uses are possible. From the
viewpoint of meaning there is absolutely nothing in common
between the mouthpiece of a bridle, a small measure of time,
twelve and a half cents, the cutting part of a hatchet, the end of a
key that moves the bolt, a part in a play, units of information as
defined in computer theory, and a B(achelor) of I(ndustrial)
T(echnology).57 The fact that this short paragraph contains at least
one other word, "bolt," that also lends itself to homonymous use,
ma y suggest the enormous number of such words that could be
gathered from the same dictionary. Proportional to that number
should be the "fun" such words present to ambitious programmers
of conversations "understood" by computers.
That in all such cases the "exact" meaning, which is always far
more than its formalization, can only be established from the
context, should be obvious. Such a context is the definition of
eac h and every word in any dictionary. Almost all of them are
based on a recourse to synonyms, each with an " extent" of
mean ing that can be circumscribed only by dotted lines. Being
used in a definition, these not strictly defined areas of meaning are
made to partially overlap one another. The more " exact" is a
definition of a word, the greater is its share in those not strictly
c ircu msc ribable overlappings. The more of them there are on
hand, the greater is the " formal" imprecision , both with respect to
content and to total outline, that is, the "extent" of meaning. Such
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is a graphic rendering of the reason that prompted Whitehead to
speak of the "Fallacy of the Perfect Dictionary."SS
Why is it then that verbal definitions, or any discourse for that
matter, are not a potential vicious circle? For such would be the
case if knowledge were, as Hobbes claimed, a mere reckoning with
words,.s9 a perspective very much at the basis of the AI ideology.
Then the explanation of a word, always imprecise in itself, in
terms of other imprecise words, would become equivalent to the
compounding of probabilities, or to the decrease of certainty or
clarity. The reason why the best minds usually take the fewest
words is not that they are in sympathy with the consequences of
Hobbes' hopelessly flawed view. Rather, they cast a vote on behalf
of the dynamism whereby language is an exercise of an intellect
zeroing in on the intelligible object with unfailing immediacy.
THE UNWISDOM AND POVERTY OF REDUCTIONISM
The intelligible character of the spoken or written word that
carries a meaning has an epistemological primacy even in that
realm, mathematics and geometry, where the formalized aspect may
seem self-explaining. Actually, it was in connection with the most
formalized systematization of mathematics, the one worked out by
David Hilbert, that his foremost disciple, Hermann Weyl, wisely
stated that even there "one must understand directives given in
words on how to handle the symbols and formulae."60 That this is
also true of the notations of symbolic logic should seem all the
more logical, except perhaps to some infatuated with it. Those
who are strangers to what Hilbert, Wey! and other leading
mathematicians deal with still can grasp the priority of words over
formulae and shapes by reflecting on the figure indicating the
"quantity" called zero. Unless an intellect substantially superior
over matter were at work in the pronunciation of the word "zero,"
the word itself would necessarily stand for " something," the very
opposite of nothing. The formalization in the shape of a small oval
circle of the concept of zero may indeed be the most explosive
among all discoveries of the mind, "the coining of Nirvana into
dynamos." 61
At the other end of the quantitative spectrum is that infinite
whose description as the realm where " zero is the magician king,"62
will appeal only to the wise. It should be enough to think of the
resistance which some advocates of the " transfinite" infinite set up
against the logical stringency of the inference whereby one
concludes to the impossibility of an actually realized infinite

quantity.63 About the schizophrenic reasoning which supported for
so long in scientific cosmology the presumed reality of an infinite
universe,64 a remark of Eddington may seem most appropriate:
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"That queer quantity 'infinity' is the very mischief and no rational
physicist should have anything to do with it."65 Wise programmers
take note!
Just as in moving from basic words used in mathematics to
words relating to everyday realities one encounters an increasing
disparity between meaning and its formalization, a similar situation
is on hand when one moves from mathematics to the empirical
sciences. This fact received a poignant recognition in a remark of
Professor George Wald, a Nobel laureate for his studies of the
phys iology of vision . Much as we know about the physics and
che mistry of vision, he remarked, " we don't know what it means to
see." 66 The source of epistemological defeatism (and touch of
unwisdom) transpiring through his remark lies in the assumption
that understanding consists in knowing all the quantitative , that is,
easi ly formalizable, aspects of a process and that whenever we
don't have complete information about those aspects, we don' t
understa nd.
A chief merit of Professor Wald's remark is that its ill -concealed
defeatism evokes the poverty of reductionism , a poverty brought
about by sheer unwisdom.
Reductionism is the very same
philosophy that lies at the base of hopeful statements about AI.
They all share in the facile oversight of two facts: One is that as
close as form and meaning may be in basic mathematical notions,
the form as such means nothing unless it is understood. The other
is that understanding is a primary datum that cannot be reduced to
something else so that it may be better understood or understood at
all. Reductionism, which, once grafted on the interpretation of
sc ience, turns the latter into a cultural wasteland, is also the source
of the pathetic predicament generated by belief in AI. There one
can also see the hapless resistance of human sanity to becoming the
victim of self-despoilment.
A telling illustration of this is Douglas R. Hofstadter's Godel,
Escher, Bach, a book offered by him as a perspective on the battle
that still rages between the followers of De la Mettrie and their
opponen ts. Hofstadter assigns ultimate victory, which he specifies
as o ne of the major theses of his book, to De la Mettrie's followers
on the ground that the opposition between the two camps does not
represent a "contradiction at all." The ground is equivalent to
stating that one's opponents are actually non-existent, a way of
reso lving crucial differences worthy of that make-believe realm
which is nowadays being crowned by copious assertions about the
existe nce of Al. Yet the battle line separating those opponents
re mai ns as real as ever. A proof of this is Hofstadter's oversight of
the fact that from his point of view it is plainly contradictory to
urge "each reader" to engage in a most non-mechanical activity,
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namely, "to confront the apparent contradiction head-on, to savor
it, to turn it over, to take it apart, to wallow in it, so that in the
end the reader might emerge with new insights into the seemingly
unbridgeable gulf between the formal and the informal, the
animate and the inanimate, the flexible and the inflexible."67
That Hofstadter, a physicist turned philosopher, failed to urge
his readers to reflect on what it means to understand both that
battle and the activity he recommended, should not seem
surpr1S1ng. The act of understanding that cannot be understood in
terms of anything else is not part of the instruction offered in the
philosophy departments of most American universities . There one
is allowed to discuss intelligent behavior, which Hofstadter
explicitly mentions in the context, but not what it means to be
intelligent.
There philosophy begins with Descartes (or with
Ockham), grows into pragmatism, logical positivism, and linguistic
analysis, and ends with the illusion that no respectable philosopher
would ever consider but problems that are "analytical."
This illusion, particularly strong in British and American
philosophical circles, received most recently a rebuff so sharp as to
make front page news. 68 The American Philosophical Association,
dictatorially ruled by the "analytical" establishment that has only
its sceptical solvent for questions relating to ontology, is now
challenged by a breakaway group, called the Society of
Philosophers in America. Members of the latter are resolved to
give proper attention to questions such as: What is being? Is there
a purpose? Is there something beyond the physical? and the like.
Their revolt is the bursting to the surface of Jong suppressed
dissatisfaction with the "received view," a quintessence of which
is Quine's answer to the most fundamental question, made famous
by Hamlet: "To be is to be the value of a boundary variable."
Clearly, such is not an answer that would have agitated a Hamlet or
anyone not shielded from reality by the emoluments of opulently
endowed chairs of philosophy. It is therefore supremely ironical
that Quine could be referred to as the "titan of American
philosophy," unless, of course, for the unintended reason that his
definition of "to be," if taken logically, that is, with full
consistency, is a foolproof directive to a titanic catastrophe of
thought and life.
It would be an illusion to hope for a change of heart on the part
of most "analysts" who, for ample reason, see no threat in that
revolt to their domination of the academia. They will continue to
dismiss their opponents' appeal to the long history of philosophy
with the words of Ruth B. Marcus of Yale, words illustrative of
the mere game with words into which the "analysts" can turn the
interpretation of philosophy or of anything else: "It's not just fake
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history, it isn't even history. The tradition up to Kant was
analytical. It was one of addressing questions in a careful way and
giving reasons for one's point of view." Clearly, the program of
instruction in most departments of philosophy will continue in its
"analytical" tracks.
Neither the true Plato, let alone the true
Aristotle in quest of making clear the understanding of the real,
will be spoken of, nor those who saved Aristotle from himself, and
much less those who presented that story to our times with
extraordinary historical scholarship. 69
An aspect of the poverty of that instruction in philosophy is that
it imparts no intellectual sensitivity for pondering the points which
precisely those critics of Al brought up who steeped their criticism
of it in the primacy of understanding.
A case in point is
Hofstadter's description of my Brain , Mind and Computers as a
book "whose every page exudes contempt for the computational
paradig m for understanding the mind." Yet, although he admits
that the book brings up points "interesting to ponder," he considers
none of them .10 Nor does he mention even the four main points of
my book, although, being the themes, prominently listed, of its
fo ur chapters,11 they are too obvious to be overlooked. None of
those points can, of course, be eye-catching to any of those
countless "modern" philosophers who try to begin understanding
with the forms of understanding that constitute "intelligent
behavior" and not with that understanding whose nature is to
understand things before it can understand itself.
One aspect of those points made in my book relates to some
patent, jewel-like evidences, the very source of philosophical
ri ches, of what it is to understand.
One's mental eyes are
continually excited by those evidences, one of them the word now
o r rather the intelligible reality it evokes. The reality is indeed the
immovable axis on which everything else revolves in intelligent
life, including any discourse about behavior, intelligent or not. It
has of ten been stated that animals experience neither the past nor
the future. If this is so, it is only because they have no sense of
the present. The now which does not exist for them, exists for
humans and is the very factor that turns their particular mental
possessions into that whole which is more than the sum of its parts .
It is in terms of that whole that humans can conceive of the
Perfect Being, God, in whom all is present all the time and this is
why He is not touched by time, the great spoiling factor.
Compared with that eternal present, man's grasp of the now is
incredibly imperfect though still so reliable as to constitute in his
mental " mac hinery" (a place with incessant transformations) the
pivotal factor that remains unchanged.
This is why man's
conscious identity, his chief and most precious possession, is
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retained through incessant transformations, not only mental but also
physical, including the entire replacement of all atoms in his body
(and brain) in every seven years. Chesterton's definition of a
machine reveals its philosophical depth precisely because it can
illustrate even the "machinery" of the mind without turning it into
a machine. In addition to depth he also showed courage when long
before the appearance of computers he labeled the expression
"thinking machine" as a "baseless phrase of modern fatalism and
materialism." A machine, he added, "only is a machine because it
cannot think."72 As to those who can take basic philosophical
advice only when it is offered by a prominent physicist, they
would do well to ponder Einstein's remark, targeted at no less a
logical positivist than Carnap, that the now completely escapes the
net of physics.73
What, indeed, would be a formalization, even remotely
convincing, of the now? For if an electrical impulse, or a given
dot on the screen, is taken to represent the now, do not thereby all
such impulses and dots become representative of the now and make
meaningless its arbitrarily chosen "formalist" representation?
Similar questions could be raised about such words as nevertheless,
if, but, however, and, last but not least, about as, a tiny word that
carries on its back an enormous variety of conceptual relations.
And what about signs of punctuation? They should seem so
easy to formalize as they are but mere forms, yet the intangible
nuances of meaning they are meant to convey are all too often
hopelessly elusive to a formalist representation. An exclamation
mark gives itself away and so does a quotation mark. Yet in both
cases a sense of impotency should be felt if some proportion were
to be found between the formalization and the shift in meaning
those marks can bring about. Thus the distance should seem
enormous between the unimportance suggested by a cursory "don't
mention it" and the crucial importance of a "don't mention it!"
The difference between God and "God" is abysmal and so is the
one between God and god, whereas most computers operate on the
basis that there is no difference between upper case and lower case.
A mere comma can turn the confidence of "God save the Queen"
into a cry of desperation: "God, save the Queen."74 Efforts at
formalization should seem doomed to failure if it is true, as H. W.
Fowler, the arbiter of the King's English, stated that a comma
"separates the inseparables." 75
Phrases of this kind, undoubtedly paradoxical, are instances of
the mind's inventiveness that should seem magical, if not plainly

absurd, from the reductionist viewpoint.

Prospects for finding

some formalization of that inventiveness are nowhere in sight.
Furthermore, ever fresh evidences of the inexhaustible riches of
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that inventiveness turn up continually. One of the pleasures of
keeping up with the latest and best in novels and poetry is to come
across ever new verbal virtuosities, whereby insights, situations,
motives, fears and hopes come alive in a light never seen before.
The average reader can savor at regular intervals either in The New
York Times Magaz ine76 or in the R eader's Digest77 fresh offerings
about the latest exploits in the use of language that should make
computer programmers groan with despair. The delight or plight
of teaching English has in part to do with being exposed to some
hilarious misuse of words and errors in spelling that turn up in
term papers.
College-bound students can come up with the
declaration that they want to be "bilingual in three or more
languages" or with their desire to be "weight-listed," or with a
gently needling " needles to say."78
As to the last two cases a computer can easily be programmed to
be led to the proper expression as the differences are but slight
between the incorrect and correct forms. The day may not be far
when computerized author listings will bring up the right author
even if his or her name has been slightly misspelled. The problem
represented by the improper use of bilingual is far more complex.
To cope with it the programmer has to pay attention to the large
variety in which bilingual can be connected with names of
languages and various groups of them.
Programming subtle
paradoxical nuances may present so great a difficulty as to appear
insurmountable.
TEN GUIDELINES ABOUT Al
In view of all this, nothing is more tempting than to oppose Al
on the ground that practically impossible may seem the task of
programming into computers the kind of information that goes
considerably beyond the use of purely quantitative terms. 79 Such a
temptation must be resisted for a reason far more serious than the
prospect of making a wrong bet. In fact, if guidelines are to be set
for dealing with the cultural malaise embodied in AI, the first
should be the following: Don't insist unnecessarily on the enormous
complexity of formalization connected with ordinary human
discourse and reasoning .
Undoubtedly, insistence on that difficulty can effectively cut to
size brash spokesmen of AI and deny them undeserved
psychological advantage. But the same insistence may undermine
the merits of a truly dualist view of man as outlined above.
According to that view, all workings of the human mind , insofar as
they are conveyed, that is, made known, have sensory aspects
which lend themselves to various degrees of formalization.
A
co mplete listing, for the purposes of programming, of all those
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aspects may forever lie beyond the combined practical capabilities
of all human talents, but great advances along these lines have been
made and even more of them will come, and at an accelerated rate.
A genuine dualist should never become a crypto-manichean
suspicious of technology and even of that technology-on-paper,
which is programming. Insistence on the failures of programming
should never serve as the basis of defense of the existence of the
human mind . Such a basis would prove as counterproductive as
did those arguments in which shortcomings of physical science
were taken for a justification to invoke God. Holes in scientific
knowledge have an uncanny way of being filled up and leave
shortsighted divines stranded. Formalization, too, will proceed by
leaps and bounds.
The second guideline is that while with respect to formalization
one should be most generously minded, one should not yield an
inch, not even the fraction of an inch, on the essential issue of
understanding. That issue is the priority of understanding over the
formalization of what is understood. Those who oppose AI on any
other ground inevitably give away the game. They do not fail to
demonstrate the dire consequence of dangling one's hand through
the bars of a lion's cage. Two cases have already been mentioned .
One is the denying to computers wisdom and creativity while
grant ing them ordinary understanding or intelligence. The other is
to grant to computers the ability to know but not the ability to
experience purpose. A third one is the granting to computers the
ability to make some modest discoveries but not the ones that
represent a real breakthrough.so The computer no more discovers
anything than does a slide rule or an abacus.
The third guideline relates not to the difficulties of
formalization but to the claims according to which AI has been
achieved in whatever rudimentary form . While the countering of
those claims is ultimately a philosophical task, psychologically a
most effective use can be made of blunt appraisals of the state of
art by some leaders in computer programming. One of those
appraisals was heard in the full glare of publicity at the 1984
conference of the computer-science community in San Francisco.
There Herbert Grosch, a member of the advisory board of the
Association for Computer Management, minced no words: "The
emperor, whether we call him fifth-generation project or artificial
intelligence, is stark from the ankles up. Or to put it in the
vernacular, most of what we're talking about is a bunch of crap.
Now I said from the ankles up. From the ankles down the emperor

is wearing a well-worn and sturdy pair of shoes ...and we call them
expert systems ... they are good. We need lots and lots of expert
systems. And we'll grind them out the way we've been grinding
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them out for thirty years. We won't generate them with magic.
We won't generate them with artificial intelligence."81
The
effectiveness of recalling outspoken criticisms of AI that may
appear too negative, can greatly be strengthened with references to
some scathing words which basically sympathetic critics of AI
offered about some programs embodying conve rsati o nal
understanding: "I have just said," M. Boden wrote, "that PARRY
is a fraud. This is fair comment also on ELIZA, to whom human
interlocutors typically attribute a good deal of common sense and
reasoning ability."&2
The fourth guideline is about the paramount importance of
seeing through the hollowness of the rhetoric of advocates of Al.
Whenever they admit the substantial failure of this or that project,
they credit the failure with great advances as well. A case in point
is the statement Michael Brady of MIT made in 1985 about the
status of robotics: "Robotics is the intelligent connection of
perception to action .... We've barely scratched the surface. It is
going to be a long haul for hundreds of years to get to anything
with the same kind of capabilities as man. On the other hand ,
there has been some damn spectacular work in the last five or ten
years."83 A curious scratching of the surface that, admittedly, was
but barely touched . The interview, of which Brady's words formed
a part, was presented under the title, "Today's robots have to be
told." Obviously Brady could not convince the reporter that the
wall separating non-intelligence from intelligence has bee n pie rced
by robotics, however slightly.
Especially much should be made, and this is the fifth guideline ,
of the occasional admission by AI advocates about a pressing need
for clarifying basic philosophical questions. " We do have problems," stated Edward Feigenbaum, "and they could be illuminated
by a first-class philosopher." Typically, Feigenbaum failed to spell
out those problems as he saw them . He could think "of only one,
perhaps two philosophers who have the grasp of what AI and
computing are all about, and also know philosophy." They were of
no use, according to him, because both were busy with their own
problems and not with the basic philosophical problems posed by
Al. Clearly, such was a transparently cheap way of coping with a
situation, which, and here Feigenbaum was on target, could not be
cleared up with Dreyfus's phenomenology, aptly described by
Fe igenbaum as "that ball of fluff! That cotton candy!"84
The sixth guideline is that only by being steeped in moderate or
methodical realism can one cope with false philosophical criticisms
of claims about Al. The most talked about of those criticisms is
the one offered by Dreyfus who falsifies Aristotle by turning him
into a forerunner of Descartes!85 By taking Aristotle for an

Language, Logic, Logos

123

intu1t10nist, he ignores Aristotle the realist and the very reason for
which Aristotle was a critic of Plato insofar as the latter was a
rationalist. But if one can ignore that difference between Plato and
Aristotle, the far greater difference between Aristotle and
Descartes will appear non-existent. Furthermore, nothing will then
transpire about the straight road that led from Descartes's
rationalism (a subtle form of the priority of the formal and
mathematical over the physical or ontologically real) to De la
Mettrie's sheer materialism.86
The farce is then crowned by
Dreyfus's effort to overcome the dehumanizing materialist
consequences of Al ideology by opting for a covert materialism.
To be sure, human thinking is a reality only because the mind
operates in and through a body. Dreyfus rightly emphasizes the
bodily parameters of the expression of any perception and
judgment.
They are indeed omnipresent, enormously large in
number, and interconnected in staggeringly complex ways. But this
does not turn the act of understanding into a mere bodily or
physical process, however complex. Yet Dreyfus would be the last
to take the mind for a reality essentially different from the body,
however closely connected with it.87 No wonder. Phenomenology,
which he takes for a guide, has been notorious for blocking
genuinely metaphysical perspectives and has served all too often as
a specious excuse to disregard them.
The seventh guideline is methodical realism which is a dogged,
systematic resolve to recall at every juncture the basics in
epistemology. This procedure is the only safe guide when it comes
to criticisms of AI that are dressed more in scientific than in
philosophical terms. The chief among them is the one offered by
Godel, author of the famous incompleteness theorems in
mathematics that formed the center of many debates about Al.
This is not the place to sum up, however briefly, those debates.88
Let it merely be noted that, according to those theorems, no set of
mathematical propositions can have its proof of consistency within
itself. Herein lies a feature , which a machine obviously cannot
em body, namely, to "go outside itself'' for a proof of its
consistency which it must have or else it would not work in a
genuinely machine-like manner.
Only those overawed by mathematics or formalization see a
crucial argument against AI in those theorems. They do so by
taking them for a proof that there is at least one thing a man can
do that a machine cannot. Severed from sound epistemology that
argument does not amount to much. Godel, in fact, provided a
telling illustration of this as he granted to computers the ability to
know, though with the meager proviso that the ability in question
will not include mathematical certainty. 89
Clearly, Godel
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overlooked the elementary fact that it is the immediate certainty
(never achieved with the aid of mathematics) of knowing ordinary
external reality that alone assures the applicability of mathematics
to physical reality, including the ability to talk about it to other
real beings.
Certainty of knowledge severed from that reality will easily
become a feature of the solipsist heaven. In fact, it is that
solipsism which threatens to engulf Popper's scorn for computers as
so many "glorified pencils"90 and his criticism of them as thinking
machines. The criticism is aimed at Turing's challenge or the claim
that any specified, that is, formalized way of man's superiority
over computers can be shown to be computerizable. Against that
challenge Popper offered the distinction between specifiability or
formalizability and subjective experience. This distinction, as it
stands in Popper's phrasing, cannot cope with the fact that the
subjective, as such, can never be communicated. For once it is
communicated, it takes on tangible, that is, specifiable or
formalizable aspects. Popper would not, however, admit, and for
strictly antimetaphysical reasons, that the act of verbalizing an
intellectual judgment represents a unity of mind and matter, of the
unformalizable and of the formalizable . By taking refuge in the
"subjective," which he does not identify with an objectively
existing mind or soul, Popper can only warn that "Turing's
challenge should not be taken up,"91 a warning that counsels resolve
not to meet one's opponent head-on.
In debating with advocates of AI, and this is the eighth
guideline, one should remain especially aware of the difference
be twee n proofs and convincing.
Proofs, however sound in
themselves, can be convincing, that is, effective with a real
opponent only if reality as such is acknowledged as the ground of
any proof. Anyone who is unwilling to admit the primacy of
man's grasp of reality either when he thinks or when he acts for a
purpose, makes himself immune to arguments about the inanity of
Al.
That by the same unwillingness one locks himself into
solipsism has, of course, its own instructiveness, though onl y for
the realist.
The solipsist is a philosophical narcissist who,
enamored of his own mental physiognomy, grows unappreciative of
the real world around him. In view of what has been said about
AI as an invitation to solipsism, advocates of AT fully dese rve
Chesterton's devastating "Cherish it!"--his reply to one who
extolled solipsism as the best of all philosophies .92
The ninth guideline calls for courage to call a spade a spade .
The daring may seem outrageous, but hardly unnecessary in a
society that merrily marches down the road to anarchy. The march
is to the tune of brass bands composed of academics who have
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been busy trumpeting that exclusive attention to quantitatively
specifiable patterns is the only posture with intellectual
respectability.93 Such a pattern is on hand whenever a behavior, no
matter how queer, is acted upon in a statistically significant
number. From there it is but a short step to claims to legal
recognition and protection, as on the basis of mere patterns, so
many pure formalizations, everything becomes a mere machinery,
with no allowance for distinctions between the morally good and
the morally evil.
Hence the steady erosion of sensitivity for
hallowed principles, as if they were so many words, and the
growing readiness to grant social respectability to any behavior,
provided it establishes itself as a pattern.
The measure to which Al ideology is fueling that s101strous
decay of modern society should seem obvious. To oppose that
subversive trend the least one should do is to imitate the courage of
Winston Churchill, not a great philosopher by any standard but
certainly alert to threats which so many of his contemporaries
preferred to ignore.
On being presented, in 1949, with an
honorary degree at MIT, an early stronghold of AI research,
Churchill had to listen to the oration of the dean of humanities
who boldly predicted, with an eye on computers and biochemistry,
the complete control of human mind and will within the
foreseeable future. In accepting the honor conferred upon him,
Churchill acidly remarked that he "would be content to be dead
before that happens."94
Courageous remarks are not, however, enough, which is the very
point of the tenth and last guideline. One may wonder whether
Churchill was sufficiently aware of the debt which his sense of
human dignity owed to Christian cultural tradition. Yet, even
more frequently than in Churchill's days is the brave claim made in
purely secularist circles that the unconditional dignity of the
individual can be secured on grounds that exclude religious
perspectives. Historically, the matter should be clear. Sophocles
could compose admirable choruses about the marvel which is man
and especially about the marvel of human speech, but he remained
perplexed in the face of Antigone's single-minded commitment to
moral ideals. His perplexity was part of a surrender to a blind
Fate engulfing all human beings and above all their dignity.9S
Escape from that dead end came only when the human word
was found to be a worthy means for carrying mere man into God's
innermost life. Belief in the Word (Logos), eternally uttered by the
Father, has become the salvation of human words as well. Only in

that perspective have those words remained immune to being
degraded into mere tools of facile intellectual games, all aimed at
undermining the intellect itself. Such games systematically cater to
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infatuation with the moment, so different from the now
transcending the succession of moments.
Hence the
irreconcilability of a view of the mind, trapped in those games,
with the vision of Christ as one who is the same yesterday, today
and forever (Heb 13:8). The eternal now which is Christ is the
inspiration behind the motto, stat crux dum volvitur orbis, engraved
on the obelisk at the center of St Peter' s Square in Rome, a motto
evocative of Chesterton's view of the machine, be that machine of
cosmic dimensions.
Those unwilling to follow this theological train of thought may
not be equally reluctant to take a closer than customary look at
scientific history. Advocates of Al are wont to look at the alleged
advent of AI as the culmination of man's scientific progress. They
still have to face up to an apparently most untheological question
about science: Why did science, the great pride and advantage of
the Western world, not arise in any of the great ancient cultures?
The question should seem all the more important as the rise of
science in ancient China or India would have greatly changed the
course of world history. Few things are indeed as instructive as
the desperate efforts in the modern counterparts of those cultures
to catch up with Western science and the various explanations given
there for their backwardness.%
Any serious probing into these topics brings up, however,
questions about world views and with them theology, too. In all
those cultures the world view was dominated by emanationism
which invariably implies the growing absence of order and
rationality as the chain of being extends farther and farther from
the source of emanation, however divine. It was only with belief
in that Word or Logos--as is clear from the writings of Athanasius
who fully perceived in Arianism a potential backsliding into
emanationism--that there came a categorical assertion about the
full rationality of a world created by a fully divine Logos.97 Was
not that cosmic rationality--so alien to the Greeks of old who took
the sublunary realm for the arena of partial disorder--the very
precondition for seeing the fall of an apple and of the moon as
expression of the same law?
Was not empirical investigation
sparked precisely because a given set of created physical laws could
be seen as contingent, that is, only one among an infinitely large
number of possible sets of laws, all available for the free choice of
a truly transcendental, personal Creator? Was not belief in the
createdness of man's mind to the image of such a Creator the
source of confidence that man's words, the tangible signs of his
intellect, can truly grasp the laws of a universe no less created than
was man's mind?98 And was not that createdness best safeguarded
among all monotheistic religions in the one in which the work of
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creation was assigned to the Word?99
In That Hideous Strength, C. S. Lewis offers a remark couched
in medieval garb about those who lose their hold on human words
because of their growing insensitivity to God's word.100 Modern
secularized culture, which wallows in mental contortions
(poignantly evoked by Escher's drawingslOI) to make the idea of AI
respectable, certainly illustrates this point. But those ready to make
that point and appreciative of not yet being engulfed in a global
vortex of irrationality, must have an eye for the other side of the
coin as well. (That a coin has two sides to it may seem obvious,
but only the Word of God made an emphatic recall of that
elementary truth, another memorable proof of His being a
safeguard of rational balance). If indeed our cultural debt to that
Word or Logos is immense, we must be logical to the point of
realizing our intellectual duties as well.
Those duties are part of that Christian worship about which Paul
enjoined that it should be a logike latreia, or a reasoned worship
(Romans 12: 1). While Paul did not recommend logic chopping, he
certainly did not suggest a timid , let alone a suspicious recourse to
reason.1°2 History is a witness that a steadying hold on the Word of
God always implied a firm resolve to vindicate the human word as
a reliable tie with intelligible reality, physical and spiritual, human
and divine. Such a view of reality is the basis of that salvation
which safeguards man's ability to wonder in the broadest sense.
Wonderment is not only the condition of that love of wisdom, to
recall the very opening of Aristotle's Metaphysics, which is
philosophy, but also the mental stance that alone can do justice to
the wonder which is any machine, primitive or sophisticated.
It is that wonder which is turned into a pseudo-admiration
within the ideology supportive of AI and therein lies its sin against
humanity. For as Chesterton put it in his Heretics: "The wrong is
not that engines are too much admired, but that they are not
admired enough. The sin is not that engines are mechanical, but
that men are mechanicaJ."103 Whereas machines cannot sin, a chief
of man's sins has become his abuse of machines. Recent history is
in fact a record of tragic abuses of artifacts that in themselves are
but so many wonders of human inventiveness. In view of this
disheartening past, contemplation of the future should be full of
foreboding about possible abuses of that machine, which, though
perhaps the most wondrous among all of man's machines, should be
best called a mere logic machine.
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my Chance or Reality and Other Essays (Lanham, MD: University of America Press,
1986).
44. Hence the inordinate praises accorded to Boole, the founder of mathematical logic,
in books favorable to Al, such as, for instance, G. Johnson, Machinery of the Mind:
Inside the Ne w Science of Artificial Intelligence (Redmond, WA: Tempus Book, 1986),
pp. 38-39, and P. McCorduck, Machines Who Think, pp. 40-41.
45. For a discussion of the anti-objectivist and anti-realist biases of the Copenhagen
school, see chap. 13, "The Homs of Complementarity," in my Gifford Lectures, The
Road of Science and the Ways to God (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978) or
its paperback reprints.
46. For a short and non-technical discussion, see ibid., p. 411 .

47. My reference is, of course, to Allan D . Bloom's greatly overvalued book (New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), see especially pp. 377-378.
48. Details of this are masterfully presented and documented in E. Gilson's A History
of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages.
49. Such as creation out of nothing and in time, and the strictly personal characteristic
of the Prime Mover.
50. In commending, not enthusiastically though, the word "consubstantial" in his
Institutes (I. 13. 5), Calvin does not face up to the crucial question about the apparent
ineffectiveness of the scriptural term "monogenes" in the Arian controversies.
51. A main target of A. Koestler's The Ghost in the Machine (New York: Macmillan,
1967).
52. Minsky's words, quoted by B. Darrach, see note 10 above, p. 68.
53. As done by Boden, see note 38 above.

54. Thus J. Weizenbaum in his Computer Power and Huma11 R eason: From Judgment to
Calculation (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1976): "However much intelligence
computers may attain now or in the future, theirs must always be an intelligence alien
to genuine human problems and concerns" (p. 213).
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55. As, for instance, in H. G. Wells's devastating criticism of Herbert Spencer's
cosmogenesis: "He believed that individuality (heterogeneity) was and is an
evolutionary product from an original homogeneity, begotten by folding and
multiplying and dividing and twisting it, and still fundamentally it." First and Last
Things: A Confession of Faith and Rule of Life (London: Watts and Co., 1929), p. 30.
56. The Pythagorean of old who first noted the irreducibility to an integer of the square
root of the hypotenuse of a right-angled triangle with unit sides, committed suicide in
despair. Since then all that has been learned about the limitations of quantitative
method would allow for AI champions a less drastic escape from the clutches of an
irrationality of their own making.
57. Similar reflections could be sparked by a brief look at the 35 meanings listed in the
same dictionary in connection with the word "bite," which by its similarity in form (and
strict identity as a simple past and past participle to "bit") could easily turn matters
nightmarish for programmers.
58. N. A. Whitehead, Modes of Thought (1938; New York: G. P. Putnam, 1958), p. 235.

59. "Words are wise men's counters-they do but reckon by them; but they are the
money of the fools" (Hobbes, Leviathan, Part I, chap. 4). A grim reckoner like
Hobbes, could but make a mockery of wisdom. One wonders what interpretation
Hobbes would have given to the reasoning of the three Wise Men of the Nativity story.
60. Quoted from Weyl's lecture, "Knowledge as Unity," from the text of lectures
delivered at the Columbia University bicentenary celebration, October 1954, and
published under the title, The Unity of Knowledge, ed. L. Leary (Garden City, NY:
Doubleday, 1955), p. 22.

61. An expression of Halsted, quoted in B. L. Van der Waerden, Science Awakening, tr.
A. Dresden (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1963), p. 56.
62. P. Carus, "Logical and Mathematical Thought," The Monist 20 (1909-1910), p. 69.
63. In spite of the warning of Hilbert, a foremost admirer of Cantor's transfinite
numbers, that "the infinite is nowhere to be found in reality. It neither exists in nature
nor provides a legitimate basis for rational thought." D . Hilbert, "On the Infinite," in
Philosophy of Mathematics, ed. P. Benacerraf and H. Putnam (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice Hall, 1964), p. 151.
64. Throughout much of the nineteenth century and during the first decades of the
twentieth when the Milky Way was taken for the forever visible part of the infinite
universe. For details, see chap. 10, "The Myth of One Island," in my The Milky Way:
An Elusive Road for Science (New York: Science History Publications, 1976).

65. A. S. Eddington, New Pathways in Science (Cambridge: University Press, 1934), p.
217.
66. Quoted in P. J. Davies and R. Hersh, Desca11es' Dream: The World A ccording to
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Mathematics (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1986), p. 245.

67. D. R. Hofstadter, GOdel, Escher, Bach: an Eternal Golden Braid (New York: Basic
Books, 1979), p. 26. The subtitle, a vote on behalf of cosmic etemalism, was also
expressive of its interminable convolutedness, a facet aptly rendered by Escher's
drawings, but, contrary to Hofstadter, incompatible with the magnificent linear
architectonic of Bach's compositions.
68. As reported by R. Bernstein, "Philosophical Rift: A Tale of Two Approaches," The
New York Times, Dec. 29, 1987, pp. Al and A4. Quotations in this and the next
paragraph are taken from that report.
69. Such as E. Gilson, in particular.
70. Hofstadter, GOdel, Escher, Bach , p. 750.
71. This is all the more curious because he referred to the second edition of my book in
which that listing is succinctly given in a new Preface.
72. G. K. Chesterton, The Father Brown Stories (London: Cassell, 1929), p. 11 .
73. As reported by Carnap himself in his intellectual autobiography, The Philosophy of
Rudolf Carnap, ed. by P. A. Schilpp (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1963), pp. 37-38.
74. See Pico Iyer, "In Praise of the Humble Comma," Time, June 13, 1988, p. 80.
75. H. W. Fowler, Modem English Usage (1944; Oxford University Press, 1950), p. 567.
76. I mean, of course, William Safi.re's weekly column "On Language."
77. I mention the February 1987 issue which lay around in the room where I was
collecting my thoughts in preparation of this lecture. On p. 111 it contains a half-page
long section under the caption "One Good Thing... " illustrated with seven facetious
remarks, one of them being " ... about playing a piece of modem music is that, if you
make a mistake, no one notices."
78. See the excerpt from a communication by Richard Lederer of St Paul's School to
National Review, May 13, 1988, p. 16.
79. At present they cannot cope with the slightest misspelling, say, of an author's name,
as countless users of computerized library catalogues have already found out.
80. Anyone who follows carefully the steps of programming in the system called
BACON (developed by Gary Bradshaw, Pat Langley and Herbert Simon) can easily
see that the "discovery" by that system of Ohm's law, of Snell's law of refraction, and
of Kepler's third law of planetary motion was an inevitable consequence. Failure to
note this is only one of the several serious misconceptions in the article, "Computers
and the Nature of Man: A Historian's Perspective on Controversies about Artificial
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Intelligence" (Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society, Oct. 15, 1986, pp. 113126) by Judith V. Grabiner who systematically skirts basic questions of epistemology as
if mere historical perspectives were a satisfactory substitute to them. Even the
distinction between exaggerated and modest claims about Al (a distinction on which
Grabiner ultimately falls back) cannot be made unless an epistemological judgment is
made, however implicitly, about intelligence and understanding.
81. Quoted in G. Johnson, The Machinery of the Mind, p. 235. Grosch was applauded
by not a few in a gathering which Al advocates hoped to use as an undisputed platform
of publicity and propaganda. Sanity, it appears, has a greater presence in the computer
field than suggested by that systematic and sensationalist cultivation of half-truths,
equivocations and insinuations bordering on rank falsehood to which Pulitzer provided
so much respectability.
82. Boden, Artificial Intelligence and Natural Man , p. 106.
83. Quoted in G. Johnson, The Machinery of the Mind, p. 150. Only contempt is
deserved by T. Winogradow's phrase, "computers can only touch the shadow of what
we call emotion," quoted in Newsweek's cover story, "Machines That Think," June 30,
1980, p. 53, whereby he did not suggest that there is a shadow only if there is a thing,
but that the shadow is a part, however minute, of the thing itself.
84. Quoted in McCorduck, Machines u-'ho Think, p. 197.
85. He does so both in the revised edition of his u-'hat Computers Can't Do: The Limits
of Artificial Intelligence (New York: Harper and Row, 1979) and in his Mind over
Machine: The Po wer of Human Intuition and Expertise in the Era of the Computers
(New York: Free Press, 1986), see especially pp. 202-203, which he wrote jointly with
his brother, S. E. Dreyfus.
86. The development was carefully traced by Gilson in his The Unity of Philosophical
Experience (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937), pp. 174-175.
87. According to Dreyfus, it is the body that organizes and unifies "our experience of
objects." See u-'hat Computers Can 't Do, p. 234. In sum, Dreyfus's ultimate argument
agai.nst AI is that computers cannot grow into organisms comparable to human bodies.
88. For a summary, see my Brain, Mind, and Computers, pp. 214-216.
89. In fact, Godel granted the possibility that "there may exist (and even empirically
discoverable) a theorem-proving machine which in fact is equivalent to mathematical
intuition." The sole difference, according to Godel, between that machine and human
intellgience is that the former 'could not prove its intuition. Godel spoke in this vein in
his Josiah Willard Gibbs Lecture in Providence, Rhode Island, on December 26, 1951.
The foregoing quotation is from a somewhat longer passage from the manuscript of
Godel's lecture that first appeared in print in Hao Wang, From Mathematics to
Philosophy (New York: Humanities Press, 1974), p. 324.
90. A phrase which Popper used as early as 1950 and which he emphatically repeated
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in his The Self and Its Brain, written jointly with J. C. Eccles (New York: Springer
International, 1977), p. 208.
91. Ibid.
92. Maisie Ward, Return to Chesterton (London: Sheed & Ward, 1952), p. 130.
93. The principal parts of that brass band are behaviorists, sociobiologists, logical
positivists and linguistic philosophers.
94. Quoted in J. W. Kratch, The Measure of Man: On Freedom, Human Values,
Survival and the Modem Temper(lndianapol.is: Bobbs-Merrill, 1954), p. 45.
95. Sophocles' perplexity should seem particularly poignant when viewed against his
summary of man's excellence: "O clear intelligence, force beyond all measure"
(Antigone, Ode I, antistrophe 2).
96. A point discussed through chapters 1-0 and 9 of my Science and Creation: From
Etemal Cycles to an Oscillating Universe (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1974; 2d
enlarged ed., 1986) and in chap. 1 of my The Savior of Science (Washington DC:
Regnery-Gateway, 1988).
97. It was also on that ground that Athanasius opposed the idea of several universes
(see his Against the Heathen, 39), an idea whose blatant illogicality is still to be
perceived by many modem men of science.
98. Such is a consideration to which Galileo gave a pivotal role in his methodology of
science as can be seen in the concluding pages of the First Day of his Dialogue
conceming the Two Chief World Systems. Conversely, the absence of that consideration
among Chinese of old was singled out by J. Needham as the cause of their failure to
formulate science.
99. For a discussion of the dogma of Incarnation as a shield against pantheism within
genuine Christian contexts, see chap. 2 of my The Savior of Science.
100. C. S. Lewis, That Hideous Strength (1946; New York: Collier Books, 1962), p.
351. "Qui Verbum Dei contempserunt, eis auferetur etiam verbum hominis" or "They
that have despised the word of God, from them shall the word of man also be taken
away."
101. That Escher's world is worlds removed from Bach's can easily be seen by anyone
who tracks down in Hofstadter's rambling pages the mere one page he is able to offer
on the "similarity'' of the two. Typically, the "proof ' is Bach's Crab Canon, a simple
musical joke, and less than a mere drop in Bach's vast, and linearly lucid, creativity.
Bach's name in the very title of Hofstadter's book is typical of the intellectual flippancy
characteristic of Al advocates. That flippancy, which is refractory to any argument,
however cogent, received its most revealing, as well as self-defeating, formulation in
Good's idea that the gap between mind and computers will be closed"because we shalJ
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gradually make human thinking less mysterious and machine operations more so." See
his"Human and Machine lntelligence," p. 306.
102. Similar enjoining of the same rationality is 2 Corinthians 5:12, Colossians 4:6 and
1 Peter 3:15.
103. G. K. Chesterton, Heretics (London: John Lane, 1905), p. 140.

Book Reviews
Noll, Mark A. Between Faith and Criticism: Evangelicals,
Scholarship, and the Bible in America. Society of Biblical
Literature Confessional Perspectives Series. San Francisco:
Harper and Row, 1986. i-xiv. 255 pp. Select Bibliography.
Index. ISBN 0-0606-6302-2.
In this work, Wheaton historian Mark Noll traces American
Evangelicalism's stormy relationship with biblical criticism. After
defining his key terms and approach, particularly the definition of
"evangelical" (chap. 1), Noll moves into a chronological account of
evangelical involvement in critical biblical scholarship (chaps. 2-5).
After an initial period of vigorous response to criticism in the late
nineteenth century, evangelical biblical scholars steadily withdrew
from the arena of critical study and forged an uneasy alliance with
populist revivalism until around 1935. Assisted by their British
counterparts, American evangelicals began reentering the scholarly
arena, with the publication of Lane's Mark in the NICNT series
serving as a milestone, since it was the first American contribution
to that series. Noll then analyzes the present situation (chaps. 6-8)
and offers a series of suggestions and projections for the future.
The history is heavily documented and well told, and provides an
insightful analysis of the lovers' quarrel between evangelicals and
professional biblical criticism.
Evangelical biblical scholars,
especially, will find this story helpful for assessing their own
attitudes and aspirations. Lay readers will profit from a broader
awareness of the historical context in which a distinctive American
evangelical biblical scholarship arose and within which it functions.
Despite its obvious quality and value, certain limitations
characterize the work. First, the author is a historian, not a
biblical scholar, and does not evaluate the quality of evangelical
scholarly arguments, but looks only at credentials--a dubious
criterion. The crucial issue for the key players in the debates was,
however, the effectiveness of the arguments.
Many believe
evangelical conservatives at the turn of the century simply failed to
answer the emerging critical theories adequately, and thus
justifiably were excluded from subsequent debate. Again, the
author seldom differentiates "higher" criticism from text-critical,
linguistic and artifactual study. Evangelicals usually supported and
excelled in the latter, but seldom touched the former, except for
polemics. In OT studies, ancient Near Eastern languages and
archeology constitute the competence of most evangelicals who,
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nevertheless, address higher-critical questions in their publications.
But is the study of, say, Punic inscriptions really preparation to
evaluate source, form and redaction criticism? Are "credentials"
equated with qualifications?
Very few of the Old Testament
professors in Noll's survey studied at institutions where engagement
with critical, hermeneutical and theological questions formed an
inescapable aspect of graduate study. This gap in preparation
could explain the continuing problem specifically in evangelical Old
Testament studies and in evangelicals' failure to deal with the
substantive theological and hermeneutical difficulties described in
the final chapters.
While Noll's book is an excellent survey and analysis of the
presence and absence of evangelicals in critical biblical scholarship,
only a deeper probing of the underlying higher-critical issues and
arguments will finally reveal the reasons underlying the fluctuatin g
marginal status of evangelical biblical scholarship.
LAWSON G . STONE
Assistant Professor of Old Testament
Asbury Theological Seminary

Morris, Thomas V., ed. The Concept of God. Oxford University
Press, 1987. vi, 276 pp. $36.00, cloth; $13.95, paper.
ISBN 0-1987-5077-3.
The main relevance of this book to readers of this journal is
suggested by the following line from the Introduction: "In recent
years, numerous philosophers have talked about God with a degree
of confidence which, interestingly, is not to be found amongst
many professional theologians" (p. IO). The essays which follow
are an impressive demonstration of this claim and represent an
important development which has significant implications for the
future of theology.
In the past few decades, philosophers of religion have focused
on what Morris calls "broadly epistemological" issues such as
arguments for and against God's existence and the rationality of
religious belief. Lately, however, many philosophers have turned
their attention to matters more specifically theological. Much of
this work is being done by philosophers committed to the orthodox
Christian tradition. These philosophers are exploring afresh many
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of the topics treated by classical theologians and are producing
updated defenses of traditional doctrines.
In this volume, Thomas Morris has brought together some of the
outstanding recent work dealing with the divine nature. Some of
the topics treated here have been largely neglected or abandoned in
contemporary theology. For instance, there is the doctrine of
divine simplicity, a popular doctrine in medieval theology, which
maintains that God has no "parts" or components of any kind. In
his essay entitled "Simplicity and Immutability in God," William E.
Mann argues that the doctrine of divine simplicity can help us
understand how God can be both immutable and active. The
doctrine of simplicity is highly controversial and has been criticized
by a number of other philosophers, including Morris. Mann's essay
is a good entry into this discussion.
Most of the essays deal with more familiar themes such as divine
goodness, omnipotence and omniscience. All these attributes have
generated puzzles and difficulties for traditional theism and a
number of the essays address these difficulties. Robert M. Adams's
important paper "Must God Create the Best?" makes the case that
God need not create the best possible world He could create in
order to be perfectly good. The claim that God is omnipotent
seems to entail the theologically unacceptable consequence that God
is able to sin. In "Maximal Power," Thomas P. Flint and Alfred J.
Freddso articulate a rigorous account of omnipotence which avoids
this problem. And , in a typically masterful paper entitled "On
Ockham's Way Out," Alvin Plantinga defends divine foreknowledge
against the common charge that it is incompatible with human
freedom .
Not all the essays, however, are written from the standpoint of
traditional theistic belief. In his contribution, David Blumenfeld
maintains that the attributes of maximal power and maximal
knowledge are incompatible, so the traditional concept of God is
contradictory, and hence, not possibly true. And, in a fascinating
piece entitled "Does Traditional Theism Entail Pantheism?," Robert
Oakes returns an affirmative answer to the question he raises. His
title, however, is somewhat deceptive, for what Oakes ends up
claiming is that traditional theism entails Berkleyan Idealism.
The volume is a recent addition to the well-known Oxford
Readings in Philosophy series. It contains twelve essays in all, as
well as a very helpful Introduction which clearly summarizes the
current debate about the nature of God . A few of these are rather
technical and would be hard going for those without a
philosophical background. However, the sections which include
difficult papers also include more accessible ones which facilitate
understanding of the more difficult.
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The book is a valuable resource for anyone interested in
disciplined thinking about God. It would be an excellent text not
only for courses in philosophy of religion, but also systematic
theology.
JERRY L. WALLS
Assistant Professor of Philosophy of Religion
Asbury Theological Seminary

Froehlich, Karlfried, ed. and trans. Biblical Interpretation in the
Early Church . Sources of Early Christian Thought. Philadelphia:
Fortress Press, 1984. viii, 135 pp. $12.95. ISBN 0-8006-1414-3.
The series, Sources of Early Christian Thought, seeks to provide
students with access to texts crucial for understanding the
development of the Christian tradition. Froehlich, Benjamin B.
Warfield Professor of Ecclesiastical History at Princeton Theological
Seminary, has contributed a concise introduction to early Christian
exegesis and illustrated that analysis with selections from the
following texts: (I) Sifra-The Exegetical Rules (Middot) of Rabbi
Ishmael and Rabbi Hillel; (2) Ptolemy, Letter to Flora from
Epiphanius's Panarion, 33; (3) Irenaeus, Against Heresies, Bk.
4.26.1-4; (4) Origen, On First Principles , Bk. 4.1.1-4 .3.15; (5)
Papyrus Michigan Inv. 3 718, a list of ..standard" Christian
allegorizations of biblical texts including Matt 19:24, Matt 13:33,
John 2: I, Luke 3:8, Prov 13: 14 and other miscellaneous proverbs;
(6) Diodore of Tarsus, Prologue to the Commentary on the Psalms;
(7) Diodore of Tarsus, Preface to the Commentary on Psalm J 18 ;
(8) Theodore of Mopsuestia, Commentary on Galatians 4:22-31; and
(9) Tyconius, The book of Rules, l-3 .
The introduction (pp. l -29) surveys the history of Christian
exegesis during the patristic period and comments on the selected
The presentation of the issues and the
illustrative texts.
interpretation of the various writers are cautious and conservative.
The essay does not reflect, for example, the ongoing debates about
the position of Marcion and his canon in the history of Christian
thought, and retains the somewhat too rigid bifurcation between
On the other hand,
Alexandrian and Antiochene exegesis.
Froehlich does an admirable job of suggesting relationships
between the diverse schools of thought and regions of the Empire.
Unfortunately, this does not extend to the Syriac-speaking church.
For example, although Ephrem of Syria thought carefully about the
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methods and uses of exegesis, his work is not discussed.
Other issues which might have been addressed are those of the
genre in which exegetical results are presented, and the socioecclesiastical function of the genre within the Christian community.
Both form and function were influential in the development of
hermeneutics.
These suggestions are not intended to detract from a very useful
volume. At last, theological students have available a succinct,
reliable, well-written and inexpensive introduction to the
complexities of early Christian exegesis.
The well-chosen
bibliography will serve as a guide to further reading.
DAVID BUNDY
Assistant Professor of Christian Origins
Asbury Theological Seminary

Dayton, Donald W. Theological Roots of Pentecostalism. Grand
Rapids: Zondervan, 1987. $19.95. 199 pp. ISBN 0-310-39371-X.
For the general reader, this volume will set the Pentecostal
movement in its theological context within an extremely complex
nineteenth-century American religious history. Such an exercise is
especially critical for a proper understanding of evangelical revival
movements, because so frequently they regard themselves as having
come into existence de novo. The tendency for such movements to
ignore or even deny their historical and theological rootage is more
common in America than elsewhere. Our experience as a nation of
immigrants and our consequent separation from old homelands and
cultures fuels an emphasis on the "now" among us which in turn
generates the sense of "historylessness" of which Sydney Mead has
reminded us so forcefully.
No American revival movement has been more prone to this
"historyless" understanding of itself than Pentecostalism. And no
feature of the movement lies more at the crux of this de novo claim
than the essential character which it gives to the witness of
glossolalia as the only valid sign of Spirit Baptism--a phenomenon
so new to the whole of Christian history that efforts of Pentecostal
scholars to establish any regularity, even of its exceptional practice,
remain unconvincing. Therefore, when Dayton makes this feature
a matter of non-consideration in his treatment of the movement, he
is striking at the heart of the hermeneutical problem. Only in this
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way can he get at the legitimate historical and theological roots of
the movement within the complex of American Revivalism in the
nineteenth century.
This procedural device, however, creates the greatest weakness
in the book in that Dayton does not explicitly come back to tie in
the significance of this most distinguishing characteristic of the
movement to the main interpretive categories he has utilized
throughout the volume. He is on solid ground when he claims that
all late-nineteenth century Evangelicalism was only a "hair'sbreadth" from Pentecostalism, but he fails to indicate how radical a
step those holiness and higher-life advocates took who crossed that
thin line and made glossolalia the necessary and only authenticating
sign of Spirit baptism. The Pentecostal pioneers' unique claims for
this sign-gift radically transformed the dynamics of the complex of
historical theological categories, contained within the "Four- fold
Gospel," from the way that complex operated within the context of
the Holiness Revival where it first arose. The change was so
critical that the Wesleyan/ Holiness Movement was the first to sense
an abrupt historical and theological disjunction between itself and
the new Pentecostal Revival.
It is at this pivotal point, the witness of glossolalia, that we
arrive at the essence of the movement's de nova understanding of
its place in Christian history.
At that juncture, the early
Pentecostals- -some consciously and others unconsciously- -broke
with Christian history. Their understanding of the "Four-fold
Gospel" became so much more radically restitutionist and
eschatological that most of their fellow "Four-fold Gospel"
advocates failed to relinquish their more reformationist,
historically-focused sense of mission to follow them. It is the
former mind-set, or the lack of it, which created the strong
theological tensions which have existed between the historical
churches and Pentecostalism. These tensions, unfortunately, have
become more bitter than those between Pentecostalism and many
other bodies. This antagonism arose more because of common
roots than in spite of them.
One indication of the critical role which glossolalia plays as the
sole sign for Spirit Baptism in this analysis is the difference found
in the self-understanding of those adherents of the more recent
charismatic movement who regard the witness of the gift of
glossolalia as only one of a number of identifying signs. Such a
stance allows a much broader historical and theological selfunderstanding. Hence, there seems to be an easier accommodation
of persons in that movement to other evangelical groups, who
accept some aspects of the current charismatic focus upon gifts of
the Spirit, but not their tendency toward accommodation to
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traditional Pentecostalism.
The more pluralistic charismatic
understanding is utterly unacceptable to traditional Pentecostalism
because it would irreparably dissolve its critical point of distinction
from its holiness and higher-life familial rootage.
Dayton's excellent analysis of nineteenth century revivalistic
theology, however, serves the student of the Holiness Revival just
as well as the person who seeks an understanding of Pentecostalism.
He reminds us once again of what is now almost a truism--that the
roots of the latter movement lie, in the main, in the nineteenthcentury Methodist Holiness Revival.
As a result, the essay
represents the most comprehensive and definitive presentation of
the theological development of the Holiness Revival which we have
to date. With clarity and plausibility, the account wends its way
through the intricacies of the complex theological influence and
counter-influence between American New School Calvinistic
Revivalism and Methodist Holiness Revivalism .
It contributes
especially to a better understanding of how extensively Methodist
Arminianism and Perfectionism permeated all American religion in
the nineteenth century, especially through the holiness/ higher-life
revival.
There is a consistent leit motif in the presentation which will be
as interesting to Wesleyan scholars as is the central theme of the
work. It plays out in Dayton's constant comparisons and contrasts
between Wesley's positions and those subsequently adopted by the
myriad of Holiness, Higher-Life and Pentecostal Holiness
movements which recognize him as father or, at least, as
grandfather.
Dayton's interpretation of subsequent theological
developments among these Wesleyan kinfolk attempts to determine
the extent to which they modify, or contradict, Wesley's own
purported positions.
Limitations of space obviously make any
extensive analysis of the stance of either party at any given point
difficult at best. The lack of evidence at ma ny points provides
illusive hope for any more informed conclusions than have already
been reached. Nevertheless, the impression persists that Dayton too
readily separates Wesley from what seem to be the logical
consequences of his own often radical positions. The degree to
which he committed himself, within the confines of his own
religio us milieu, to positions very parallel to related positions taken
by his namesakes , in the context of their own later milieu, may be
too readily diminished in the effort to suit a thesis of radical
modification.
In summary, the volume effectively represents the conclusions of
Dayton's own twenty years of scholarship in the area of American
Wesleyan/ Holiness/ Pentecostal studies in interaction with others in
the field with whom he has been in intensive dialogue over these
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years. The result is a book that incites new discussion equal in
intensity to that surrounding the older questions it helps lay to rest.
Pentecostals and Wesleyans, as well as all students of American
religion, must take his thesis into account in any further
meaningful analyses of nineteenth-century religious history and the
Wesleyan revival movements which today comprise such a large
sector of Protestant Evangelicalism.
MEL VIN E. DIETER
Professor of Church History and Historical Theology
Asbury Theological Seminary

